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Part I
General Introduction
“Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything. A country’s
ability to improve its standard of living over time depends almost entirely on its ability to
raise its output per worker.” (Krugman (1994, p. 11))
As the 2008 winner of the Nobel Prize in the field of economics clearly points out, economic development
and the evolution of mankind is deeply interconnected with productivity and its trend over time. It
not only defines the standard of living but also provides the conditions for the business environment
by implicitly shaping the technological premises of production processes. By doing so, technology and
productivity work as natural boundaries on the road to prosperity (OECD (2015b, preface)). Even
more, they can significantly limit the growth path and the standard of living in the future. Representing
a potential economic bottleneck, for economic growth it is of central concern to fully exploit the
technological opportunities and productivity forces - so to speak, to unbound the prometheus1.
Economic welfare, expressed as levels and growth rates of gross domestic product per capita,
therefore roots in the productivity forces. Moreover, and as neoclassical growth theory has stated,
in a steady state growth in income per capita is impossible without the existence of technological
progress. Undoubtedly, implementing new and improved technologies in the production process, like
in the course of the invention of the internal combustion engine by Jean-Joseph Ètienne Lenoir in 1858,
has clearly raised overall productivity, output and therefore the wealth of nations. Griliches (1987,
p. 1), in this context, defines (aggregate economic) wealth among others as the knowledge of how to
convert the input quantities into the desired output goods. That point clearly describes what we would
identify with technology - in some way, the ’blueprints’ of the production process. Moreover and in
order to quantify technological progress by the translation into aggregate economic productivity, Zvi
Griliches states that:
“Measuring technological change is of interest because, in a sense, it defines our wealth
1With regard to Landes (2003).
1
and puts limits on what we can accomplish.” (Griliches (1987, p. 1))
Being confronted with the data for many developed economies nowadays, declining rates of growth in
productivity have to be noted for (at least) the last two decades. Over time, average annual growth
rates of gross domestic product per capita have been cut in half for Germany on a decade-by-decade
comparison2. For other countries, similar patterns can be outlined. Decreasing productivity not
only puzzles but exhibits the challenge to shed light on the forces faltering economic development.
Otherwise, the fruits of economic well-being will be out of reach for future generations.
In order to contribute to the illumination of the productivity puzzles, the present study tackles
the nexus of productivity, technology and economic development. The two main purposes include an
exploration into the quantification of technology in economic theory and an elaboration on the implicit
forces shaping productivity. The former question elaborates on the nature of the variable, commonly
used to express technology - which is total factor productivity (TFP), the latter question discusses
two potential strands of explanations for decreasing rates of productivity. Hereby, it asks whether real
economic reasons contain explanatory power or whether the productivity puzzle is just illusory and a
result of incorrect measurement in national accounts.
By doing so, the present study’s aim and contribution are to analyse and possibly reduce measure-
ment errors for the explanation of productivity puzzles. Moreover, it points on definitory problems
of the exact content of the TFP-residual and finally evaluates on the environmental conditions for
the German economy. The latter then offers potential for policy-makers to critically reflect on these
conditions and execute appropriate policy actions.
In a first step (part II), the history and evolution of TFP are presented, starting with the works of
Cobb and Douglas (1928) on production functions back in the 1920s. Works by Jan Tinbergen (1942)
and Robert Solow(1956; 1957) then mark the next milestone in the history of growth accounting -
the analytical framework to decompose economic growth into its contributors. As a result of the
decomposition, TFP was calculated as a residual and since then seen as a representative of technology.
The consecutive debate on the nature of this residual has formed the discussion on whether the TFP-
2As the empirical section of the present study will show, the average annual growth rate for 1971-1980 has been 2.8%,
whereas nowadays it is only 1.4% for 2006-2015 (see chapter 8).
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residual is an equivalent of technology, just related to technology or a melting pot of sources, which
economic theory is not (yet) able to identify.
Assuming that TFP is related to effects of technology in any way, the second point of interest
(part III) then shapes the discussion of two potential strands of explanation. On the one hand,
there is the hypothesis of incorrect (or insufficient) measurement frameworks. If mismeasurement in
national accounts can be corrected for, then the current productivity slowdown must be illusory. Of
main interest is a study for the United States, set up by Chad Syverson (2016)3. Syverson tries to
correct for certain aspects, national accounts are not able to measure, he claims. Especially in course
of the introduction of (modern) information and communication technologies (ICT) into economic
sphere, the slowdown has become stronger - so Syverson’s analysis mainly focuses on potential leaks
in the ICT sector. As a contribution, the present study applies his method on Germany and favours
the same conclusion. Mismeasurement is a problem and it contains explanatory power, the gap of
missing productivity, however, is simply too large to be explained. For the main explanatory content,
other reasons must be inferred. In addition to potential mismeasurement in the ICT-sector, it is also
discussed whether price deflation offers explanatory power (by making use of the so-called hedonic
price correction method).
By adopting the revived4 theory about so-called “secular stagnation”, real economic causes play
the lead. Secular stagnation, a term which describes a prolonged period of insufficient growth, is
nowadays mainly associated with works of Larry Summers (2015b) and Robert Gordon (2012; 2014).
Whereas the former focuses on the demand side of an economy, the latter analyses supply side effects.
The present study then applies the supply side logic on Germany and asks whether deficiencies in
the business environment in Germany provide explanations for the productivity puzzles. Hereby, it is
structured by splitting the conditions into headwinds, which falter economic growth. It will be shown
that some headwinds play a larger role, others a smaller.
The discussion does not claim to find one single reason but rather points on a combination of many
effects, shaping insufficient conditions for the economy to prosper. Arguing in a sense of real economic
3For the current study, the working paper version Syverson (2016) was used (published later as Syverson (2017) with
some minor modifications).
4Initially formed by Alvin Hansen (1939), it was Larry Summers (2015b) who reintroduced the debate.
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causes, it relies on an empirical section at the beginning of part III. It provides a compendium of
several variables, all of them related to productivity development. As the majority of studies in this
field rely either upon TFP or labour productivity as central variables, the present study follows. For
reasons of benchmarking and comparing, the United States plays the counterpart of the research object
Germany. Not only does the mismeasurement calculation apply the same (mathematic) logic as in the
US-study by Syverson, the empirical section as well as the headwind-discussion are presented in a
sense of comparing German conditions with those of the United States, too.
With regard to the first of the two main purposes of the study, it is stated that TFP is related
to technology but should not be treated as an equivalent. Any interpretation and application on
economic policy has to be treated with a certain amount of care. For the second of the two main
purposes of the study, it is shown that mismeasurement offers explanatory power but the gap of
missing productivity is simply too large. Real economic reasons, combined as a nexus, are responsible
for the productivity puzzle. Hereby, some aspects seem to be more significant for Germany (i.e. the
demographic headwind), some seem to be of less concern (i.e. the educational system).
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Part II
Total Factor Productivity - an Insufficient
Measure of Technology?
1 Introduction
Nowadays, total factor productivity (TFP) is the most commonly used variable, derived from a specific
economic framework to capture effects of technology for social accounting purposes. Robert Solow once
stated, that
“an important, usually, the most important, element in the growth of a modern economy
is the sustained increase in total factor productivity” (Solow, 2009, p. 30).
Due to the residual nature of the TFP, one has to be careful in simply aiming for an enlargement of
the TFP component. TFP is an outcome and not a cause (even though it is assumed to represent
technology as the best proxy available). As the name says, total factor productivity captures the
change in efficiency over time of all factors included in production. Efficiency in this context is a
measure “used loosely to denote the ratio of output to any related input or class of inputs” (Kendrick,
1956, p. 2).
A change in productivity might result from many sources; part III of the present study explicitly
deals with productivity puzzles and the (potential) causes for productivity development. Examples of
what TFP5 might cover too, include changes in management practices and organisational rearrange-
ment. Further, it can include marketing, network and production effects, like (the value of) brand
names or economies of scale, market competition or adjustment costs in the production process OECD
(2015a, p. 12).
Even though many aspects might play a role in defining TFP, the notion is commonly devoted to
5Some sources, like the OECD, prefer the term Multifactor Productivity (MFP) over Total Factor Productivity
(TFP). For example, see (OECD 2015a).
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changes in technology. Due to this, the term is frequently used by economists as a proxy or even a
perfect substitute for technology. For broader analyses, and due to the fact that economic theory lacks
of a better alternative, TFP seems to be the best variable available for a quantitative approximation
of technology. This first part of the study does not intend to substantially criticise the use but it tries
to make aware of simply equalizing technology and TFP.
So, there is serious doubt on whether TFP can simply be used as an equivalent for technology
and whether or not it captures all effects of technology in production processes. If one takes a deeper
insight into the theory of TFP (with regard to definition and measurement), it can easily result in
confusion. Even among the most famous economists and (early) works in this field of study, it is not
clear what total factor productivity actually is.
Without any doubts, total factor productivity offers potential for several fields of serious contro-
versies. The definitions range from simply promoting the equivalence of technology and TFP (in this
case the simple correlation by neglecting any other sources):
“Improvements in technology - the invention of the internal combustion engine, the introduction of
electricity, of semiconductors - clearly increase total factor productivity” (Law, 2000, pp. 6-7) or
“Economists tend to think of productivity as measuring the current state of technology used in
producing the goods and services of an economy (or industry or firm), and want to interpret the
changes in such a measure as reflecting ‘technological change’, shifts in the production possibilities
frontier. For this purpose, it is usual to focus on one or another version of ‘multi-factor productivity’,
where the list of inputs considered extends beyond labour and includes also measures of capital services
and also, occasionally the use of materials and other inputs.” Griliches (1987, p. 1),
admitting that,
“[...] conventional measures of productivity are only a distant and murky reflection of it. Changes
in such indexes, especially sharp short-run fluctuations, should be interpreted with great care since they
may have little to do with technological change proper.” (Griliches (1987, p. 2))
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to definitions, that there is no relationship at all:
“Since we know little about the causes of productivity increase, the indicated importance of this
element [productivity increase, O.Z.] may be taken to some sort of measure of our ignorance about the
causes of economic growth” (Abramovitz, 1956, p. 11).
When talking about an equivalence of total factor productivity and technology, this equivalence is
often interpreted as a perfect correlation and/or causality (see Law (2000) above, who is well aware
of the fact, that there is only a relation, no equivalence however, between the effect of technology and
the residual).
The remainder of the first part of the study illustrates the evolution of the famous variable and
provides a short mapping of the theoretical (measurement) framework. It also asks for the nature of
total factor productivity. Following Carlaw, K. and Lipsey, R. (2003), three views of what TFP actually
measures have been identified. A first one, which follows the idea of a (more or less) equivalence of
technology and the TFP-residual, which can be labelled as the “traditional approach”. A second one,
which exactly criticises this equivalence and emphasizes the boundaries of human knowledge regarding
the variables (the “ignorance view”) causing growth and a third one, which on the one hand denies the
equivalence but on the other hand accepts a linkage and relationship between the two notions.
The question, whether TFP can be seen as a technology-equivalent or not, shall not be answered
completely (as it seems impossible to do so) but it is tried to shed some light on the discussion on the
nature of TFP. One can, however, already anticipate, that - in contrast to (former) common belief -
there is no simple and perfect equivalence.
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2 Definitions and Early Research
2.1 Technology, Technique, Progress and Change
In economic theory, there are plenty of notions and definitions related to the general description of
the growth process of an economy. For many variables, however, it seems like there is not ’the’ right
definition but rather a range exists (Godin (2015, p.3 ), Kennedy and Thirlwall (1972, p. 12)). Before
proceeding, it seems appropriate to shortly decompose and discuss the notion of technological change
and its siblings. It is important to reduce confusion, as still today economists often talk of different
variables, notions or even approaches, when in fact often meaning the same thing. Accurately defining
the relevant technological aspects is difficult, a fact Joan Robinson (1952) has clearly mentioned a long
time ago: “Technical progress is difficult to discuss in precise language” (Robinson (1952, p. 36)).
A first potential field of confusion is the one that includes technology and technique and with respect
to the more dynamic growth context technological progress and technical progress. When scanning
literature, one finds a huge amount of notions describing a production process or even broader, the
structure related to the transmission of (non-) physical inputs goods into output goods. In fact,
there is confusion about the notions, whereas often they are used interchangeably without further
interpretation.
In economic theory, a line of separation is drawn. However, in the Anglo-Saxon literature, it is not.
Technical and technological are assumed to represent the same thing - the mechanical and operational
knowledge, combined with physical units, like machines, to convert input goods into output goods.
Everything, that is related to the production process is named as technology or technique. Blueprints,
which capture the skills are meant as well as heavy machines, tractors and tools, necessary for the
workers (which are themselves part of the production technology/technique). Outside the Anglo-Saxon
sphere, there is a division between technology and technique. To become familiar with the complexity
of technology and in order to have a more precise understanding, it is shortly shown, where the
differences (might) lie between these notions.
Holwegler (2003) defines technology as the book of blueprints, available in an economy. It contains
the knowledge and skills, available for the production process at a specific point of time. As a result of
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progress, the pages of the book of blueprints’ increase - in other words: new production knowledge is
available. Technique, then describes the application of the new knowledge, available due to inventions,
the process of innovation and knowledge diffusion Holwegler (2003, p. 9).
For a more precise definition, the view has to be expanded to the microeconomic field - the firm-
level in this case. Especially, the Schumpeterian trilogy is still famous and separates the development
process (Kromphardt and Teschner 1986, p. 236 quoted after Holwegler 2003, pp. 9-10).
Three different stages of the development process are identified:
1. Stage of invention: An invention simply represents the evolution of ideas for new products and
processes.
2. Stage of innovation: Following the stage of invention, an innovation stands for the knowledge,
resulting from the initial idea. It then is the application of the early invention and describes the
’new’ way, a product is generated.
3. Stage of diffusion: After having implemented the initial invention in the innovation stage, the
’new way’ of producing (or the ’new good’) is applied in other companies or industries. It diffuses
through the economy, meaning that more and more production processes adopt the ’new way’ of
producing.
This trilogy can be transferred to and implemented into the general macroeconomic framework. Tech-
nological development can be related to the stage of invention, whereas technical development covers
the stages of innovation and diffusion (Holwegler, 2003, p. 9).
These lines of separation match with those of Schmookler (1966), who defines technological change
as “the rate which new technology is produced” as well as ”change in knowledge”, whereas a change in
technique is rather “ a change in practice” and therefore if a company “uses a method or input that is
new to it” (Schmookler (1966, pp. 1-9) quoted after Godin (2015, p. 8)).
Moreover, for the two notions of ’change’ and ’progress’, many works do not explicitly separate.
Even though the notion ’progress’ implicitly exhibits a positive, forward-looking character, there might
be in fact, backwards-looking development as well. Technically, this should be captured by the notion
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’regress’. ’Change’, therefore, has a more neutral underlying, compared to ’progress’ and its negative
form ’regress’.
As innovations, usually, only find their way into production processes of an economy, if they in some
way raise efficiency, they can be considered as improved or superior. Due to this superiority, compared
to the existing production structure, it seems fair to think of an inter-changeability of ’change’ and
’progress’ in this context. Any other technology (and therefore technique) would not be applicated,
when producing less, with the same amount of inputs or produce the same output, requiring more
inputs.
2.2 The Aggregate Production Function
Modelling production processes requires a theoretical understanding of the transmission process of
input goods into output goods. The nature of the (development) process is hereby determined by the
technological premises. Combining capital K and labour L - the two relevant factors in production - is
usually executed by either a specific production technology A, describing the nature of the transmission
process and hereby implicitly representing limitationality or substitutionality of K and L, or a form
in between (substitutionality is explained in the remainder of this section, examples for limitationality
is the Leontief production function. For an explanation of the latter see i.e. Csontos and Ray (1992)).
Many starting points in the history of accounting for economic growth are reasonable; the present
study chooses to start with defining the very basic production structure. A common one, if not ’the’
most common, is the so-called Cobb-Douglas-production function (Felipe and Adams (2005, p. 428)).
In the late 1920s, the economist and senator of Illinois (1949 - 1967) Paul Howard Douglas and his
mathematical fellow and friend Charles Wiggins Cobb developed their own vision of a production
structure (Cobb and Douglas, 1928), aiming for a way to theoretically describe the conversion of input
goods into output goods on an aggregate level. It is interesting to note that the authors hereby
implicitly brought up the later growth accounting theory as they claimed to have found a way to
examine
“whether this increase in production was purely fortuitous, whether it was primarily
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caused by technique, and the degree, if any, to which it responded to changes in the
quantity of labor and capital.” (Cobb and Douglas (1928, p. 139)).
Even though Cobb and Douglas (1928) are associated with the works on the production function, it
is noteworthy that the origins go back to the work of Knut Wicksell in the 19th century (Wicksell
(1896), Wicksell (1900)). The “reward” for its formulation has at least to be shared with Wicksell. See
Samuelson (1979, p. 923) for example, who reckons Wicksell’s merits and Malinvaud (2003) for a more
detailed review on Knut Wicksell’s contributions.
After having set up indexes of the amounts of capital, labour and production, the authors define
the theoretical construct (Cobb and Douglas, 1928, p. 152 ff.). Based upon their empirical part, the
actual production function (homogeneous of degree one) takes the following form6:
P ′ = 1.01L
3
4C
1
4 (1)
Aggregate, actual output P ′ is produced by capital C and labour L and a constant (here: 1.01 and
in the more general case P = bL
3
4C
1
4 ), with b, as independent from labour and capital input. It is a
catch-all variable, including all forces, which have not been measured or were not able to be measured
(Cobb and Douglas, 1928, p. 155) - a shifting parameter of technological taste.
Certain features apply (i.e. partial elasticity of output due to incremental changes in labour equals
3
4 , and in capital
1
4 respectively). In contrast to other production functions, the Cobb-Douglas frame-
work enables the user to substitute for the production factors. Capital and labour can be exchanged
for each other, when respective factor prices are allowed to be flexible, too. Substitutionality allows to
preserving the output level. If, for example, wages rise and labour becomes more expensive (in relation
to capital), then it is substituted by a rise in capital use, keeping the production level constant.
Such a simple but useful framework has paved the way for separating for the technology component,
in order to isolate and emphasize the role of technology in production. The Cobb-Douglas-production
function has become one of the most (if not the most) relevant production function in economic the-
ory. Paul Samuelson acknowledged the Cobb-Douglas-function as “part of every economist’s toolbox”
6The authors first set up the actual production function P ′, derived from actual values of the period 1899-1922 for
the US manufacturing sector. The mathematically derived form later is modelled and named by P .
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(Samuelson (1979, p. 924)). Its simplicity, however, requires some special properties (“Santa-Clause-
properties” Solow (2007, p. 13)) and assumptions, which might limit its general appliance. This been
mentioned, the practicability and acceptance was and still is huge so that it is a “wonderful vehicle to
generate informative examples” (Solow (2007, p. 13)).
Neoclassical growth theory, and its starting point - usually associated with the works of Robert
Solow in the 1950s - uses the Cobb-Douglas framework as its theoretical underlying. It enables the user
to set up a simple but useful framework to theorize a production process. In fact, however, the present
study will argue, that besides the contribution of Robert Solow7, it was a study by Jan Tinbergen
(1942), which first modelled and expanded it into a more dynamic structure.
2.3 Notion of Efficiency and the NBER-program
The notion of efficiency, a.k.a. ’total factor productivity’, can be traced back to a research program
of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in the 1940s. It includes the works of George
Stigler (1947), contributions from Solomon Fabricant (1959; 1954), John Kendrick (1956; 1961) and
Moses Abramovitz (1956) - just to name a few of them, who paved the way for a detailed analysis
of the sources of economic growth. In the centre of the study and consecutive debate is the general
dichotomy of investment (leading to capital deepening, increasing capital per labour input and similar
definitions; generally the increase in input quantities) and technological progress (with positive effects
on productivity) and its relevance for economic performance of a country. Stigler (1947), however, has
worked on productivity analyses independently from the later works of Jan Tinbergen (see chapter
3.2).
Even though many have contributed to the evolution of early productivity measurement, it was
Kendrick (1961), who brought up one of the most pioneering (empirical) studies. His book on pro-
ductivity measurement has not only offered a step into a mainly unexplored theoretical field; even
more, it has provided (one of) the most detailed works on empirical productivity measurement and is
still considered as one of the major surveys on national accounting and productivity measurement in
general.
7And the works of Trevor Swan (1956).
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It is remarkable, to which extent Kendrick has traced productivity trends and taken care of their
relationships with other variables - a merit, many have acknowledged (see for example Kavesh (1962)
or Fabricant (1961)). The latter has once labelled the book as “the most comprehensive survey of
productivity trends in the United States ever made” Fabricant (1961, p. lii).
The book itself consists of more than 600 pages of detailed and carefully collected data on the
time period of 1889 to 1959 for the United States. Not only does it provide a catalogue, similar to a
goldmine for researchers, it also aims to overcome the shortcomings of other efficiency measures - an
issue, Stigler (1947, p. 43 and p. 49) has already emphasized. Stigler (1947, p. 49) criticizes efficiency
measures, which only rely on one single production factor - mostly labour - which, according to him,
are incomplete measures of economic progress.
Compared to labour productivity, Kendrick prefers an index, which covers all factors included
in production. This index, later made famous as total factor productivity, was meant to overcome
the shortcomings of (simple) labour productivity measurement in order to account for technological
progress. Again it was Fabricant (1961) in the foreword of Kendrick (1961)’s survey, who labelled the
“new” notion of efficiency as “the best currently available approximation to a measure of efficiency”
Fabricant (1961, p. xli). Without exaggerating, it still is the most commonly used (and probably the
most suitable) tool for productivity measurement and still works as a representative for technological
progress.
For the purpose of this study, one can thankfully rely on the excellent introduction of Fabricant
(1961), who has summarized the main findings of Kendrick (1961)’s work (even a chapter “The Facts
in a Nutshell” exists). Shifting the focus to total factor productivity, Kendrick finds that its annual
growth rate for the covered period of time (1889-1959) is 1.7% in the US private domestic economy
(see also Kavesh, 1962, p. 835 for a review of Kendrick (1961)). Real private domestic product instead
grows at roughly 3% to 3.5% (Fabricant, 1961, p. xxxvii). So, about one half of economic growth is
caused by effects of increasing efficiency, the other half can be traced to the effects of an increase in
input factors (forming the already mentioned “dichotomy” of productivity effects versus effects of an
increase in input factors). Whereas Kendrick’s opus magnum is probably the most important one in
these times (mainly due to its excessive data work), other contributions of the NBER-program of the
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1940s have contributed, too.
For the covered period of time, 1899-1939, Stigler (1947) finds a rising trend in output, measured by
national income in certain industries. Output in the relevant six8 industries has almost trippled over
time. The average working amount of hours worked per worker, however, has declined but employment,
measured by the number of workers, has risen by around one-third over time so that in total the amount
of hours worked in the US has remained almost constant. As chapter 9.2.4, in course of the theory of
secular stagnation, will show, several effects on labour markets contribute and potentially neutralize
each other (i.e. an increase of the amount of people employed can be counterbalanced by a reduction
of the average amount worked per week).
Even though Stigler emphasizes the necessity to include all factors of production in the productivity
measurement, he focuses only on the labour input (expressed as output per worker). According to his
data-set, output per worker rose at around 3% per annum. Abramovitz (1956) finds productivity as
the main source for economic growth for the covered period of time (1869-1953), by using data from
the work of Simon Kuznets (1952), as well as from Kendrick (1961)9. The study and findings will be
discussed in detail later on (see chapter Abramovitz’ Measure of Ignorance and a Reaction). General
(empirical) developments with regard to productivity are provided in more detail in chapter 8. The
notion “total factor productivity” can be derived from the work of Stigler (1947) (Stigler calls it a
“changes in the efficiency with which all resources are used” Stigler (1947, p. 49)) , the exact notion,
however, is from the work of Kendrick (1956).
8Agriculture, manufacturing, mining, gas and electric utilities, and steam railroad are the six industries covered in
his analysis. He focuses on these industries, as they have initially employed around two-thirds of the national labour
force (1899) and produced around 90% of national output in the US.
9See the acknowledgements of Abramovitz (1956, p. 5).
14
3 Growth Accounting
3.1 Origins of Growth Accounting
In economic theory, the notion and concept of “total factor productivity” (TFP) is commonly used to
describe the role of technology in the production process. It hereby captures the effects, not resulting
from a simple increase of the input quantities of the respective production factors (i.e. Hulten (2001),
Ganev (2005)).
The theoretical framework, which is normally chosen to identify and calculate total factor pro-
ductivity, is the so-called “growth accounting approach”10 (Cadil (2007, p. 347)). Accounting for the
sources of growth in a tighter definition stands for separating the individual production factors and
their respective contributions to output growth from each other. Usually, the factors are captured by
capital input, labour input and the technology component.
After accounting for capital input growth, labour input growth and the resulting growth in output,
there is a residual left over, aiming to represent technological progress - the growth of total factor
productivity. As the present study is about the linkage between productivity, technology and more
broadly the development path of an economy, this section provides insight into the modelling structure
and the underlying theoretical framework of the commonly used variable (TFP) to capture the effects
of productivity (and technology).
Even though the notions “growth accounting”, “the residual”, “total factor productivity” and similar
ones are usually assigned with the works of Robert Solow in the late 1950s11 (Solow (1957)), it was the
Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen (1942), who has originally set up a framework, in order to separate
for the causes of economic growth.
The initial version of the mathematical underlying, the Cobb-Douglas production function, did
not contain a dynamic perspective. In other words, a time-index was required, in order to provide a
framework for a more dynamic approach. It was Jan Tinbergen, born in 1903 in The Hague (Nether-
10Alternative approaches to define and measure TFP are (i.e.) the “Index Number Approach” or the “Distance Function
Approach” (for example see Carlaw, K. and Lipsey, R. (2003)).
11Whereas Solow (1956) sets up his vision of a neoclassical growth model without technological progress, it was his 1957
paper (Solow, 1957) which enriches this neoclassical model with a technology component. This technology component
then is measured as a residual and has later become famous as “Solow-residual”.
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lands), who took a step further and developed a time-indexed, dynamic framework on the base of the
Cobb-Douglas production function (Tinbergen (1942), Oppenländer (1976, p. 15)). Tinbergen allowed
for comparing specific points of time with regard to their respective production process. By doing so,
he provided the possibility to compare the efficiency levels of the production process of an economy.
More precisely, if one compares the production function of say yesterday (t−1) to that one of say today
(t), one can examine the (change in the) efficiency level of how input factors are converted into output
goods. Even more, by fitting the model to the data, it is possible to check whether an economy’s
ability to efficiently convert input into output has improved or worsen.
The beginnings of (neoclassical) growth theory are usually associated with the works of Robert
Solow and the independently developed growth model of the Australian Trevor Swan in 1956 (Swan
(1956)). Pointing into the same direction, the approaches of Solow and Swan slightly diverge and differ
in detail. Solow i.e. provides a graphical exposition in dependency of the capital-labour-ratio, whereas
Swan uses the output-capital-ratio instead, which allows to directly observe the effects of technological
progress from the illustration (in the basic Solow model, technological progress can only be observed
by the roundabout of calculating efficiency units). Swan worked out one single contribution to form
his growth model, including aspects of technology, whereas Solow separately modelled technological
progress (Solow (1957)) and expanded his 1956-paper by the role of technological progress (Solow
(1957)).
It is often discussed, why the neoclassical growth model is commonly referred to the works of Solow
and not to Swan likewise by the same extent. In an article by Swan’s daughter, Barbara Spencer (see
Dimand and Spencer (2009)), she argues on a number of reasons but also emphasizes the kindness
of Solow, who recalls Swan’s contribution to neoclassical growth theory regularly. Aspects, which
separate the two approaches from each other do not only include the role of technological progress or
the issue on production technology (CES production technologies or only using a special case out of it
- the Cobb-Douglas production function (see Dimand and Spencer (2009, pp. 118-120)); these aspects
also include geographical obstacles and the lack of modern communication possibilities back in the
1950s. Whereas Swan has published his entire work in Australian journals only (besides the reluctance
to publish in general due to his high standards of work (Dimand and Spencer (2009, p. 119))), Solow’s
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articles were accessible to economic public quite more easy.
Both works form the base for the growth accounting approach. However, it was Tinbergen, who
independently had employed the very first model and enriched it with data, years before the neoclassical
theory was born. Tinbergen not only developed a growth modelling environment, but he also provided
a wider catalogue of different subtypes of production processes (technologies). He was also motivated
by the general problem of combining theoretical aspects and approaches with data. Statisticians, he
stated, do not completely rely on an underlying theoretical concept and on the other hand, serious trend
movement theory has not yet given a (reliable) database. His goal, therefore, was to provide a “very
simple quantitative theory of the trend of production, employment and real wage rates” (Tinbergen
(1942, p. 513 and p. 547)). A little later and “for having developed and applied dynamic models for
the analysis of economic process”12, the Dutch mathematician and economist then in 1969 received
the first Nobel Prize in economics together with Ragnar Frisch.
Tinbergen modelled the same properties as in the subsequent basic neoclassical model - production,
employment and wealth on the aggregate level, influenced by capital accumulation processes, popula-
tion growth and technological progress. By doing so, he explicitly stated the necessity to distinguish
between short-run developments (cycles) and long-run movements (trends) - an issue, still present in
today’s economic discourse. Whereas short-run movements are merely triggered and influenced by
speculation or business- cycle developments (Tinbergen (1942, p. 511)), long-run developments, the
issue Tinbergen is more explicitly dealing with in his paper, consist of movements in a time period of
decades or even centuries.
As population, production potential or technical development are usually considered as (more or
less) rigid over shorter time horizons, they do play a significant role in the long-run. His aim, therefore,
was to focus on these long-run developments and how they affect the long-run growth performance of
an economy (Tinbergen (1942, p. 512)).
However, the original 1942-paper did not receive the deserved attention. Probably due to the fact,
that the world was stuck in the middle of World War II, or maybe simply because its original version
was written in German 13. Due to this, the first approaches in growth theory were not associated with
12See www.nobelprize.org for further details.
13The original version of the 1942 paper was later translated into English (Tinbergen, 1959).
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Tinbergen, but with the works of Roy Harrod (1939) and Evsey Domar (1946)14. Both economists
aimed to extend the ideas of John Maynard Keynes’ General Theory (Keynes (1936)) into the long-run.
Harrod and Domar, two of the most famous post-Keynesian growth economists, faced instability
problems in their approaches - a property especially of the Harrodian paper, which was later often
labelled as “knife-edge”-growth15. A coincidence of the natural rate of growth, representing growth
in labour, and growth in capital is just considered as a situation of a lucky coincidence. Imbalances
and the resulting state of (an ongoing) disequilibrium result from the technological properties of the
post-Keynesian model. Whereas the later neoclassical model consists of a production function, which
is composed of substitutionality of production factors and flexible factor prices, the post-Keynesian
models of Harrod and Domar are expressed through limitationality in production16. Even though
Harrod and Domar developed models with different aspects, they are often summarized under ’the’
Harrod-and-Domar model, which is the “genealogical ancestor from which neoclassical growth theory
claims to descend” (Punzo (2009, p. 89)).
It took 17 more years for the translation of Tinbergen’s original paper when it was again outshined
by the breakthrough works of Robert Solow (1956) and Trevor Swan (1956), both forming the birth
point of neoclassical growth theory. What Harrod and Domar, under the assumption of a rigid pro-
duction technology (limitationality of the production factors), were not able to solve, is considered
as the major achievement of the Solovian model. By replacing limitationality in production with a
flexible production framework (substitutionality of the production factors), a stable balanced growth
path became possible and not lucky coincidence any more (Solow (1956)). Solow then, only one year
later, enriched this neoclassical model with a technology component (Solow (1957)). As chapter 3.3
will show, the model made it possible to separate for the sources of economic growth - the major
approach which led to the methodology nowadays known as “growth accounting”.
In fact, the formula, which has later become famous as the “standard growth accounting equation”,
14Solow, when discussing his precursors refers to Harrod (1948) instead (see also Punzo (2009, p. 89)).
15The notion “knife-edge”-growth was initially used by Solow (1956) and later by several other economists. So it
was later immortalized by Prescott (1988); very much to the dislike of Harrod, who wanted to get rid of the notion or
being associated only with the “knife-edge”-growth issue (Hagemann (2009, p. 84)). It is interesting to note, however,
that Solow has admitted not having fully understood the entire model, when writing his famous papers in the 1950s,
particularly, the twofold (in-)stability problem of the Harrod-model (Solow (2000, p. xiv)).
16For a more detailed discussion of the properties of the postkeynesian approaches and the relation to Solow’s neo-
classical model see Hagemann (2009).
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can originally be traced back to Tinbergen (1942, p. 543). Tinbergen in contrast to Solow, Swan and
the post-Keynesian precessors Harrod and Domar claimed for a production technology in between the
two extrema (limitationality of the post-Keynesian flavour and substitutionality of the neoclassical
strand). Additionally, to Tinbergen’s main focus on the Cobb-Douglas production function, he also
provided a wider catalogue, composed of various subtypes of production technologies.
In Tinbergen’s paper, the breakdown for the sources of economic growth resulted in an expression,
representing effects of technology and related ones, all summed up as a change in efficiency. The simple
expression “technical development” (Tinbergen (1959, p. 193)) measures technology (original German
expression: “Rationalisierungsgeschwindigkeit” Tinbergen (1942, p. 543)) as the residual, resulting
from output growth minus growth of capital and labour input. So, the birth of the growth accounting
approach, which is often associated with Solow (1956; 1957), Swan (1956) and the birth of neoclassical
theory in the 1950s, origins in the works of Tinbergen, set up more than a decade before the works of
Solow (1956) and Swan (1956).
Even though Tinbergen has originally provided the relevant framework to measure technology as
a potential source of economic growth (in the line of the growth accounting approach), it was Solow
(1957), who was responsible for the dissemination and making known the growth accounting approach.
It is highly speculative, whether Tinbergen’s work would have been known nowadays without the works
of Solow on that field. In order to understand the relevance and evolution of the growth accounting
concept and the nowadays famously known residual, and in order to compare Tinbergen’s theory to
its ancestors, a short description shall be provided in the next chapter. I hereby focus on the structure
of the 1942 original paper.
3.2 Tinbergen as the Origin
For the basic Tinbergen-framework, a one-good economy (like the famous Ricardian “corn-economy”,
an economy consisting only of one commodity (Ricardo (1815))) is assumed, removing the necessity
to introduce monetary variables (i.e factor prices and goods prices). The commodity can either be
used for consumption or investment purposes. Tinbergen’s model relies on the production function,
modelled by Paul Douglas and Howard Cobb (Cobb and Douglas (1928)). The exponential production
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function exhibits constant returns to scale (as the respective input shares are summed up to one).
Following the original notation, a good u is produced by a transformation process, using capital K
and applied labour a as inputs. A third production factor, land, is assumed to be constant and can be
thought of implicitly represented by the factor capital. The functional relationship is then adjusted
by the efficiency parameter “technical development” (Tinbergen (1959, p. 193))εt, which represents
Tinbergen’s extension of the Cobb and Douglas (1928) production function17. Interestingly, the effi-
ciency parameter has a time-indexed superscript, providing the possibility for a change in efficiency
and allowing the introduction of technological progress in a modelling structure. Tinbergen, in his
paper, emphasizes the distinction between technological progress and growth in [labour] productivity
as potential sources for economic development (Tinbergen (1942, p. 540)).
Growing labour productivity is either the result of a change in the underlying (type of the) produc-
tion function, implying technological progress, or the effect of using more capital relative to labour. For
his study, the former case is ruled out, by assumed the underlying production function to be constant
over time for the respective time periods covered.
Even though Tinbergen talks about the second case (rising capital intensity) as technical progress,
he relativizes this claim. A rise in capital intensity - and therefore a rise in labour productivity - of a
given production function, is obviously accompanied by a decline in capital productivity. Only if both
factors in production experience an improvement in terms of efficiency, it is technical development
(represented by εt) (Tinbergen (1942, pp. 521-522)). It shows that Tinbergen was well aware of the
confusion regarding technology, its measurement and the fact that all factors included in production
have to be considered in productivity analyses - he explicitly points out the necessity to define tech-
nological change due to a general confusion about the nomenclature (Tinbergen (1942, p. 516 and p.
521)). More generally, he also states that technological progress is meant to be defined as “a reduction
of the real costs” (Tinbergen (1959, p. 193)).
Real (overall) costs in production logically do not only represent labour input. Situations of rising
labour costs are possible as well as stated above; however, only if accompanied by an overproportional
17Cobb and Douglas (1928) production function is represented by the following (Tinbergen) notion: u = caλKµ. Note
that c is the constant, now being replaced by the technical development component in Tinbergen’s analysis.λ and µ
stand for the shares of the production factors.
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reduction of the respective capital costs. According to his work, technological progress, therefore,
cannot work as a simple equivalent of growing labour productivity, in order to explain productivity
trends in general.
One apparently realizes all the recurring statements and debates on the nature of technological
progress and its relationship to economic growth in the forthcoming growth theory literature - i.e.
the general dichotomy of capital intensity and technological progress for the explanation of growth
in labour productivity (and wealth) by Robert Solow, or the subsequent studies (i.e. the research
programme by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)).
Cobb and Douglas (1928) did not allow a production function to change regarding their technical
properties (there were no such technical development parameters like εt, as Tinbergen has introduced).
The definition of technological progress by Cobb and Douglas (1928) therefore, was reduced to an
ongoing flow of capital formation (capital deepening), whereas in Tinbergen’s theory the rise in overall
efficiency is named “technical development” and therefore meant as a synonym for technological progress
(Tinbergen (1942, p. 521 f.)).
At first, Tinbergen sets up the representative production function. He compares different types of
underlying production functions, whereas his main focus is on a Cobb-Douglas-type, which Tinbergen
adjusts by the efficiency parameter εt of technical development. Following Cobb and Douglas (1928),
the Tinbergen production function for growth accounting purposes then takes the form of:
u = εtaλK1−λ (2)
Technical development is adjusted by a time-index, whereas the superscripts of the input factors
represent the shares in production and therefore the shares of how economic income is distributed on
capital and labour. Following Cobb and Douglas (1928), the empirical results show λ = 34 , so that the
more specific production function can be written as:
u = εta
3
4K
1
4 (3)
A feature of the Cobb-Douglas type is perfect substitutionality of the input factors capital and
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labour. Despite having some doubts on this in reality, Tinbergen adopts it for his main example
(“We are not certain that this complies with the facts [...]”, in original Tinbergen (1942, p. 522) and
Tinbergen (1959, p. 194) in the English translation). Moreover, he provides a catalogue of different
production scenarios. A production function of complete complementarity is offered as a second main
case, aiming for limitationality in production processes, when input goods have to be used in fixed
proportions.
In a next step, the demand side of the economy is defined. Assuming that both production factors
earn their respective marginal products, the demand equations for capital and labour can be modelled
as follows (marginal product equals respective factor price) 18: demand for capital 34
(
K
a
) 1
4 εt = l′and
demand for labour 14
(
a
K
) 3
4 εt = m′, with m′ as the market interest rate, l′as the wage rate. For the
supply side, the amount of labour supplied not only depends on the wage rate but is additionally a
dependant of wage-flexibility λ19.
Wage flexibility λ is an important feature, as it offers various interpretations. It would be intuitive
that, if wages rise, people tend to supply more labour (wage-flexibility greater than zero). It is,
however, possible as well, that people of a specific age, gender or region offer less labour in course of
rising wages - this would be the case if they consider their goal in earning a specific amount of money,
which enables them to satiate their needs.
By assuming that the supply of goods determines production, the demand for the production factors
labour and capital does equally represent the supply equations for the final goods - a feature, which is
ultimately linked to Say (1803)’s law (Tinbergen (1942, pp. 527-529)). The set-up of the Tinbergen
model of growth and its derivation of an equation, that accounts for separating for the sources of
18Note that the following equations represent the demand for capital and labour on the aggregate level.
19The corresponding supply side of the economy is set up as supply of labour being l′ =
(
a
b
)λ′
l°°λt and supply of
capital being K˙ = χu. Supply of labour a generally depends on wages l′. The amount of labour supplied, relative to
the entire population b, depends on the wage rate l′, relative to a wage rate l°, which is considered to be the “normal”
wage rate: l
′
l° =
(
a
b
)λ
. Defining the movement of the “normal” wage rate over time ( l°=l°° λt) as a function of a
constant (l°°) and the annual rate of change (λt) and adding the growth of population (b = bβt, with b as the initial
population and βtas the relation of population of the past period, compared to the period covered) one gets the supply
of labour: l′ =
(
a
b
)λ′
l°°λt. Supply of capital is a less complex function and does not offer much potential for empirical
analysis to discuss. Capital accumulation is the sum of all current accumlated amount of capital. The law of motion for
the accumulation of capital seems rather simple, as a specific amount of economic output u (expressed by the marginal
prospensity to save χ) is saved.
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economic growth, logically makes him the ancestor of the theory of growth accounting.
3.3 Solow and the ’Second Date of Birth’
As already stated, however, the growth accounting approach would not be that famous without the
works of Robert Solow. Whereas the Solow (1956)-paper was about setting up a (neoclassical) growth
model, the 1957-paper added technological features and focussed more on the role of technology in the
process of economic growth. Robert Solow received the Nobel Prize in economic sciences in 1987 for “[...]
his contributions to the theory of economic growth”20. His neoclassical vision of economic growth and
his studies on the sources of economic growth in the US still represent some of the major breakthroughs
in the field of economics in the twentieth century. The nowadays commonly used neoclassical growth
model (allowing for household optimization in contrast to the basic “Solow-model”) is built upon the
base of Solow’s approaches in the 1950s, mainly based on the two popular papers (Solow (1956, 1957)).
Besides forming the neoclassical growth model, the Solow-model implicitly includes the growth
accounting approach. The basic idea was to find a method of separation for the growth of national
(gross) product into its contributors. Solow was interested in distinguishing output changes, caused by
technological progress from those resulting from the effect of capital deepening (Solow (1957, p. 312)).
Applying the theoretical approach to the data, he found that nearly seven-eighths of total output
growth in the US (over the covered period of time of 1909-1949) was caused by a not-yet explained force,
conjecturing effects in productivity and/or technology. The other one-eighth resulted from a simple
increase in capital intensity, meaning more capital per labour unit; generally speaking an increase in
the factors of production. In his famous paper, Solow (1956) first provides a mathematical explanation
of his view of the aggregate production process. He defines the aggregate production function as a
simple input-output relationship, in the tradition of Cobb and Douglas (1928).
The input factors are narrowed down to capital K and labour L. A third production factor
A is identified and defined as technology, more precisely as neutral21 technical change. In terms
20See <‌<https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1987/press-release/>‌> for further details.
21Neutral technical change improves both input factors in the same way and to the same amount and therefore leaves
marginal rates of substitution unchanged. For deriving growth equilibrium in the basic Solow model, technical change
is assumed to be Harrod neutral (labour-augmenting). The model itself uses a Cobb-Douglas production function (see
equation Q = A(t)f(K,L)), which leads to the fact of a coincidence of the Hicksian neutral technological progress and
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of production theory, this technology component stands for a mathematical shift-parameter of the
aggregate production function. By defining the technology-parameter A as both labour- and capital-
augmenting, the aggregate production function is expressed over time as:
Q = A(t)f(K,L) (4)
Equation (4), providing the nature of the production process, describes the basic aggregate pro-
duction function, consisting of the input components capital and labour, adjusted by technology and
resulting in a stock of final goods. Note that here, Q represents output, whereas A, the technology
component, works as a ’shifter’ for the production function, including the input factors capital K and
labour L.
Technology in a static, one-period case offers a description of the way an economy uses specific
input factors, like capital goods or labour units to receive a final good at the end of the production
process. A production technology therefore implicitly defines several properties, for example, the
technical configuration of a machine, the level of human education, the organizational structure of a
company and many more.
Every economy has its own, specific way of extracting output from input-factors. These “blueprints”
then can be named technology. However, the way of producing changes over time due to innovations
in machinery, organization, labour skill and others. A serious classification of which innovations con-
tribute most, what kind of innovations shall be considered or neutrality-vs.-non-neutrality-aspects of
innovations, in general, shall be neglected at this point. If one, however, changes the average pro-
duction concept of an economy (“blueprint”), it means nothing else than technological change. Such
a change of the average technology in use might result from more firms in the economy, shifting to
better technologies (“technology diffusion”), less productive firms withdrawing from economic activity
or (and especially for the long-run), if the generally available technology has improved due to R&D,
innovations and others.
A production concept becomes obsolete and gets substituted by another one, only when the former
the Harrodian one.
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produces less efficiently. An economy, or a representative entrepreneur, only apply a new technology
when the input-output-ratio is more in favour of the latter one. The term ’change’ offers the possibility
of using less efficient technology.
For an investigation on TFP, one has to keep in mind that scenarios of switching to inferior tech-
nology are possible as well (a discussion on the nature of the notion ’change’ has already been set up
in chapter 2). The result would be (if one assumes that TFP perfectly represents technology) negative
TFP-values. For the purpose of the present study, the notion ’technological progress’ suits, as well as
’technological change’, if one keeps in mind that technological regress is possible as well.
In order to bring together theory and data, Solow sets up time derivatives of the output equation
(4). After further simplifications and rearrangements, growth in output is on the left-hand side of
equation (5). On the right-hand side, one finds the growth of technology component A and growth
of the input factors K and L, both adjusted by their respective marginal shares wKand wL. These
shares represent the output shares:
Q˙
Q
=
A˙
A
+ wK
K˙
K
+ wL
L˙
L
(5)
The method and resulting equations, Solow sets up, can be found in a similar way in Tinbergen’s
work. Providing an expression of output in terms of input and marginal shares, in fact, is a key
component in Tinbergen’s analysis (Tinbergen (1942, p. 523)), which again emphasizes the importance
of Tinbergen’s work and its similarity to the (more) famous successors.
Solow then in a next step defines the output per worker ratio (or labeled differently as labour-
productivity, q), capital per worker ratio (capital intensity, k) and the relative share of capital (wK)
and assumes the function f(.) of being homogeneous of degree one22. It follows that:
q˙
q
=
A˙
A
+ wK
K˙
K
(6)
After having set up the theoretical base of his analysis, Solow links his concept to the data (Solow
(1957, pp. 314 ff.)).
22It is:Q
L
= q, K
L
= k and both shares added up to 1: wK + wL = 1.
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The simple structure of the expression in equation (6) only needs three time-series to be computed
and inserted: output per unit of labour, capital per unit of labour and the share of capital (Solow
(1957, p. 313 f.)). His empirical computation is based on a data-set from 1909 to 1949 for the US.
Especially data for private non-farm gross national product (GNP) per man-hour, like the labour-
efficiency component, can be traced to Kendrick (1956) (appreciated explicitly by Solow (1957, p.
314))23.
Solow makes use of private non-farm data on a gross level. The intuition is that it simplifies the
analysis by restricting the measurement of government activity; the reason for using gross instead of
net values simply lies in the availability of the data. Exact data on capital time-series are derived from
Goldsmith (1955). Solow justifies its adoption: capital service data was not available to a sufficient
amount. Instead, and in order to derive capital-in-use from the capital-stock data, Solow adjusts it
by data for the labour force employed, which implies the level of utilization and therefore works as a
proxy for capital services.
After having computed the time-series, one finds a steadily rising trend of - what is per Solovian
definition technological progress24 over time. The residual share has increased (Solow (1957, p. 315)),
also stating the increasing importance of technology for economic growth in the United States and its
implications for appropriate policy actions.
Solow’s empirical investigation states that the major source of economic growth cannot be at-
tributed to a simple increase in the factors of production- capital and labour. Variations in capital
and labour only account for roughly one-eighth of total output growth, the residual (technology per
definition) for around seven-eighth. These results exhibited a milestone in the analysis of economic
growth and built the starting point of modern economic growth analysis. Input quanta, or put in other
words, an increase in capital intensity (implying more capital per labour unit), plays a less significant
role for long-run economic growth and an economy’s growth path.
But what does the residual actually represents? For Solow, the residual was nothing else than “the
technical change index” ((Solow, 1957, p. 313 and p. 316)) and therefore a variable, which includes the
23Other data sources, for example, are: Douglas (1953) for labour force related data, Goldsmith (1955) for capital
stock related data (see Solow (1957, p. 315)).
24The fact, that A(t) rises constantly over time makes it easier to speak of technological progress instead of change.
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change in efficiency in the production process of an economy. In advocacy of Solow, he was well aware
of the fact, that a simple application of technological progress as residual and therefore a non-explained
source of growth was not the be-all and end-all of everything:
“...A(t) series, which is meant to be a rough profile of technical change, at least looks
reasonable." (Solow (1957, p. 316)).
However, these results shattered economic theory as well as politics likewise. Long-run economic
development and growth is not possible without technological progress. Moreover, capital accumulation
cannot account for steady-state growth.
It is interesting to note that results of the discussed approaches in this chapter vary. The NBER-
program finds productivity as the main source of economic growth; so does Solow, who labels the
effects in productivity as technological effects. Tinbergen, however, suggests that capital and labour
input are the responsible factors of economic progress. For sure, the disunity in the results might arise
from covering different periods of time. They do, however, also arise from discordance in definition
and measurement - the latter one of enormous interest for the present study on productivity puzzles.
If, in the sense of Tinbergen and Solow, technology is measured as a residual and accounts for
the major part of economic progress, it leaves the problem of deriving policy implications almost
untouched - providing an even larger “residual of ignorance”. Even though many studies in the mid-
end of the twentieth century have focussed on measurement problems and definitory issues, it was
Abramovitz (1956), who first brought up his doubts. His study arose independently from the Solovian
ones, expressing his dissatisfaction on the status quo.
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4 Measure of Ignorance and Reactions on the Traditional View
4.1 Abramovitz’ Measure of Ignorance and a Reaction
In course of the upcoming wave of interest in the origins of economic growth and the development path
of economies, the works of Jan Tinbergen, Robert Solow and others have received attention. It was
them, who intensively promoted the relevance of a technology component for the economy’s growth
process. Especially the breakdown of the individual contributors with regard to output growth, later
known as the growth accounting approach, have defined the field. Theory and empirics were both set
up, in order to find a representative for technology and to define and measure its contribution. Hereby,
a residual term, later become famous as ’Solow-residual’, did that job.
The conclusion, that more than 80% of output growth over time for the US (1909-1949) can be
traced to technology seemed to be like a major breakthrough and important finding; and in some way
it was. By separating for an increase in input factors and a rise in technology as an explanatory source
of output growth, most studies argued for the latter one. It was Solow, however, who equated the rise
in productivity with a rise or improvement in technology. This, in turn, has raised several doubts. Is
the individual contribution of technology, in fact, more than eighty per cent accountable for economic
growth and what does this mean for policymakers? Do they only have to stress the increase of the
residual, in order to promote economic growth?
From nowadays, we know that a simple equalization of the (productivity-) residual and technology
is not sufficient and not completely accurate. In addition, the residual is an outcome and not a cause,
complicating the situation for economic policy. Aiming for a simple enlargement of TFP pushes the
debate ad absurdum (see i.e. Carlaw, K. and Lipsey, R. (2003, p. 458) who emphasize the character
of TFP as “lumped together as a residual left over factor”).
The major starting point for a slight critique of the Solovian work (more precisely on the equal-
ization of TFP and technology) was a study by Moses Abramovitz (1956). Even though the study
came up independently from Solow’s, it can easily be considered as a critique on some of the major
predominant studies in these times.
Agreeing on the general method and modelling approach of the studies of Robert Solow, Abramovitz
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(1956) denied a simple equalization of productivity and technology. Even more, he stressed the ig-
norance of the ingredients, assembled in the (technology-) residual. By doing so, he highlighted the
residual’s character as a catch-all variable, containing several unknown factors. Abramovitz’ own study
investigates, as almost all of the other studies of the NBER-related research programme (see chapter
Notion of Efficiency and the NBER-program), developments of the time period of 1870 to the mid
1950s (here: to 1953) in the US. By doing so the author argues that net national product of the last
decade of the study (1944-1953) is thirteen times higher, compared to the first one (1869-1878). It
implies an average growth rate of roughly 3.5% p. a.. Tripling population over time makes it a per
capita growth rate of 1.9% p.a, which then has led to a quardrupling of net national product per
capita in the covered period of time. A tripling of the population and effects resulting from structural
change (i.e. production shifting from agricultural to industrial production in these times) led to a
remarkable increase of the labour force of 25% in total. It was, however, (more than) counterbalanced
by a reduction in the average working hours per worker, so that aggregate labour input, measured in
total hours worked, has remained constant (or even slightly declined, subject to interpretation of the
results).
Compared to labour input, (physical) volume of capital, on the other hand, has increased even
overproportionally, leading to a (net) rise in the capital per worker ratio (representing capital intensity
in production). In the next step of his calculations, Abramovitz compares for a (hypothetic) situation,
in which the efficiency levels would have remained constant, inputs however grown at the actual rate.
It enables to isolate for the effects in productivity. The result of the analysis is quite interesting, as
it traces only around 14% of the increase in net national output to the effect of capital deepening
- a rather small portion. Eventually, productivity has to account for the rest of the increase in net
national product of this hypothetic scenario25.
In the general dichotomy of whether capital deepening or rising productivity accounts for economic
growth, Abramovitz favours the latter one - however also admitting the lack of knowledge when it
comes to the explicit sources of productivity and to the exact definition of the residual:
25It is furthermore discussed, how the change in the underlying base year changes the results. Abramovitz admits
that a change in the base year of the empirical analysis leads to other results. It, however, does not change the shares
of productivity and capital deepening strongly, so that the conclusion remains the same.
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“Its source [of the increase in national product, O.Z. ] must be sought principally in
the complex of little understood forces which caused productivity...” (Abramovitz (1956,
p. 6)).
Two more points are noteworthy here. Firstly, capital inputs and productivity do of course have
a relationship. There is, however, a yet unexplored connection in between, so that rising inputs
have in some way contributed to economic growth, too. Secondly, Abramovitz emphasizes (general)
possible measurement problems, which might lead to a bias in tracing the sources of economic growth.
Measuring labour input seems to be quite straightforward, capital a bit more complicated. The author
hereby paves the way for the later debate on mismeasurement and definitory debates, which have
defined the research area from the 1960s onwards and will also form the remainder of the present
study. Even more, Abramovitz also reckons, that due to potential biases in the measurement process,
generally the observed trend in productivity might be overstated (Abramovitz (1956, p. 12)).
What does this imply? If productivity change is mainly unexplained, the relationship to the effects
of capital deepening remains unexplored, too, and a separation of both effects with regard to economic
growth becomes complicated. It then follows that:
“Since we know little about the causes of productivity increase, the indicated importance
of this element may be taken to be some sort of measure of our ignorance about the causes
of economic growth...” (Abramovitz (1956, p. 11)).
It is of central concern, to find the appropriate source(s) of productivity growth (see also OECD
(2015b, p. 32 f.)). If productivity and its ingredients are unexplained phenomena, we cannot simply
(re-)label it as technology (or technological progress) - a hypothesis, Jorgenson and Griliches (1967,
p. 52) shared later on. Abramovitz’ study has, among others, emphasized the role of productivity for
economic growth. In order to shed light into the analysis on the actual sources of productivity, the
present study contributes by exploring the role of the measurement problem as well as by discussing
other potential explanations (which help to specify the linkage between input factors and productivity).
Contrary to former studies and conclusions, in 1967 Dale Jorgenson and Zvi Griliches have embossed
a next era in the history of understanding the causes of economic growth (Jorgenson and Griliches
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(1967)). Their emphasis is on the measurement problems of the variables, associated with the growth
accounting theory. More precisely and according to their understanding, real national product and
real factor inputs have been measured incorrectly (Jorgenson and Griliches (1967, p. 52)). If all
input and output coefficients are measured correctly, then the residual (almost) vanishes. This, in
turn, leads, in the sense of Abramovitz (1956), to a “measure of ignorance”, that growth in output is
mainly explained by growth in input. The ingredients, we do not know, shall be explained, defined
and (correctly) measured and not summed up in a catch-all variable. Not only measurement problems,
but definitory problems are raised as well as:
“Simply relabeling these changes [changes of ’The Residual’ or ’The Measure of Our
Ignorance’, O.Z.] as Technical Progress or Advance of Knowledge leaves the problem of
explaining growth in total output unsolved.” (Jorgenson and Griliches (1967, p. 52)).
Their own definition goes along with the growth accounting approach - growth in output as a result of
the separation of growth in input and growth in total factor productivity. In fact, Jorgenson expanded
the basic Solow Model mainly by measurement innovations (Jorgenson (1963)). This separates the
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967)-approach from the traditional one(s) so that it is considered as being
different from the traditional Solow Model and its ramification. For Solow, the production theory
involved in the growth accounting approach functioned as a tool, whereas Jorgenson and Griliches
stated its ultimate relationship (Hulten (2001)):
“For Solow, the aggregate production function was a parable for the measurement of
TFP; for Jorgenson and Griliches it was a blueprint.” (Hulten (2001, 14)).
The interpretation of Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) is in line with the “spill-over” and “free-lunch”
view, which will be discussed in chapter 5 of the present study in more detail.
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4.2 Correcting the TFP-Formula - a Potential Solution?
Among several other studies following Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), it again was Zvi Griliches in
the late 1970s and 1980s (i.e. Griliches (1987, 1988)), who summarized several deficiencies of the
TFP-measurement and definition and pushed the 1967-approach further. Despite a doubtful side-
effect of the economic debate, drifting to minimizing the residual generally (no matter how), it is
being considered as an important step to analyse the character of the residual and its relationship
to technology. Griliches not only outlined several deficiencies, associated by the quantification of the
residual, but also provided a - to his understanding - ’corrected’ formula of the TFP-residual.
In accordance with his previous works with Dale Jorgenson, he set up a ’corrected’ version of the
residual. His goal was to take into account all deficiencies, identified with the definition and mea-
surement of total factor productivity. From his perspective, the main stumbling blocks, the advocates
of the ’traditional’-view of the residual encounter, can be divided into the following subcategories
(Griliches (1987, pp. 2 ff.)):
1. A relevant capital concept (i.e. the debate on net vs. gross values)
2. Measurement of real output (i.e. including discussions about the right price deflator)
3. Measurement of input (i.e. quality-aspects are usually untouched. See chapter 9.3.2 for further
details)
4. R&D and public infrastructure (i.e. how to treat them in national accounts)
5. General data problems (missing or incomplete data; i.e. the amount of hours worked in total is
a variable, which is extremely complicated to measure, as chapter 8.2 will also debate on)
6. ’Weight’-problems (i.e. the existence of shadow prices)
7. Aggregation over heterogeneity (with regard to various types of input factors)
8. General theoretical assumptions (i.e. what kind of production function, what kind of inputs)
Griliches among others, dealing with conceptual and measurement errors, however, was aware, that
in general, the problems are subject to overlapping and incompleteness. Their original formula of
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the residual (TFP = Y − sK − (1 − s)L) was obviously not sufficient26(Jorgenson and Griliches
(1967)). Extensions and changes of the formula could help to allow for a better and more accurate
understanding, what the residual actually consists of and accounts for. So, Griliches (1987) himself
set up a ’corrected’ version of the residual. His purpose was (at least) to show the limitations and
incompleteness of the approach, going back to Solow (1957). According to the list of stumbling blocks
(points 1.-8.), the unexplained part of economic growth - the total factor productivity - can (and
should) take the following form (Griliches (1987, p. 3)):
TFPcorrect = s(k∗−k)+(1−s)(n∗−n)+(s∗−s)(k∗−n∗)+h[sk∗+(1−s∗)n∗−f ]+αzz+u+TFPincorrect
(7)
The rewriting of the ’incorrect’ Solow-residual allows for a more exact but also a more complex
definition of the unexplained part of economic growth. The variables, denoted with asterisks represent
the correctly measured inputs. The first term represents errors of capital measurement (k ∗ −k),
weighted by the share s of capital on the overall index. If there were no errors in capital measurement,
the term would easily vanish, as the measured value k would be equal to the correct value k∗. The
same logic applies for all the remaining terms. Please note that n represents labour input, s and
respectively (1− s) account for the shares. The final term TFPincorrect stands for the old, incorrectly
measured residual.
Connected to definitory problems, as well as to the capital input component, is the issue of uti-
lization. For productivity analyses, it is important, that the rate of utilization of machinery (any
other capital good would do) is not affected by business-cycle-effects as this might lead to potential
biases. If, however, the rate of utilization is influenced by business-cycle-trends, then this might lead
to an over- or understatement of efficiency and misleadingly provide wrong implications for the path
of technological progress.
Labour input, or more precisely the correction for labour input, is represented by the second term
(n∗−n), weighted by the respective share. Problems with the measurement of labour input arise from
26The calculation is pretty straightforward and simple. When subtracting capital input K, labour input L- both
weighted by share s - are subtracted from output Y , this yields the residual.
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aggregation issues over heterogeneous agents, like young vs. old, male vs. female or the very important
separation between educated and uneducated labour. Moreover, aggregation issues result from a price
bias, too. If individuals’ marginal prices do not correctly display their individual productivities, this
ultimately leads to wrong implications about efficiency levels of specific labour cohorts, as well as for
the aggregate level.
Problems occurring due to wrong weights of the input factors capital and labour are represented
by the third term (s ∗ −s). If for example an economy experiences (a wave of) structural change or
a change in specific industries, the relation between capital use or labour use might change. If now,
relative prices observed, get disconnected from their marginal products, efficiency estimates get biased
as well.
The fourth term stands for economies of scale. The h hereby expresses the degree of elasticity of
scale in production. If, for example, there are no economies of scale, it would not have an impact on
the residual and the fourth term would vanish. Note that the term would also disappear if the growth
rates of inputs, weighted by their correct shares just equal the growth rate of establishments f (plants)
of an economy.
The fifth term z stands for the omitted variable bias, adjusted by the ’true’ elasticity of output for
omitted variables. If its value would be positive, then factors contributing to residual growth were not
listed or recorded in the conventional input factors capital and labour.
Omitted variables play a significant role in certain industries, for example for the sector of agricul-
ture, fishing and forestry (AFF). Natural resources and their use do not enter the production function
of most growth accounting approaches (if the production function is denoted as Y = Af(K;L)); in
theory, these natural resources find their way into the production function implicitly via the capital
component K. Rainfall is absolutely crucial for plant growth in agriculture. AFF-industries more
likely suffer from too little rainfall (compared to a situation of excess rainfall). Too little rainfall would
diminish economic growth, without showing up in the production function. In terms of a production
function Y = Af(K;L), one could come to the (wrong) conclusion, that this might result from a
decline in efficiency (or technological regress) (for example see Kulys and Topp (2014)).
The sixth term u represents the output part. More precisely, definitory problems of output mea-
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surement, not further specified by the author and therefore summed up as a ’catch-all’-variable u. As
for some questions, it is hard to find an exact definition like ’where do final goods start?’ and ’where
to draw the line between them and simple intermediate goods’. As a potential but rather general
claim, Griliches asks for a more serious “border of economic activity” (Griliches (1987, p. 3)). It is
remarkable that current debates in the 21st century about the appropriate framework for national
accounts in order to capture economic activity correctly have already bothered economists long time
ago.
Other problems might include the question of how to treat pollution, underground activity, home
office work or the effect of outsourcing. If a mother decides not to employ a nanny, but take care
of their kids by herself, how does this service enter the aggregate production function? In terms
of market transactions and market prices, an ’outsourcing of parenthood’ raises national GDP and
affects productivity measurement. If the mother, in turn, raises her child by herself, there is no
market transaction. National productivity measurement remains untouched. As initially stated, a
general problem results from separating goods, services or units into their respective price and quantity
component.
For productivity analyses, it is crucial, that prices reflect their marginal costs in equilibrium. If
prices are regulated or controlled by governmental institutions, an adjustment of goods by constant
prices seems impossible. Even more, if for example prices are subsidized by governmental institutions,
then this may lead to a biased view of productivity. Depending on ’external activity’ (all activity
except market activity), one might come to a wrong conclusion about the change in efficiency.
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5 Spill-overs, Super-Normal-Profits and the ’Free-Lunch-View’
In theory, and if in reality TFP is measured as a residual, it might capture the effects of technological
progress. As already stated, however, there are serious doubts on the extent (i.e also see OECD (2015b,
p. 32 ff.)). Technological change is, at least in part, already embodied in capital goods (K), which has
to be taken into account. Hence, for measuring TFP some caution is necessary. If technological progress
is already embodied in capital goods, then another interpretation of TFP is, that it will account only
for the disembodied part of the innovation. This can include network effects, more efficient practices in
general, the impact of brand names, organisational change and general knowledge (diffusion) (OECD
(2015a, p. 32)).
Emphasizing that TFP does not and even cannot measure technological progress entirely, Carlaw,
K. and Lipsey, R. (2003) state that TFP is (at best) only related to technology. In fact, the authors
maintain a rather sharp point of view by stating that “productivity is not a measure of technology”27.
The confusing terminology of TFP among economists makes it problematic to speak of both notions
in the same breath.
Their own definition of TFP is described by the notion of so-called “super-normal-profits” associated
with technological change. TFP, or the residual, then captures “contemporary returns, that are in
excess of the normal rate of return on investing in known technology” (Carlaw, K. and Lipsey, R.
(2003, p. 457)), but not technological progress itself. Moreover, only under certain conditions, TFP
can capture these “excess returns”.
By rejecting the simple equality of TFP change and technological progress, they also provide
criticism on the disembodiment-hypothesis and exogenous technology treatment of former studies.
Technological progress is not the result of spontaneous events (the often cited ’manna from heaven’;
i.e. see Davenport (1983, p.139) on the exogenous character of technological progress in traditional
approaches) but a result of intensive resource-using activities. These resource-using activities are
composed of more than just simple R&D-costs. They are represented by the entire “development costs”
of a new technology set, which also include “installation costs, acquisition of tacit knowledge about the
27Chapter 2 of Carlaw, K. and Lipsey, R. (2003, p. 458) is titled accordingly.
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manufacture and operating of the new equipment, learning-by-doing effects in making of the product,
and learning-effects by using it, plus a normal return on investment of funds in development costs.”
(Carlaw, K. and Lipsey, R. (2003, p. 467)) - broadly speaking, anything related to the introduction of
a new set of technology into the economic sphere.
Carlaw, K. and Lipsey, R. (2003) follow the line of Jorgenson and Griliches (1967). More precisely,
they adopt the “excess returns”-logic (Carlaw, K. and Lipsey, R. (2003, p. 467)) described in the
1967-study.
5.1 Jorgenson and Griliches 1967
By following Abramovitz (1962), and under the assumptions of constant returns to scale and the
respective shift in the production function, according to Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), this shift
is identified as “the effect of ’costless’ advances in applied technology and managerial efficiency, and
industrial organization” (Jorgenson and Griliches (1967, p. 250) quoting Abramovitz (1962, p. 764)).
Put together, any advance in production, which is costless in terms of market transactions, is identified
with changes in total factor productivity. Characterizing TFP as “costless advances” represents a
“spill-over”-character from technology. Moreover, the authors’ understanding form the basis of another
potential view of how to interpret TFP.
If then, all variables are measured correctly, output growth is (or should be) mainly explained by
growth in inputs. In their own calculation, the authors then correct for several deficiencies, i.e. aggre-
gation errors, errors in investment and goods prices, errors in relative utilization, errors in aggregating
capital services and aggregating in labour services. Initially, 52.4% of output growth is explained by
inputs and the respective counterpart of 47.6% by the effects of productivity (TFP)28. After correcting
for the (measurement) errors, there is an increase in the explanatory power of input growth to 96.7%
and a reduction in the productivity residual to only 3.3%. For the time period covered (1945-1965),
a 3.59% increase in output p. a. is noted and productivity effects account for only 0.10 percentage
points (Jorgenson and Griliches (1967, p. 270 f.)).
28The results might puzzle, if compared to the Solovian analysis. Jorgenson and Griliches focus on a different period
of time in US history, namely from 1945 to 1965, which obviously complicates a comparison.
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The result confirms their hypothesis, that after correcting for all measurement errors (which arise
from mis-exploitation of economic theory), growth in output is mainly explained by growth in input.
As the remainder of the present study will show (especially chapter 9.3), a reliable and correct quan-
tification of measurement errors is not only complicated but also subject to critical and discussable
assumptions.
Having established a new view on how to think of TFP, Jorgenson and Griliches have not only
encountered approval. An important reply has been set by Edward Denison (1972). Denison’s studies
have confirmed residuals significantly differing from zero, emphasizing the importance of productivity
with regard to the underlying methodology - the opposite of what Jorgenson and Griliches have found.
By applying his own methodology, Denison finds, that the proposed (almost) zero-residual is a false
statement (Denison (1972, p.1), Hulten (2001, p. 13)). For 1950-1962, Denison (1972) finds that 1.37
percentage points of the growth rate of output can be explained by output per unit of input, which
is productivity, compared to only 0.3 percentage points as provided by the Jorgenson and Griliches
(1967)-study; see Denison (1985, p.1 f.) and the results of Jorgenson and Griliches (1967, p. 270 f.)).
It can be suspected that differences between the two studies have arisen mainly due to the problem
of different covered time periods, the definition of output in the two studies and the types of sectors
included in the calculation, different labour and capital shares and as well different measures for
deflating nominal values.
Heterogeneous assumptions and definitions represent general issues when comparing studies and
their respective implications. Whereas Jorgenson and Griliches refer to real gross national product per
unit of input in the private sector as the relevant data source, Denison takes real national income per
unit of input for the entire economy (Denison (1972, p. 2)). It seems problematic to calculate under
different assumptions and a comparison between the studies (or mutual criticism) should be treated
with care. As an example, Denison calculates shares of capital and labour of 21.4% and 78.6% for
the whole economy, measured as part of national income. Jorgenson and Griliches instead, take gross
national product at factor prices just for the private sector and receive 29.2% and 70.8% respectively
(Denison (1972, p. 4)). In addition, Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) have calculated and adjusted
capacity utilization by the help of electricity (proxy-solution), which in turn led to further differences.
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However, being aware of the different set-ups of their calculations, Denison (1972, p. 1 ) also admits
that even “[a]fter allowance for these differences, most of the large discrepancy between our measures
of output per unit of input remains”.
5.2 Super-Normal Profits and Super-Normal Benefits
Carlaw, K. and Lipsey, R. (2003) are of the opinion that TFP captures only the gains, that are
over and above the development costs in production. This understanding merely follows the logic of
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967). Only if technology generates returns, that exceed their costs, TFP
growth is positive. They consolidate their view by providing an example of three possible scenarios
(see “A thought experiment”, Carlaw, K. and Lipsey, R. (2003, pp. 467 ff.)). An entrepreneur faces
development costs and the value of a product of the new machine so that three possible scenarios
arise: costs equal value, costs being smaller than value, costs being larger than value. In all three
cases, there is technological progress, embodied in the new machine. Only in the scenario (scenario
three) of returns exceeding development costs of the machine, however, TFP growth is positive, which
apparently rejects any equalization of TFP and technology.
Free-lunches or any other externalities, arising from technological change are a result of the assumed
framework of a perfectly end-state equilibrium, which necessarily equates all lines of returns - those
from an investment in new technology to those from the investment in a new capital good of the
existing (’old’) technology. Under conditions like these, additional returns would only arise due to
externalities. The authors prefer the term “super-normal-profits” or “super-normal-benefits” over “free
lunches of externalities” (which Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) prefer to make use of). Even though
the notion “free-lunches of externalities” is associated with benefits accruing to third parties, there is
a slight divergence to what TFP measures (Lipsey and Carlaw (2004, p. 1128 f.)).
Providing a scenario with the emphasis on different implications of risk and uncertainty (“Knightian
uncertainty”), problems, associated with a “free lunch”- notation can occur (Carlaw, K. and Lipsey,
R. (2003, pp. 469 ff.)). Frank Knight (1921) famously distinguished between risk and uncertainty,
whereas uncertainty is a state, not measurable and not possible to be calculated. In such a “real
world”-scenario there exist additional profits due to the commitment of undertaking risk. Profits arising
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from this commitment, which are over and above development costs, might appear - but they are not
genuine free-lunches. The appearance of these profits represents incentives to persuade entrepreneurs
to undertaking innovative expenditures. They are premia, which do not stand for a free-lunch, but
some kind of extra-return due to taking over uncertainty. If the resulting innovations take over forms of
general purpose technologies (GPT), like electricity, the steam engine, computers or innovations in turn
of the information and communication technology (ICT), then their characters change to externalities
for any other entrepreneur in this world. GPT are genuine free-lunches.
In order to avoid misleading implications, associated with free-lunches, Lipsey and Carlaw (2004)
use “super-normal profits” as “the difference between the firm’s return to [the effort of, O.Z.] innovation
and the return that can be obtained by investing in capital embodying existing technology” (Lipsey
and Carlaw (2004, p. 1129)). Moreover, “super-normal benefits of technological change” as “the sum of
all associated output increases and cost reductions accruing to anyone in the economy minus the new
technology’s development costs” (Lipsey and Carlaw (2004, p. 1129)). Whereas the former definition
is rather associated with the entrepreneur’s behaviour, the latter one is a more aggregate view for the
entire economy.
In addition, the authors discuss scenarios, in which the TFP-residual does not capture these ’super-
normal benefits’ (Carlaw, K. and Lipsey, R. (2003, pp. 470 ff.), as well as Lipsey and Carlaw (2004,
pp. 1133-1141)). Interestingly, these scenarios can be interpreted as potential measurement errors in
the process of measuring productivity growth accurately. A question that will accompany the present
study over the next parts and chapters.
Timing of the appearance of the invention is important. If technological change spreads its effects
over different time horizons (in their example at once compared to a spread over 20 years), the effects
regarding TFP and free-lunches can differ. More precisely, as free-lunches represent a reduction in the
production costs they can diverge from the TFP measured, due to a difference in the contribution of
cumulative costs.
Another important issue is the treatment of R&D in national accounts. If costs for R&D are
reported as costs only, they do not lead to an effect on output (and productivity, therefore). It is
a general problem, associated with the set up of national accounts in terms of how to treat certain
40
variables. For Germany, the Statistisches Bundesamt has corrected this inadequacy in course of a major
revision in 2014 and since then there is an explicit treatment of R&D as part of capital formation (see
i.e. Statistisches Bundesamt (2014), also discussed in chapter 8 of the present study).
Natural resources are usually assumed to be included (implicitly) in the input factor capital. Any
incorrect measurement (“omitted variables”) of these input factors can either over- or underestimate
output and productivity. If natural resources (such as land or minerals) are underestimated according
to their implicit treatment (in K), then TFP and the “excess returns” diverge.
Omitted variables and more general aggregation problems are similar to the general discussion
about measurement errors, as provided by Griliches (1987) (see chapter 4.2). Last but not least is the
measurement problem of general purpose technologies (GPTs). Their effects on productivity might
still be large, even though the respective date (or period) of innovation, invention and also diffusion
has already been taken place decades (or even centuries) ago. For example, without having discovered
electricity, modern production technology and the high level of efficiency still gain from this invention
(though, its innovation costs do not show up anymore). It seems that measurement problems, one of
the main aspects in the present study, appear and have appeared in many studies and debates before.
Its potential for the explanation of missing numbers in data turns up to be reasonable.
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6 Concluding Remarks Part II
Technology and productivity are the main drivers of human development, wealth and output (i.e.
Herzog-Stein et al. (2017, p. 5)). So, it is of central concern to capture technology from a quantitative
perspective in order to theoretically model it accordingly. In the majority of studies and approaches,
this is total factor productivity (TFP), representing the degree of efficiency of all factors included in
production. It is calculated as a residual in a growth accounting framework - a possibility to decompose
economic activity regarding its contributors.
For the evaluation of productivity of the individual input factors, there are the variables of labour
productivity or capital productivity. Both rely on the evaluation of the efficiency of the respective
input factors. For an overall analysis of efficiency, the concept of total factor productivity is inferred -
and if all factors are evaluated regarding efficiency, this represents or at least is related to technology.
Even though the common approach to model technology in terms of total factor productivity
has some merits, it also contains several points, which are open for debates. More precisely, three
potential views on how to interpret the TFP-residual are provided in this first part of the present
study: a traditional one, stating an equivalence between TFP and technology; an alternative one,
aiming to assign the unknown ingredients of the residual to input factors and a “third-way”, which
interprets the TFP-residual as some kind of economic externality.
There is a long-lasting history for the exploration of the causes and explanations on economic
development. In order to theorize and theoretically discuss economic progress, an analytical modelling
framework was required. Back at the beginning of the 20th century, the base for it was set. By
providing the possibility of the theoretical conversion of input goods into economic output, in 1928 the
Cobb-Douglas production function was developed.
Based on, and enriched with, a time-indexed property, the studies by Jan Tinbergen in the 1940s
form the origin of the growth accounting approach, which purpose it was, to separate economic growth
into its contributors. Hereby the general dichotomy between an increase in input factors and effects
resulting from productivity is outlined - the latter traditionally associated and equalized with (effects
of) technology.
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Independent works from Robert Solow and Trevor Swan in the 1950s - the starting point of neo-
classical growth theory - then form the next milestone in the debate on the causes of economic growth.
As a result, Solow discovered a residual - the “Solow-residual” - being responsible for the bulk of US
economic growth - and he labelled it as technological progress. As the consecutive studies and ap-
proaches have argued, however, there is far more behind a simple equalization. Rather the residual is
to be understood as a variable, composed of unknown ingredients - a measure of ignorance, as Moses
Abramovitz has once labelled it.
This second view of how to see and interpret the residual was later shared by works of Dale
Jorgenson and Zvi Griliches in the 1960s and 1970s, who aimed to improve measurement and hereby
minimize the residual - they were on the quest of turning the ignorance into real and reliable economic
explanations. By doing so, they unknowingly formed a debate, the present study is dedicated to: what
explains productivity puzzles - real economic causes or poor measurement?
Another potential view, the “third way”, as provided mainly by Richard Lipsey and Kenneth Carlaw,
on how to interpret TFP, is to understand it as the amount of “super-normal profits” or “super-normal
benefits” with the character of an economic externality. Only those gains, which are not yet embodied
in the stock of input factors show up as residual. And only under specific conditions, these disembodied
effects represent technological progress.
Even though these points of scepticism exist, there is no better variable such as TFP, describing the
contribution of technology in an economic framework. Having started from a simple equivalence, the
external-effect and spill-over approaches became quite common. Usually, in modern growth literature,
there is no serious nomenclature-debate, as it seems there is no necessity. If, however, one talks about
technology and total factor productivity in one breath, one has to keep in mind that disturbances
might exist, which might lead to a biased measurement and therefore to biased policy implications.
Without doubts, the main driver for the development of an economy is technology; however, it is
hard to capture in a quantitative approach. If one correctly assumes a relationship between technology
and (total factor) productivity, then it is of central concern for an economy to stress on a positive trend
in the productivity statistics. The remainder of the present study will draw an image on the trends in
productivity with a special focus on Germany and discuss potential channels and linkages. Moreover,
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it will discuss the declining trends in productivity and provide a two-fold line of explanation - real
causes on the one hand, and mismeasurement on the other.
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Part III
Mismeasurement or Real Causes? -
Implications for the Explanation of
Productivity Puzzles
7 Introduction
Productivity and its development over time are of central concern for economists and politicians
likewise. Part II has already indicated that technological progress and productivity growth are linked
to each other. They are connected and therefore intercorrelated with the development process of
an economy. In course of the debate on declining rates of labour productivity in the 1970s (as a
ramification of the two oil-price shocks), Nordhaus (1982, p. 131) once stated that:
“The recent slowdown in productivity growth constitutes the major economic ailment of
modern industrial countries today. More than any other ill - higher oil prices, deteriorating
terms of trade, volatility of financial or foreign exchange markets, high inflation - low
productivity growth is the root of the arrest of growth in living standards as well as the
political malaise in the West.”
Without taking a deeper insight into the data, one is easily confronted with shrinking rates in
productivity in many countries over the last years (decades), varying to the extent, however. Not
only regarding extent; economic conditions and explanations suspect that Germany is a special case,
compared to other developed economies (Elstner et al. (2018, p. 34)).
Superficial research instantly confirms the view, that over the last years productivity growth has
decreased (or in some categories at best stagnated), depending on the respective productivity variable
considered. Growth in labour productivity and total factor productivity in Germany has slowed down
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over the past decades as illustration 1 shows. One is immediately reminded of the 1970s and the
underlying debate over the reasons for the (global) decline in productivity (see chapter 9.1) and the
worldwide recession back then.
Since the 1970s, growth rates of hours worked and persons employed have (more or less) remained
stable over time, whereas GDP growth rates have declined in the latest past. Numbers of employment
growth, measured as persons employed, can be found in between an interval of ±2%, except some
(stronger) cyclical variations, like in the aftermath of the two oil-price shocks in the 1970s (i.e. -
2.5% in 1975) or in course of the era of the German reunification. The latter has led to a so-called
’German Sonderkonjunktur’ (i.e. +3.2% in 1990 and +2.8% in 1991), implying outstanding economic
performances, at least for the (two) consecutive years after Reunification.
Likewise, employment volume by per capita measurement has remained stable. Following the same
trend as employment, measured as per person, the growth rates can be found in between an interval of
±1% (also subject to cyclical swings in course of the oil crises in the 1970s, the German reunification
1989-1991 and the global financial crisis 2007-2009).
At first glance, this implies a declining growth ratio of output per unit of input (denominator
constant, decreasing enumerator). The red line in illustration 1 shows the efficiency parameter of GDP
per hour worked.
In the 1970s GDP per hour worked has experienced growth rates of about 5% p.a. (i.e. 1973: 5.1%).
In the 2000s then, these values have dropped below the 2%-mark (neglecting cyclical phenomena in
course of the financial crisis or others shocks; strong negative growth rates of -2.6% in 2009 have been
compensated by years of moderate recovery in 2010 (2.5%) and 2011 (2.1%)).
Since then, growth rates have almost reached the zero bound, implying some kind of stagnation
phenomenon. Their declining trends, and as the empirical section of the present study will show,
therefore confirm the supposition, that productivity growth in Germany has decreased over the last
years (and even decades) and GDP growth rates have declined slightly in the 21st century so far. Prior
to this, growth rates of around 2% to 4% (except the often cited strong effects in part of the German
Reunification) are found; nowadays only temporarily overstepping the 3%-mark.
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Figure 1: Labour Productivity Growth and TFP Growth in Germany (in per cent), 1971-2013. Source:
OECD Statistics (2016); own illustration.
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Typically, theories for explanation are categorised into the demand or supply side of an economy.
A debate on weak effective demand hereby is often used to explain the decline. Recent statements
by Larry Summers (i.e. see Summers (2014a; 2014b; 2015b; 2015a)), have re-activated a discussion
on what is called (demand-side) ’secular stagnation’. Summers relates his studies on the origin of the
debate - delivered by the Presidential Address of Alvin Hansen back in 1939 (Hansen (1939)). Since
then, ’secular stagnation’ has been revived as a potential strand of explanation for decreasing rates of
productivity (i.e. Aksoy et al. (2015)).
The main objective of the debate on (demand-side) ’secular stagnation’ is the shortfall of effective
demand in the long run. Whereas the majority of issues dealing with effective demand usually connects
to the short run and the business-cycle-view, the debate on secular stagnation has shifted and extended
the discussion to the long run.
Moreover, weak capital spending plays a role - withholding the latest and technologically advanced
capital goods for the workers. Capital spending, especially in the public sector, provides the required
framework for economic progress (mainly infrastructure). Besides the income effect, capital spending
creates capacity for future economic performance and works as a “diffusion-machine” for technological
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progress. The impact on productivity growth is similar, like a high level of government spending, i.e.
represented by regulatory issues29. A discussion of potential reasons is found in chapter 9. As weak
capital spending also provides potential for a discussion, the empirical section provides data and trends
on general investment behaviour, especially for Germany. Germany currently experiences a debate on
whether there is a lack of investment in the economy (’Investitionslücke’, engl. ’investment gap’). See
section 9 and the listed studies for a more detailed discussion.
In contrast to demand-side phenomena, the supply-side provides explanatory power, too. The
supply-side of an economy is associated with the (business) conditions and more general the framework
for economic activity. As a substitute for a demand-side explanation (or a complementary?), Robert
Gordon has formed an analysis, targeting potential obstacles in the framework of the regulatory sphere
(i.e. Gordon (2012; 2015; 2016)). Whereas Gordon’s major argument (less technological innovations)
is subject to debate on, his minor arguments - the so-called “headwinds” - clearly focus on insufficient
conditions in the environment of the United States, faltering economic growth.
This part of the study (part III) critically reflects on the development of German productivity vari-
ables. It asks whether Germany and other economies are experiencing a productivity slowdown from
an empirical perspective and sheds light into the discussion about potential causes and explanations.
One main focus hereby lies on the so-called mismeasurement hypothesis and general measurement
problems- if there is a lack in the methodology and/or actual measurement process, this might account
for the missing part in the data.
Syverson (2016), for example, recently has set up an analysis with regard to mismeasurement for
the United States of America, spanning a time horizon over the last decades back to 1995. He concludes
that mismeasurement cannot (entirely) account for the large gap in the productivity statistics but offers
potential for further discussions and a deeper analysis. In fact, he discusses four different patterns,
which counter the validity of the mismeasurement-hypothesis and (in sum) provide significant obstacles
for its plausibility.
One of the issues discussed in the course of the mismeasurement hypothesis is the connection of
ICT-heavy economies and labour productivity slowdowns (i.e. Syverson (2016, pp. 7-9)). In this
29The Wall Street Journal’s May 2015 survey has proved results like these, available under
<‌<http://projects.wsj.com/econforecast/#ind=gdp&r=20&e=1431549244029>‌>.
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context “ICT-heavy” means, that the information and communication sector plays a decent role for
the domestic economy, often measured by a ICT-to-GDP-ratio. In the course of the analysis of this
section, country-by-country comparisons and the connection to the ICT-sector (and its size) are unfold.
If mismeasurement is to account as a correct answer for the productivity puzzle in the US, then it should
not be reflected in other countries as well (still subject to to discussion, as mismeasurement problems
might occur simultaneously in various countries; at least they should not appear to the same extent or
exhibit equal patterns). Data, however, show that a significant amount of other countries (other than
the US) is experiencing low and declining numbers in productivity development, too (despite having
different ICT-intensities).
Moreover, mismeasurement can also be related to the problem of changing quality or more generally
- the composition of different types of goods and services. If products change regarding quality or their
characteristics, then a quantitative comparison over time will be distorted. So-called “Hedonic Prices
Indexes” have a long-lasting history and try to correct for changing product properties, in order to
isolate the price effect.
This part, therefore, contributes in multiple ways. Firstly, it provides an evaluation of productivity
indicators with a focus on Germany. Secondly, it separates for the two main strands of explanation
- the productivity puzzle as a result of poor measurement or real economic causes. For the latter,
Gordon’s theory of (supply-side) secular stagnation is applied on Germany, evaluating the (economic)
environment with regard to productivity development. For the argument of mismeasurement, the
main focus is on Syverson (2016), and an application on Germany is provided. It will be shown that
mismeasurement exhibits potential wisdom for the solution of productivity puzzles, its explanatory
power, however, is simply too small. The reasons for shrinking rates of productivity, therefore, must
lie in a nexus of real causes and maybe in the belief of having less (important) innovations in the 21st
century.
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8 Empirical Analysis
8.1 Preliminaries
General
What is so special about productivity variables and what can we infer for the general economic devel-
opment path of a country? According to the first part of the present study, total factor productivity
represents the best option available to capture technology in an economic framework. The growth
accounting approach hereby divides economic growth into its relevant components. One can use it
to display the relationship between productivity variables (namely labour productivity LP and total
factor productivity TFP ) and the effect of capital deepening (k):
LˆP = kˆ + ˆTFP (8)
denoted in growth rates, with k = KL as the amount of capital (K) per unit of labour (L).
Labour productivity growth is the sum of technological progress (if one accepts the TFP-notation)
and the growth in the ratio of capital goods per unit of labour30.
Any further specifications are possible - for example, in course of the rising relevance of the ICT-
sector, a separation between ICT- and non-ICT-sectors regarding capital investment. It allows to
evaluate the effects of changes in the ICT-sectors and non-ICT sectors separately (following Herzog-
Stein et al. (2017, p. 6)):
LˆP = aKˆICT + bKˆNon−ICT + ˆTFP (9)
with a and b as weights31.
30Rearrangements are possible, so that (i.e.) technological progress is labour productivity minus the effect of capital
deepening.
31These weights are expressed in percentages and are calculated as average over the last periods of time, regarding
their weight to total capital input. Herzog-Stein et al. (2017, 4) follow the OECD-calculation method (see OECD
(2015a), especially pages 69-70). The shares are computed by using data for the past two years and are calculated by
the Tornqvist-method.
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So, no matter which productivity indicator is chosen, one can derive implications for the counter-
part. If one wants to explain declining incomes and decreasing rates of economic development, one has
to confront the analysis at different points. Either one can find reasons for decreasing incomes (ex-
pressed as GDP or GDP per capita) due to less labour productivity growth, less technological change
(represented by TFP) and/or by the effects of a lack of investment (per unit of labour).
It seems acceptable, taking labour productivity as central productivity variable due to better data
availability, more studies dealing with it instead of total factor productivity and the easier and more
straightforward approach with regard to measurement32 (Griliches (1988, p. 10)). Labour productivity
can be expressed as either per person or per hour worked (the former as rather a welfare indicator,
the latter one usually preferred for efficiency analyses, like OECD (2015a) offers).
In both cases, it reflects an input-output-relation, which allows to evaluate efficiency and economic
develoment. (National) income per person (=labour productivity as measured per person), the in-
dicator for economic welfare and development mostly used, can be split into the following identity
(Herzog-Stein et al. (2017, p. 4)):
GDPt
Popt
=
GDPt
ht
x
ht
Et
x
Et
EPt
x
EPt
Popt
(10)
with the components of entire population (Pop), amount of hours worked (h), persons employed
(E), employment potential (EP ) and gross domestic product (GDP ). All variables are taken from the
same period of time t. Gross domestic product (GDP) or national income per person then is derived
as the product of four terms: GDP per hour worked (GDPtht ) times average hours worked (
ht
Et
) times
employment ratio ( EtEPt ) times Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) (
EPt
Popt
).
This separation allows tackling the individual parts individually. It also shows that finding one
single explanation for declining rates of productivity seems unlikely, as a variety of potential reasons
exists.
32Labour productivity erases complications from having more than one production factor in the calculation and it
avoids the problem of aggregating over heterogeneity of capital stocks.
51
Data
In order to provide a reliable base for the consecutive discussion of the productivity puzzle, this chapter
breaks down important stats and trends in productivity development. Several databases are possible
to be taken into account, all of them slightly varying in detail and sometimes methodology. Many
of the following illustrations of this chapter are based on the OECD productivity statistics33. The
OECD also makes use of data provided by The Conference Board (2019), which itself collects data
from OECD, national accounts like Eurostat or EU-KLEMS34 (see i.e. OECD (2015b, p. 100)).
Methodology and individual calculations for the OECD data are explained in De Vriees and Erumban
(nd). If appropriate, calculations and methods are explained in more detail in the respective subsequent
chapters. Also, if other sources differ in their data analysis, this will be noticed in individual cases.
National accounts are subject to regular minor and major revisions. To provide a common base
and to make data comparable, country-specific data is based on the System of National Accounts
(SNA). The SNA is an internationally agreed standard and includes a catalogue of regulations and
recommendations for the quantification of economic activity. The current version in use is the SNA
2008, which almost all member states of the OECD have already adopted and implemented successfully.
Switching from one to another system-version includes major changes. As the SNA includes several
revisions, country-based comparisons have to be used with a certain amount of care, as differences in
the data also might result from (minor) differences in the calculation method.
An important example for a major revision is the revision of national accounts in Germany in fall
2014. Beside including military goods in the investment category, R&D-activities are now part of the
large investment category (counted to “other fixed assets”) and have changed the numbers significantly
in this class.
The effect of including R&D was tremendous for the investment category. For Germany, the revised
value for GDP in current prices in 2010 (taken as example) was an increase of 3.3% (or from €2.5
trn. to almost €2.6 trn.). Gross capital formation in total rose by 14.3% (around €2 bn.), the so-
called “other fixed assets”, making almost €60 bn., which include the important R&D-expenditures,
33See OECD Statistics (2016) and the yearly published extensive compendium of productivity trends: OECD (2015a).
34More details on the EU-KLEMS project are provided at <‌<http://www.euklems.net/index.html>‌>.
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now explicitly taken into account. In fact, including R&D-expenditures has increased gross capital
formation by the largest amount ever (i.e. Statistisches Bundesamt (2014); Hagemann et al. (2016);
Brümmerhoff and Grömling (2014)).
Another aspect noteworthy is the price-deflation of nominal GDP-data. Productivity is loosely
defined as real output (enumerator), relative to the input used in production (denominator). To infer
nominal output from the national accounts into real output, it has to be adjusted with prices. Various
concepts to deflate nominal output are possible. GDP-deflators have the advantage over consumer-
price-basket-methods in this case, as they represent all the goods and services being produced in an
economy (consumer price basket methods value the change in the costs of living standard and also
include imported goods and service). Capturing the change in prices of all goods, in this case, is
superior to the basket-method, as all goods matter in an aggregate analysis of productivity. In order
to quantify or evaluate (i.e.) the change in the standards of living, a consumer-price basket-method
has to be chosen, as the change in some prices does not influence the consumption level. Moreover,
as in the consumer-price basket imported goods are represented, they might distort the productivity
analysis of the domestic country.
To make the results internationally comparable, however, a common standard has to be adopted
and implemented. Here, the methodology of the purchasing power parity (PPP) is commonly used. It
converts nominal values of all countries’ currencies into US-dollar-standard by using the PPP-method
(here: nominal GDP by market prices), in order to receive real GDP. Then, economic data, used to
quantify and calculate productivity numbers, is linked to one unique base - US-dollar by having used
PPP, which provides a common base for all countries.
Both methods, however, exhibit problems regarding the registration of quality effects. More pre-
cisely, changes in prices can also result from changes in the nature of products (and services) and their
respective qualities. Section 9.3.2 discusses an alternative method to correct for quality-induced price
changes - the so-called hedonic price index (method). The presumption is that increases in prices are
overstated, leading to lower rates of productivities in the end. Hedonic price indexes indicate a lower
change in prices, implying higher real values of output and productivity likewise. If executed correctly
and the effects of the price correction are trustworthy, then it offers another potential for the missing
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part in productivity.
The empirical section of this study includes the analysis of the production factors in use. Hereby
the inferred productivity concepts are linked to the actual factors in production. Used most frequently,
this is labour productivity and multi-factor-productivity (MFP)35.
8.2 Labour Productivity and Income Per Capita
Commonly, labour productivity is defined as the simple ratio of gross domestic product (GDP) and a
denominator of some kind of labour input (i.e. Jorgenson (1986, p. 63)). Definitions, however, offer
potential for debates, especially when confronted to the problem of aggregation over (heterogeneous)
variables - within a country and/or by executing comparisons with other countries (in which definitions
might deviate).
For the denominator of labour productivity, either persons or the exact working volume (expressed
in hours) can be chosen (even more, persons can be understood as the entire population of a country,
its working population or another fraction -a more detailed discussion can be found in section 8.2).
Per capita rather provides information on the standard of living (represented as income per capita),
whereas per hour worked is chosen when productivity is the issue (Ademmer et al. (2017, p. 31)).
Additionally, ’total hours worked’ is the more appropriate denominator in use, as it is more robust
to economic policy actions or structural labour market developments, like splitting full-time jobs into
several part-time jobs or so-called “Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen” (ABM36, highly promoted by
German labour market policy changes in course of the introduction of the “Hartz reforms” in the early
2000s37). The effects of the “Hartz reforms” and their implications for German productivity growth
will be discussed in more detail in section 9.2.5.
Moreover, hours-based approaches have the advantage to derive propositions over more than one
year. A quick view into economic history shows, that the average daily or weekly workload or time
spent at work has slightly decreased within the last decades (i.e. in Germany after WWII from around
35Please note that in this context the terms multi-factor-productivity (MFP) and total factor productivity (TFP) are
used synonymously.
36The ABM were abolished in 2012.
37By the implementation of small-scale employment models - for example so-called Mini-jobs and Midi-Jobs - unem-
ployed persons shall be re-introduced to the labour market by roundabout, the so-called “secondary labour market”.
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10 hours per day to nowadays around 8 hours a day, see chapter 8.6 for details).
Measurements, using the person-denominator, cannot account for complete accurateness, like the
hours worked concept can. A reduction in the average workload per person provides a downward bias in
the productivity number (if total working volume is constant, less average workload per worker implies
positive employment effects, which in turn lead to a larger denominator and smaller productivity,
therefore). It should rather be understood as income per capita and the respective welfare indicator.
’Total hours worked’, the productivity-indicator chosen by the OECD, includes the workload of
employed and self-employed workers in production (“all persons engaged in production”). Productivity
statistics should capture the actual amount worked, whether paid or not (“overtime”, “unpaid work”), as
every hour worked leads to output changes and therefore contributes to national GDP. ’Actual hours
worked’, though, differs from ’hours usually worked’, ’hours paid for’, ’contractual hours of work’,
’overtime hours of work’ and ’absence from work hours’ (see OECD (2015a, p. 73)). In this context,
it is interesting to note, that the OECD includes ’maintenance time’, ’time used to travel to work
or between working locations’, ’waiting time’, ’training time’, ’cleaning time’ and ’time spend on-call
duty’ for the calculation of the denominator.
Especially ’time used to travel to work’ is discussable, as it is not ultimately linked to the production
process and might be subject to possible biases. If, for example, in rural areas people require more
time to travel to their working place, measured labour productivity is lower by the “extra-amount
[necessary] to travel” (OECD (2015b, p. 73)), compared to urban areas, where people usually need
less time to get to work, as there is a superior system of infrastructure. Does the productivity - or
efficiency - of the ’rural’ workers have to be considered as lower? Yes and no. Yes, as in a given amount
of time the urban worker will extract more output and contribute more to national product, compared
to the rural worker. No, in a sense, that their individual abilities and skills might be the same or even
differ in advantage or the rural worker.
The same logic applies for the separation between employed and self-employed workers. Self-
employed workers usually make use of more time spent in home-office. Home-office does not lead
to travel-time, so that these workers could offer higher productivity even though their abilities and
skills are the same, compared to an employed worker. On the other hand, however, less time is spent
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with unproductive travel-time. It is a question of how to define labour input in general. One finds
arguments on favour and against ex- or including ’travel time’ or other parts as well.
Excluded in the OECD-statistics, however, is the time used for (longer) breaks at work, (public)
holidays and/or educational training, which makes sense as this does not directly lead to changes
in production. Longer absences from work and holidays are not related to the working activity and
training/education is an investment in human capital and not an input factor in production. One
might ask to ex- or include some of the listed aspects, as they are part of definitory questions. If there
is a common standard, however, all countries considered will “suffer” from such a possible bias.
Biases, resulting from definitory problems, can be neglected if they occur in all countries by the same
extent. Whereas the first point (in all countries) might be true, if the same institution is responsible for
the calculations, the second point might cause problems. Countries usually differ significantly (even in
the OECD) among cultural, economic, political and social aspects and more general in their structural
composition and “way of life and work”. A (specific) portion of the difference in productivity numbers
could be derived from those biases and should, therefore, be erased as best as possible.
The actual measurement process of ’hours worked’ offers potential problems and potential to debate.
Usually and in most (OECD-) countries data is collected via direct measurement by using surveys.
Additionally and if survey data is not available (or leads to disproportionally high transaction costs),
so-called ’reference weeks’ are taken into account. Upon a ’reference week’, the annual workload is then
extrapolated afterwards. Some countries, however, do not provide data via direct measurement and
adjust the ’reference-week-method’ by other sources and components (i.e. establishment surveys, tax
registers or social security registers). Without any doubt, a method used uniformly in every country
would raise liability and correctness of data. So far, it has to be taken into account that differences in
productivity measurement can arise from different methodologies, used in different countries (OECD
(2015b, pp. 73 f.)).
The empirical analysis of labour productivity and multi-factor-productivity is organized as follows.
Deriving data from the OECD database, numbers for the measurement of the per capita, per hour
worked and per person employed approach are provided. Additionally, this section also adopts a time
interval separation from the OECD (2015b)-study, with regard to the global financial crisis of 2007-
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2009 - a major structural change for almost every economy in the world. One interval represents the
era, which is considered as ’pre-crisis’ (2001-2007) and another one as ’post-crisis’ (2007-2013). Both
are compared to a ’default-interval’ of the entire time (1995-2013).
Again, it is noteworthy, that any interpretation of trends in labour productivity should be used
with caution. A country, or more precisely, its companies, might (differently) react to a decline in
GDP-growth (may it be a business cycle- or long-run development), with a reduction of the working
hours, in order to compensate for the lack of demand in markets. Such a pro-cyclical phenomenon is
often identified in developed economies (see Okun (1962)). If then labour productivity is calculated
by the ’per person’-method, rising efficiency in crises and declining productivity in expansions would
be the result, even though skills and abilities have remained constant.
Also, if working hours are kept constant, labour productivity trends obviously might show a decline
due to a negative trend of the GDP-enumerator, arising from other aspects like a lack of demand. This
should not be interpreted as declining efficiency of the employee himself. This effect has to be separated
from changes in the quality of a country’s human capital stock.
For the analysis, the range of countries was chosen due to their economic significance, in order
to display possible differences more accurately and of course due to data availability. As Germany
(and the US) are the countries of major interest for this study, France is also taken into account as
a reference scenario or benchmark. The French economy exhibits a similar structure (compared to
Germany) and its economic performance has a similar standing in the European Union. Greece is
added as a counterpart in order to show the negative business cycle developments (especially those)
in course of the financial crisis 2007-2009. The members of the European Currency Union (ECU) are
included, as it is assumed38 to have a higher degree of similarity (homogeneity) among these economies,
than among member states of the European Union (which do not share the same currency, monetary
policy or other institutional endowments).
38At least in theory, ECU-members are expected to exhibit a high degree of homogeneity.
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Per Capita
Labour productivity per capita breaks down (aggregate) GDP relative to a country’s population,
no matter whether employed (including self-employed) or unemployed. This calculation has to be
considered with a certain amount of care. Firstly, changes in the size of the population matter, whereas
changes in the structure of an economy’s population remain unconsidered (demographic changes as
discussed in section 8.6, as well as in section 9.2.4). Secondly, and if the denominator represents
the entire population, comparisons between countries assume the same percentage of the working
population (see section 8.2), relative to the entire population (more precisely, retirement age, schooling
system and other labour market characteristics then necessarily have to coincide). As the separation
in chapter 8.1 has shown, GDP per capita can be separated into four sub-components and is usually
interpreted as a measure of income. GDP not only represents the amount of output produced in an
economy, it also accounts for the incomes generated39. A change of GDP per capita can therefore be
interpreted as a welfare indicator, as well as a productivity indicator.
Figure 2 shows the growth rates for specific countries from 1971 up to 2015, whereas figure 3 adopts
the index-method. Hereby the value of 2010 is taken as base year. Every other year is then depicted
in relation. Germany’s growth rates of labour productivity per capita have just exceeded the zero
bound by little within the past years (2012: 0.3%, 2013: 0.2%). The negative results of the year 2009
(-5.3%) can be neglected in some way, as most countries have suffered from such a collapse due to the
aftermath of the global financial crisis. As already discussed, this (and the two consecutive years of
recovery) represent a business cycle swing and a natural rebound afterwards. Even though business
cycles matter (especially due to their potential of having implications for the long run), for the purpose
of the present study longer trends play the more significant role.
A remarkable aspect of the German case is that, compared to the ramifications of the first oil-
price shock in the 1970s (1973: 4.5% and 1974: 0.9%), growth rates have slowed down on average. A
decade-by-decade comparison shows that the average annual growth rate in Germany for the decade
of 2006-2015 is 1.4% compared to 2.8% in 1971-1980, implying a drop of 1.4% p.a.
39As the calculations of pattern four in the course of the mismeasurement analysis (10) will show, in reality GDP and
GDI (gross domestic income) diverge due to statistical discrepancies.
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So does the United States perform, which has experienced a similar trend like Germany. In the
course of the supply-side shock due to the oil embargo of the OPEC in 1973 and its ramifications for
the US-industry, the values shrunk from 4.6% for 1973 to -1.4% in 1974. Also, in the recent past,
the US growth rates of labour productivity, measured as per capita, have declined (2012: 1.2%, 2013:
1.2%). The decade-by-decade comparison exhibits a similar pattern like the German case. From 1971
to 1980 the average annual growth rate in the US was 2.1%, whereas currently (2006-2015) it has
reached a value of only 0.6%, implying a drop of 1.5% p.a..
Figure 2 also provides the remarkably volatile growth rate of Greece. The swings confirm the
current economic situation in Greece: volatile development processes and a high degree of dependency
on business cycle trends cannot be considered as a healthy environment for an economy. Especially
the downturns in the 1970s, and in course of the global financial crisis in 2007-2009, which have hit
Greece quite hard. The 14.4%-drop of the Greek growth rate in 1974 (from 7.6% in 1973 to -6.8% in
1974) is an outstanding example for an extreme (negative) swing.
Even the consecutive years after the crisis, in which many other countries were able to recover (at
least) slightly, Greece has only reached negative values in income growth per capita (2008: -0.6%, 2009:
-4.6%, 2010: -5.6%, 2011: -9.0% and 2012: -6.8%). The decade-by-decade comparison for Greece is
even more remarkable, reaching from 3.7% (1971-1980) to -1.9% (2006-2015) and implying a drop of
5.6% p.a. on average.
Growth rates of the OECD and European Currency Union (ECU) are generally on a more moderate
level (also because no values for the 1970s and 1980s were available). Noteworthy is the fact that in
2012 and 2013 the European Currency Union has suffered from negative growth rates (2012: -1.1%,
2013: -0.5%); the OECD in contrast only grew negatively in the year 2009 (-4.1%). As the OECD
contains more countries, negative developments concern a larger area and not a single country only.
Negative developments have to be taken even more seriously, as the economic significance concerns a
vast area and many more citizens, compared to a single country.
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Figure 2: Labour Productivity, (GDP per capita, total economy, percentage change at annual rate)
1970-2015. Source: OECD Database (2014); own illustration.
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Figure 3 shows the labour productivity per capita development by making use of the index-method.
Hereby, 2010 works as the base year for all calculations. The results of the index-method and the results
from the growth rates expression converge. All countries or groups of countries have experienced a
steady increase in labour productivity growth until the 2000s. Up from the beginning of the 21st
century and especially after the global financial crisis the curve has become flatter, which implies
slower rates of growth or even negative values. Again, the highly volatile Greek scenario (green line)
can be identified.
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Figure 3: Labour Productivity, (GDP per capita, total economy, 2010=100) 1970-2015. Source: OECD
Database (2014); own illustration.
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Per Hour Worked
The more precise tool for the quantification of economic efficiency regarding the input factor labour is
the per hour method. It erases complications, arising from different labour market characteristics of
the countries considered (i.e. different retirement ages). Otherwise the average working weeks, in terms
of hours, have to coincide among countries, which is not the case for all countries. Furthermore, labour
market politics distort the outcome. If an institution or company decides to cut down a full-time job
into two half-time jobs, the amount of people employed is doubled in this scenario - the labour input
in total (as measured in hours) however has remained the same. The per hour method, as mentioned,
erases complications like these, but itself offers potential for criticism and biases (see chapter 8.1 for
details).
As already considered in the introduction of this chapter (section 8.2), an accurate measurement
of working hours is almost impossible. Mismeasurement due to false reports or the unwillingness of
companies to provide the data are just two of the problems, that might occur. There is also the problem
of how to define working hours. Do lunch breaks go into the calculation? Does travel time go into the
calculation? And how is training-on-the-job being treated - fully equivalent to a standard working hour
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or only by a certain fraction? Even though labour productivity measured per hour worked is subject
to uncertainty as well, it seems to offer the best methodology to compare countries regarding their
efficiency (especially if one single “data-collector” like the OECD gathers the data. However, as the
OECD makes use of the national accounts offices of the individual member states, a specific amount
of care is still appropriate, as the methodology and data collection of the national offices diverges
slightly).
Compared to the per capita calculation method, the decline of the considered growth rates (as
illustrated in figure 4) is even sharper, which indicates either an increase in the entire employment
volume (which is not the case for most of the countries) or an even sharper (overproportional) decline
in output. Apart from the example of Greece, the numbers look less volatile, compared to the per
capita calculation method. For example, German labour productivity growth rates per hour vary from
-2.6% (2009) to 2.5% (2010) instead of from -5.3% (2009) to 4.3% (2010) of the per capita approach
(both intervals ranging from 2006-2015).
Figure 4: Labour Productivity, (GDP per hour worked, total economy, percentage change at annual
rate) 1970-2015. Source: OECD Database (2014); own illustration.
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Figure 5: Labour Productivity, (GDP per hour worked, total economy, 2010=100) 1970-2015. Source:
OECD Database (2014); own illustration.
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In addition to the year-by-year scenario, the OECD also provides data in a large compendium
of productivity indicators (i.e. OECD (2015a)). Labour productivity trends for a great variety of
countries are separated into three intervals examining the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-
2009: a default scenario, which captures the entire time interval from 1995 to 2013, a pre-crisis interval,
which captures the development from 2001 to 2007 and a post-crisis scenario, capturing 2007 up to
2013.
The default-scenario of labour productivity trends in the OECD, as illustrated in figure 6, shows
the average annual growth rates for the OCED and its member states from 1995 up to 2013. Labour
productivity in the OECD has grown by 1.57% annually, while Germany shows a growth rate of 1.29%
only. Noteworthy is Korea with 4.6%, whereas Italy at the bottom end only grew by 0.27%. Such
a large time-interval has to be treated with caution, as several business cycle effects - and therefore
volatilities - do not show up (however often they are not significant for long run, if they only display
short-run phenomena, reversing themselves and therefore disconnected from long-run trends). The
’default-scenario’ is the reference scenario, the short-time intervals are then depicted in relation.
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Figure 6: Labour Productivity, (GDP per hour worked, total economy, percentage change at annual
rate) 1995-2013. Source: OECD (2015a); own illustration.
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In the pre-crisis-era of 2001-2007, as illustrated in figure 7, the OECD in total grew by 1.82%
annually, Germany by 1.34%, Korea by 4.9%, and Italy offered a slightly negative trend of -0.01%.
Compared to the default scenario, even in the 2001-2007-interval many countries have already suffered
from a decline in productivity (i.e. Spain, Italy or Australia). A result, that could indicate a rejection
of a business-cycle based explanation for the decline in productivity growth.
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Figure 7: Labour Productivity in the Pre-Crisis Era, (GDP per hour worked, total economy, percentage
change at annual rate) 2001-2007. Source: OECD (2015a); own illustration.
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To account for the negative impact of the global financial crisis and the resulting European crisis
on economic data, illustration 8 shows the average annual growth rates in labour productivity from
2007-2013 (post-crisis interval). Whereas several countries have experienced negative growth rates
in this period (i.e. Greece, Italy or even Great Britain), the OECD in total still grew by 0.71 %,
Germany by 0.5% and the United States by 1.25%. In general, labour productivity numbers have
fallen significantly compared to the ’pre-crisis’-interval. Growth rates have declined even more (with
the exception of Korea), compared to the ’default scenario’ (1995-2013), which is not a surprising
result.
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Figure 8: Labour Productivity in the Post-Crisis Era, (GDP per hour worked, total economy, percent-
age change at annual rate) 2007-2013. Source: OECD (2015a); own illustration.
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It can easily be seen, that growth rates over time have declined globally. As even in the pre-
crisis interval growth rates are lower compared to the default scenario, one can see, that the major
parts of productivity gains were located in the 1990s. Exemplarily taken and illustrated in figure 9,
Germany shows a steady decline, starting with remarkably high growth rates (expressed as GDP per
hour worked) of about 3% to 4% in the 1990s (and even 5% in the 1970s, i.e. 5.1% (1973)) down to
rates of about 0% to 1% in the late past (i.e. 0.4% (2014) or -2.6% (2009), the latter one as a result
of the global financial crisis).
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Figure 9: Labour Productivity Growth in Germany (GDP per hour worked, total economy, percentage
change at annual rate) 2007-2014. Source: OECD Statistics (2016); own illustration.
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As already discussed, labour productivity per capita provides conclusions on the level of welfare, as
well as output produced per person of the economy. A more precise way for productivity analyses
is the per hour worked approach, as it allows a more detailed breakdown and corrects for differences
across countries, as well as for differences over time regarding the standard working week. Output
is produced by the working population but labour productivity per capita “distributes” output over
the entire population, regardless of being part of the production process or not. Productivity analyses
across countries or over time then can also diverge due to different fractions of people available for work.
Demographic change also influences the labour market supply side and has to be taken into account.
Even though the overall trends of the different measuring approaches should converge, a comprehensive
empirical analysis requires the labour force to be taken into account. For further discussions and a
decomposition of labour market variables, please see chapter 8.6.
The results from the per person employed approach look similar to the hours worked method
regarding direction and trend. Growth rates in the 2000s move along the zero bound, only marginally
positive, as figure 10 shows. The dips, however, are even more extreme. Has the decrease of labour
67
productivity growth per hour worked in Germany in 2009 reached a value of -2.6%, so does it reach -
5.7% according to the persons employed approached (more examples can easily be spotted). According
to the per person employed approach, the global financial crisis in 2007-2009 has hit Germany hard,
even harder than Greece (2009: -3.8%) and the OECD in total (2009: -1.6%).
Figure 10: Labour Productivity, (GDP per person employed, total economy, percentage change at
annual rate) 1970-2015. Source: OECD Database (2014); own illustration.
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Currently, labour productivity per person employed circulates around the 1%-mark (i.e. 2015:
0.8%). So does the performance of the other countries considered. In 2015, France shows 0.8%, too,
whereas the United States and the European Currency union (ECU) show 0.9% and the OECD in total
0.6% (2014). Figure 11 shares the statement. Since 2010, labour productivity per person employed,
expressed as an index, has slowed down in Germany, too. In 2011 the index (base year 2010) was at
102.3, in 2015 at 103.1.
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Figure 11: Labour Productivity, (GDP per hour worked, total economy, 2010=100) 1970-2015. Source:
OECD Database (2014); own illustration.
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Calculating labour productivity as GDP per person employed is an alternative measure. Even
though often used to quantify labour input, it can be considered as inferior to the hours-based approach.
This is due to the fact, that the average amount of hours worked varies from country to country and
is also dependent on business cycle trends. Even countries in a relatively homogeneous economic area
differ among average hours worked per person and day. In 1995, in the European Union, 38 hours per
week have been worked, currently 36 (2017)40, including full-time and part-time occupations regardless
of age and sex. Average working week in Italy and France shrunk from 40 to 37 hours, in Germany
even from 40 to around 35. A separate calculation, based on data of the IAB, also shows a decreasing
trend over time but 32 hours on average for Germany (see section 8.6; differences occur due to different
datasets and methodology). Moreover, resulting from cultural and social differences, from regulatory
issues or structural factors, country-by-country comparisons might be subject to distortion.
Entrepreneurial behaviour is another crucial aspect, which has to be considered. Capacity uti-
lization of firms changes in a pro-cyclical way - when being exposed to a recession, an entrepreneur
often forgoes firing workers in order to keep transaction costs low (those costs include ’barriers’, like
40In order to avoid structural breaks as best as possible, European Union here consists of the first 15 countries, who
joined in between 1995 and 2004.
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contract-rigidities, regulatory issues or simply the time necessary to train a worker for the production
process). If labour productivity is measured by GDP per person employed, the denominator (labour,
input) is kept constant, as working hours do not play a role, whereas the enumerator declines due to
the recession. Individual productivity, more precisely the efficiency and ability of the remaining work-
ers, has remained constant - a result not indicated by the declining labour productivity term (already
stated in section 8.2, see Okun (1962)).
Additionally, labour market policy sometimes allows or even promotes for separating full-time jobs
into part-time contracts. Reducing unemployment (as measured by persons), especially in pre-election
times, is quite common and famous for policy-makers to secure their re-election, or to boost their
standing. If then, for example, an 8-hour workload, which has been executed by one person in the past
and is now executed by two part-time workers, employment, as measured by persons, has doubled - but
has labour productivity now being cut into half? Obviously not. Even though a per-person calculation
is tempting to ’directly’ imply for per capita efficiency, the per hours concept has to be preferred, in
order to avoid manipulation but correctly display the ’volume’ of labour put into production in an
economy.
8.3 MFP/TFP
Total factor productivity (TFP) or multi-factor productivity (MFP) is the other main variable of
interest when it comes to productivity analyses. Part II has discussed the nature of total factor
productivity and its relevance for technological changes. Taking it as an equivalent, or as a proxy if
considered as only loosely related to technology. In any case, it is the gold standard in use for overall
productivity comparisons and analyses.
An economy’s development path is deeply interconnected with the development of MFP. The more
technologically advanced an economy is, the higher its level of development and economic welfare
becomes.
Even though labour productivity is taken as the central variable for discussing the productivity
puzzle in the present study, the TFP-view shall not be neglected. It contains a broader view, as all
factors in production are evaluated regarding efficiency. Especially when it comes to the discussion
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about declining rates of gross capital formation (see chapter 8.5), TFP provides a valuable perspective
for productivity analyses. The connection between labour productivity and TFP has been unfolded
theoretically in chapter 8.1.
Figure 12 shows TFP growth rates for the G7-states. Besides the two major economies of interest
for the present study, Germany and the United States, the G7-countries are taken into consideration.
They exhibit similar structures and general economic endowments like Germany and the US do.
Experiencing TFP growth rates of almost 3% in the late 1980s, France - the Grand Nation - now
ranks among many nations with growth rates of below the 1%-mark (disregarding some positive and
negative outliers attributable to short-term cycles). In 2016 the French MFP growth rate was at 0.5%.
Germany’s peak, in the time interval considered, can be found around its age of Reunification
(1989: 2.5% and 1990: 2.8% and 1991: 2.7%). In the 21st century, however, it outperforms France
just by little (Germany in 2016: 0.9%). Canada’s strongest values are located in the 1990s, peaking in
2000 (2.3%) and currently circulating around 0.5% (2016). Italian’s growth magnitude is a little bit
larger, hereby showing rates from -3.5% (2009) up to 3% (1994) and currently -0.2% (2016). Japan
has started strongly with 4.6% in 1985 and 1988 (4.4%), before slowing down to values at around
1%. In the 2000s it has managed to rebound to 3.5% (2010). Great Britain had its strong years of
MFP-growth in the end of the previous century (1997: 2.8%) but went on to an era of (many) years
of negative growth rates, currently showing -0.5% (2016). For the US it is interesting to note, that
almost every year considered shows less growth in TFP compared to Germany and France. Peaking
in 1992 (2.6%), the US nowadays finds itself at a stagnation value of 0.0% (2016).
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Figure 12: (TFP/MFP, total economy, percentage change at annual rate) 1985-2016. Source: OECD
Database (2014); own illustration.
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The results become even clearer when depicted by using the index-method, as figure 13 does. Prior
to the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2009, all countries offer similar slopes, representing continuous
development. After the dip, their development process has slowed down dramatically, represented
by a flatter slope of the curves. For the illustration, 2010 is taken as base year. Six years later
(2016) the values for the US (101.8), Germany (105.5) and France (102.3) show the decreasing speed
in development (maybe except Germany, which has performed slightly better). Italy even shows a
slight decrease in its multifactor productivity level (2016: 99.5). The same scenario applies for the
United Kingdom (2016: 100.8), whereas Canada (2016: 103.9) and Japan (2015: 104.4) rank among
better-performing countries.
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Figure 13: TFP/MFP (total economy, 2010=100) 1985-2015. Source: OECD Database (2014); own
illustration.
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8.4 GDP
As labour productivity contains a numerator of output and a denominator of input, it also seems
appropriate to analyse the components separately. A declining numerator can result in less labour
productivity growth, so does an increase in the denominator.
Figure 14 shows the GDP-development of the G7-economies (in current prices, converted into
international US-dollar via Purchasing Power Parity)41. Besides the 2009-dip in the course of the
financial crisis, the United States shows the sharpest slope. When compared to the United Kingdom,
Italy shows a “falling behind” in the 21st century. In fact, 2003 was the first year of Great Britain to
overtake Italy ($1.794 trn. (GB) vs. $1.762 trn. (Italy)). An opening gap between the United States
and Germany is quite obvious; Germany has outperformed GB over the last decade. Has the gap
between the two countries remained constant (in this context it means a gap of $0.752 trn. in 1991
to $0.796 trn. in 2005 and only temporarily overstepping the $0.8 trn.-mark), it has widened over the
last decade. Currently (2016) the German GDP exceeds GB by $1.269 trn..
41Note that 2017 is provided as forecast due to data availability (January 2018).
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Figure 14: GDP International, current prices, PPP-conversion 1991-2017. Source: International Mon-
etary Fund (2017); own illustration.
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As a comparison based on current prices only might lead to insufficient information and conclusions,
the respective growth rates in constant prices shall be taken into account as well. By using constant
prices, the price effect can be erased, forming a more reliable view on output performance of a country.
Figure 15 provides the (real) growth rates and hereby shows a separation into two parts. The first
one, ranging from the mid-1990s until the year 2000, exhibits strong rates of economic development.
Especially Canada, Great Britain and the United States have performed well above the 2%-mark for
many years. Canada only temporarily understepping the 4%-boundary. German growth in the time
interval can be considered as conservatively constant at around 2%.
The second interval, representing the starting years of the 21st century, is characterised by growth
rates on a rather moderate level. Most of the countries provide rates of around or below 2%, except
for some outliers.
Noteworthy are the two years of recovery in Germany after the economic turmoils in 2007-2009.
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Compared to other G7-countries German economic growth has re-accelerated quickly to 3.954% (2010)
and 3.718% (2011). Only Canada was able to catch up but did not experience a sharp decline in 2009
like Germany did (-5.563% Germany vs. -2.950% for Canada).
Figure 15: GDP Growth, constant prices, percentage change 1991-2017. Source: International Mone-
tary Fund (2017); own illustration.
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In order to shift the focus to Germany, Figure 16 shows (nominal) gross domestic product (GDP)
and the respective growth rates from 1970 to 2016. Neglecting the business cycle dip in 2009, its trend
is (linear) positive. Growth rates, however, offer a different point of view. Strong economic growth at
the beginning of the 1970s (i.e. 1971: 11% and 1973: 11.4%), were cut by the oil-price shocks (resulted
in growth rates of around 5%) and revived at the beginning of the 1990s and in course of the German
Reunification (i.e. 1990: 8.8%). Since then, their values have only temporarily overstepped the 3%-
mark (hereby neglecting the -4%-outlier in 2009). In general, a trend towards less economic growth
is visible, when compared to decades ago. Also, when compared to other European countries, which
were hit by the global financial crises as well (see figures 14 and 15 and Weber (2017) for example).
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Figure 16: GDP, total economy, percentage change and levels 1970-2016. Source: Statistisches Bun-
desamt (2015c); own illustration.
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More meaningful is figure 17 and the real values for the German performance. Whereas the index
(red line) provides a positive but less strong growth, compared to the nominal values in figure 16,
real growth rates (blue bars) show real economic growth of less than 2% p.a.. Compared to the
nominal values, more years of shrinking growth rates (i.e. 1993: -1%, 2003: -0.7%, 2009: -5.6%) can
be identified.
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Figure 17: GDP real, total economy, percentage change and levels 1970-2016. Source: Statistisches
Bundesamt (2015c); own illustration.
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8.5 Capital Formation, Investment Dynamics and Infrastructure
8.5.1 General
Chapter 8 provides the base for the discussion in the remaining chapters, dealing with potential
explanations for productivity puzzles. Capital formation also plays its role, as labour productivity,
TFP and capital deepening are linked to each other.
Many studies on capital formation in the recent past have set their primary analyses on the public
sector, addressing the issue to the public capital stock. However, besides public investment, also private
investment has experienced a sharp decrease over the last decades in the world’s major economies. For
the present study, many variables of the investment category contain informative value. It is tried
to select the most important ones for the purpose of shedding light into the darkness of productivity
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puzzles. For a detailed and more comprehensive analysis of investment dynamics in Germany over the
last (almost) three decades, please see Hagemann et al. (2016, especially chapter 3).
For an international categorisation, figure 18 provides trends of (developed) countries with regard to
their total gross capital formation42. It shows gross capital formation as the fraction of the economy’s
GDP. Almost all countries are exposed to a declining trend, varying by the extent, however. In a first
superficial view, the German rate of investment appears to be on a rather sufficient level; unfortunately
offering only slightly better numbers in relation to the starting values. In the 1990s, Germany has
shown significantly high values of 25.5% (1991) - over and above OECD-average (23.9% in 1991) -
but has dropped below OECD-average and shows only 19.2% in 2014. Over the last years, it has
slightly recovered to almost 20% (19.8% in 2017). The US-value has peaked in 2000 (23.5%) and is
currently (19.7% in 2016) ranked in the same regions as Germany. Like in most countries considered,
the French ratio (France chosen due to similarity with the German economy and importance for the
European Union) has dropped in course of the financial crisis (2007-2009) but has recovered then in
2017 (23.5%) - an even higher value compared to the ones shown in the 1990s (i.e. 19.5% in 1997).
Greece, in contrast, has not yet recovered from the ramifications of the global crisis and ranks among
low-level productivity countries, currently providing gross capital formation of around 11.7% (2017).
Its drop seems to be remarkable, as for most of the years considered, Greece has circulated around the
25%-mark - and it has outperformed Germany and others.
42Total gross capital formation includes the two parts of sectoral demarcation of an economy’s capital stock - the
public one and the private one.
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Figure 18: Gross Capital Formation (in per cent of GDP) 1991-2017. Source: World Bank (2019);
own illustration.
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Depreciation of capital goods plays an important role in the evaluation of an economy’s capital
stock, so that gross values can only tell one part of the story. Net capital formation43 is another, maybe
even more accurate way to show the (rather poor) development of the German case. Figure 19 provides
net capital formation, as well as a separation between investment in the public and private sector.
Especially the public sector’s rates are subject to concern. Negative net values imply a “consumption” of
the public capital stock (i.e. infrastructure, military or ecological aspects) (i.e. see Expertenkommission
„Stärkung von Investitionen in Deutschland“ (2015), Grömling et al. (2019)). Generally speaking, the
supply of public goods not only plays a direct role for aggregate welfare of an economy in the short
run, but it also positively shapes and stimulates the environment for private investment (see chapter
9.2.3 and the discussion of the so-called “Aschauer-hypothesis”).
Back in the 1990s, net public investment has circulated around the 1%-mark but has now dropped
below the zero bound (2014: -0.2% and in 2018 just slightly positive: 0.1%). For the private sector,
43Net and gross values are linked by the effect of depreciation.
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the dip is even stronger, however, numbers are still positive. Starting with almost two-digit values
(1991: 8.5%), the private sector’s net investment fell back to 2.4% (2015) - hereby neglecting the lowest
value in 2009 (0.7%) as part of cyclical fluctuations. Whereas the private sector hardly manages to
maintain the (quantity) of its capital stock, the public sector has failed completely. However, one
could carefully interpret the last three years (2016-2018) as a sign of moderate recovery. Currently,
net capital formation for the private sector has rebounded to the 3%-mark (2.9% in 2018).
Figure 19: Net Capital Formation (in per cent of GDP) 1991-2018. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt
(2018b); own illustration.
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 
%
 G
DP
 
Public Private 
In addition to net capital formation (and in order to highlight the effect of depreciation), the degree
of modernity of total capital equipment can be used to provide information about the modernity of
a nation’s capital stock. It is defined as the ratio of net to gross fixed assets and provides a stock-
based view (contrary to the flow-perspective of investment). Figure 20 shows the declining trend of
the German capital stock’s degree of modernity (Statistisches Bundesamt (2017c), Code: 81000-0118).
Over the years, the degree of modernity has dropped from 63% (1991) to 59% (2018). Future, positive
80
net capital formation is necessary to oppose the decrease and modernise the capital stock. A modern
capital stock is crucial, as a requirement for any kind of technological progress, high rates and levels
of productivity and more generally economic development.
Figure 20: Degree of Modernity (total economy) 1991-2018. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2017c);
own calculation and illustration.
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As a short side note on the discussion about capital stocks and gross capital formation - this only
describes the quantitative evaluation. Quality and efficiency aspects are not captured so that one
might come to contrary messages on the state of Germany’s capital stock. Moreover, decreasing trends
do not reflect a calculation of setpoints or optimal values; they just suspect insufficient equipment of
business infrastructure. Detailed information and data on the (quantitative) need is required, in order
to derive explicit policy implications (Hagemann et al. (2016, pp. 196 ff.)).
81
8.5.2 Infrastructure
A part of capital formation is the investment in infrastructure. Chapter 9.2.3 will discuss, infrastructure
contains several aspects, shaping the environment (business as well as private) for an economy. One
of the most important sub-categories of infrastructure is related to traffic and transport44. In order to
provide a comprehensive view of traffic infrastructure, data on (gross) capital formation, as well as on
fixed assets and the degree of modernity are displayed. In general, gross and net values are connected
by the effect of depreciation. It also implies that positive net capital formation is in need to (at least)
maintain the current capital stock. The following figures, with data taken from Bundesministerium
für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur (2018b), are set up for the time interval of 1999 to 2016 and are
calculated and presented in 2010-€ so that price effects do not play a role. For an analysis of traffic
and infrastructure, many components are likely to be chosen. For the purpose of the present study, the
overall traffic category, as well as the sub-category roads and bridges, are shown, as the latter one plays
the most significant role for the business environment with regard to transport conditions. Numbers
for 2016, marked with asterisks, contain provisional values but should not distort overall conclusions
on the trend.
Figure 21 shows gross capital formation. In line with the general investment behaviour in Germany
over the last decades, gross capital formation in traffic infrastructure, as well as for the sub-category
roads and bridges, exhibits a declining trend. Peaking at the beginning of the 2000s (total traffic:
€37.774 mil. in 2002), the lowest value has been marked in 2015 (total traffic: €29.264 mil.).
44Another important sub-category is related to human capital and the educational system. Chapters 8.6 and 9.2.5
deal with it explicitly, so that the present chapter focusses on traffic only.
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Figure 21: Gross Capital Formation (traffic, in 2010 prices) 1999-2016. Source: Bundesministerium
für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur (2018b); own illustration.
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Simply taking capital formation for an evaluation is not sufficient. Fixed assets represent the capital
stock of an economy - and in this case the traffic infrastructure for Germany. Figure 22 shows the
gross values, figure 23 the net values. Whereas the gross capital stock shows a constant or even slightly
increasing trend, the net capital stock interestingly provides a declining trend. For an evaluation of
the infrastructure capital stock, net values are more meaningful, as depreciation seems to play a
significant role. Net fixed assets have peaked in 2011 (total traffic: €698.127 mil.), and declined since
then (€690.413 mil. in 2016).
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Figure 22: Fixed Assets Traffic (gross) (in Mil. Euro, in 2010 prices) 1999-2016. Source: Bundesmin-
isterium für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur (2018b); own illustration.
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Figure 23: Fixed Assets Traffic (net) (Mil. Euro, in 2010 prices) 1999-2016. Source: Bundesminis-
terium für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur (2018b); own illustration.
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More obvious is the degree of modernity of fixed assets with regard to traffic. Figure 24 shows the
degree of modernity for traffic infrastructure in total and for roads and bridges. Over time, there has
been a drop in the degree of modernity for both categories. Total infrastructure after 2005 dropped
from 66 to 63, roads and bridges from 68 (1999) to 65 (2016). The implications are obvious - there
has been insufficient investment; insufficient insofar as it was not even able to fulfil the needs of
depreciation.
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Figure 24: Degree of Modernity 1999-2016. Source: Bundesministerium für Verkehr und Digitale
Infrastruktur (2018b); own illustration.
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Special Case: Digital Infrastructure
In order to be prepared for technological developments and challenges of the 21st century, in addi-
tion, there is the need to provide a sufficient level of digital infrastructure. Digital infrastructure
includes many aspects. Probably the most important one is related to data transfer. Best illustrated
as broadband coverage and the speed of internet accessible to households and companies. Broadband
technologies, in fact, is a notion, which includes wired and wireless technologies, other than smallband
technologies (the ones used at the early stage of digitalization back in the end of the 20th century). In-
ternet technologies, which can be summed up under the broadband notion are Digital Subscriber Line
86
(DSL), Fiber, mobile communications45, (TV-) cable solutions and satellite technologies46. Unfortu-
nately, no common international standard exists for the exact definition of broadband with regard to
speed benchmarks (in comparison to smallband technologies). According to the International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU), technologies belong to the broadband category if they exceed data transfer
speed of 256 kilobits per second. It is the definition, the Statistisches Bundesamt makes use of, too
(see Statistisches Bundesamt (2019d)).
In Germany, most households are equipped with broadband access. Around ten years ago, just
every second household (50% in 2008) had access to broadband technology, nowadays (2018) it is 86%
of all households in Germany (Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2019a)).
Another potential variable is “Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants” from the ITU
(Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Database (2019)). It can be used as another
proxy for the evaluation of broadband coverage in Germany. Figure 25 shows the trends for several
countries with regard to fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants.
45Mobile communications in international standards is measured and labelled with notions from 1G to 5G and rep-
resents a generation of mobile communication technologies. Whereas 1G was associated with the very beginnings and
included analogue technologies, going back to the end 1950s, 5G is the latest version and should be available by 2020. It is
expected to provide speed of up to 20 gigabits per second (in comparison to 10-15 kilobit per second of the 2G-technology)
(Source: <‌<https://www.techbook.de/mobile/smartphones/lte-4g-unterschied-mobil-smartphone>‌>).
46For a definition of broadband and its sub-categories please see Bundesministerium für Verkehr und Digitale Infras-
truktur (2018a) or <‌<https://www.fcc.gov/general/types-broadband-connections>‌>.
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Figure 25: Fixed broadband Subscriptions per 100 Inhabitants, 2000-2017. Source: International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) Database (2019); own illustration.
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Except for the Republic of Korea (8.17%), almost all countries chosen started with zero in 2000
(Germany: 0.33%). Germany showed a steady increase of up to 40.47% in 2017, whereas the US fell
behind to 33.85% (2017). Remarkable is the case of Finland for the previous years. Nordic countries
usually show leadership roles when it comes to technology and innovation. Finland started strongly
and was the first of the five countries overshooting the 30%-mark (2007) but then merely stagnated
since then (2017: 30.95%).
For more data and further elaboration on the requirements and implications in the course of the
new wave of technological progress, please see chapter 9.2.3.
8.6 Labour Market Statistics and Demographics
Labour market developments influence economic welfare, too. Average working hours per employee or
a change in the employment volume (and structure) affect the outcome of the production process. As
88
the present study tackles the question, where to find the reason for less economic development (income
and productivity), empirics for the labour market shall be provided, too.
According to the identity, displayed in equation (10), average working time per employee, the labour
force participation rate (LFPR) or demographic issues (i.e. quantitative and structural changes in the
employment potential) influence productivity and income. Before discussing their individual contribu-
tions, this chapter provides a compendium of labour market indicators for the German economy.
The following scheme is set up after the South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation (see
South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation (nd)) and structures the labour market into its
individual parts. For Germany, the separation is similar; some definitions slightly vary. In order to
have a more common base, the concept of the International Labour Organization (ILO) is adopted
(which offers minor differences to the one of the German Federal Employment Agency).
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Figure 26: Overview Labour Market. Source: South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation
(nd); own illustration
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• The civilian (non-institutional) population consists of the fraction of the total population of a
country (which is older than 15 years, not living in institutions and not member of the armed
forces (for the US); source: South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation 47, as well
Sauermann (2005) referring to the ILO-concept).
• It is formed by the civilian labour force plus the sum of persons out of the labour force.
• Out of the labour force defines persons, who are required to attend school or who are not available
for employment (i.e. due to health issues).
47<‌<http://dlr.sd.gov/lmic/labor_force_technical_notes.aspx>‌>.
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• Persons employed include any employees or self-employed, working in the private or public sector.
Voluntary work is excluded.
• Unemployed summarizes all persons, actively searching for paid work (within the past four weeks)
and working less than one hour. According to German law, registration at the Federal Employ-
ment Agency is not necessary48.
As a typical indicator for structural changes in the labour market, the so-called labour-force-participation-
rate (LFPR) is calculated as:
LFPR =
civilian− labour − force
non− institutional − civilian− populationx100 (11)
and describes the potential employment of an economy.
8.6.1 Average Working Time/Week htEt
Figure 27 shows the trend for the employment volume (measured as total hours worked, blue line), the
number of persons employed (including self-employed, orange line) and the development of the average
working week measured in hours per worker (black line)49 .
In Germany, the working volume [h] has remained constant over time (1991-2016). Including
employed and self-employed workers, a total volume of around 60.000 million hours has been measured
(this is 60 bn. hours). Total employment, measured by persons involved in labour market operations,
increased from around 39 million (1991) to around 44 million at the moment (2016).
By dividing the working volume [h] by persons [E] in the respective year t, adjusting for effective
working days (i.e. subtracting public holidays) and multiplying by five (by assuming a five-day-
working-week) one receives the average working week per-person employed. Over the last two decades,
48Please note that there are differences between the German definition according to the Federal Employment Agency
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA) and the International Labour Organization (ILO). The scheme, provided in this chapter,
is based on the ILO. As for the German system, a registration as unemployed is necessary to be labelled as unemployed.
Otherwise, the person, not working, is defined as “erwerbslos”; this fraction of people is not following a regular work but
is looking for it without the help of the German Bureau of Labour Market (BA). Additionally, being “unemployed” in
the German sense includes persons, registered and working up to 14 hours per week.
49Using data from IAB <‌<https://www.iab.de/de/daten.aspx>‌>, the numbers are calculated as follows: Working
Volume [hours] divided by persons employed (plus self-employed) divided by effective working days (i.e. subtracting
public holidays) times five (assuming a five-day-working-week).
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the number has fallen from around 38 hours per week and worker in 1991 to around 32 hours per week
and worker in 2016. Put together, total working volume has remained constant, employment has risen,
so that average employment per worker has necessarily gone down.
Figure 27: Working Volume, Employment and Average Weekly Workload, 1991-2016. Source: Institut
für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (2017b); own calculations and illustration.
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8.6.2 Employment Ratio EtEPt
In order to calculate the employment ratio, data for the number of people employed [E] (it includes
self-employed) as well as for the entire civilian labour force is required [EP]. Figure 28 depicts the
trend for the employment ratio (blue line) in Germany50. Following the ILO-concept, no separation
between registered and unregistered persons is required but everything summarized as unemployed.
50The interval of 2007-2017 contains original data, whereas 1991 to 2006 is calculated via “Berliner Verfahren Version
4.1” (BV 4.1) - a specific time-series analysis method. It makes use of seasonal adjustments and component dissection,
developed by the TU Berlin (Technische Universität Berlin) and DIW (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung)
back in the 1960s. See Statistisches Bundesamt (2004) for further details.
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Unemployment implies all persons actively searching for paid work (within the past four weeks) and
working for less than one hour. In relation to the civilian labour force, one obtains the employment
ratio. Figure 28 also provides the unemployment ratio (red line), by re-arranging the equation:
CivilianLabourForce = Unemployment+Employment⇔ Unemployment = CivilianLabourForce− Unemployment
(12)
Figure 28: Employment Ratio, 1991-2016. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2017c) Code: 13231-0001;
own calculations and illustration.
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Starting in 1991, the civilian labour force in Germany has consisted of 39.31 million people (not
displayed) and an amount of 37.27 million people employed. This results in an employment ratio of
94.8% (unemployment of 2.04 million people; equivalently 5.2%). Over time, employment dropped to
a minimum of 88.88% in 2005 and respectively 4.51 million people without work (11.1% unemployment
rate). Severe and rapidly installed labour market revisions (“Hartz reforms”) in course of the “Agenda
2010” of the Administration Gerhard Schröder have led to a positive stimulus for employment, leading
to a maximum of 96.00% in 2017 for total employment (1.73 million people unemployed).
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So, over time the numbers of the civilian labour force, as well as the numbers of persons employed,
have risen - from 39.31 million (1991) to 43.01 million (2017) persons for the labour force and from 37.27
million (1991) to 41.28 million (2017) for the employment. Most empirical studies suggest evidence
in the same direction (i.e. see Krebs and Scheffel (2013); Krause and Uhlig (2011)). Implications on
productivity resulting from relatively higher rates of employment growth (in relation to GDP-growth)
and the effects on productivity are discussed in more detail in chapter 9.2.5.
8.6.3 LFPR EPtPopt
The labour force participation rate (LFPR) is calculated as civilian labour force divided by total
population. It necessarily has to be divided by total population, in order not to violate the identity.
Data is taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (2017c) (Code: 13231-0001) for the civilian labour force
and (Code: 12411-0001) for the overall population51. Figure 29 shows the trend of the LFPR for
Germany from 1991 to 2016.
51Please note that data for the civilian labour force is provided with every January, whereas overall population data
is reported at the end of a year. A higher degree of precision can be achieved when the ratio is calculated as follows:
EPt
Popt−1
.
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Figure 29: Labour Force Participation Rate, 1991-2016. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2017c)
Codes: 13231-0001 and 12411-0001; own calculations and illustration.
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In 1991 around 49.3% of the total population was available for work and therefore part of the
LFPR. For many years and at the beginning of the 21st century, the ratio declined to values of in
between 47% and 48%, before experiencing a sharp increase, especially after 2007. Nowadays around
52.1% are part of the LFPR. With regard to equation (10), this can be marked as a positive sign for
the future trend on the labour market, as a higher potential for people available for work (including
those already equipped with a job) increases economic welfare in terms of GDPtPopt . Higher LFPR suggest
that more people are available for work. And this might be true on average. However, it does not
guarantee a sufficient quality level of the labour force. Moreover, and with regard to the quality aspect,
a mismatch between skills and knowledge on the one side and requirements by the companies on the
other side, is another story. In line with the necessity to provide labour market supply, an adequate
educational system is crucial to achieve a high level of human capital in the economy.
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8.7 Intermediate Conclusions on the Empirical Section
In order to tackle the productivity puzzle, a sufficient empirical base is required. According to chapter
8.1 and equations (8) and (10), several of their “ingredients” play a central role, as they show that
there is mutual dependency between labour productivity, total factor productivity and the effect of
capital deepening. Furthermore, labour productivity per capita, per hour worked and other variables
of the labour market play a role; demographic effects likewise. Even before going into discussion, these
linkages raise the supposition that not just one single reason for declining trends in productivity is
responsible.
LˆP = kˆ + ˆTFP (8)
GDPt
Popt
=
GDPt
ht
x
ht
Et
x
Et
EPt
x
EPt
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(10)
In the previous chapters, the empirical trends of the components have been analysed with a special
focus on Germany. Three potential views on labour productivity are offered - measured per capita, per
hour worked or per person employed. Even though the trends of all three contain the same conclusions,
the magnitudes differ. Growth in labour productivity per capita has slowed down since the 1970s in
Germany to stagnating values of around 0% nowadays, for the US to around 1%. Expressed as per
hour worked, the trend was less volatile. Interestingly, most developed countries offer slowdowns in
comparison to the 20th century (especially when compared to the 1990s) - varying by the extent,
however. The most extreme dips are noted when measured and expressed as per person employed. It
seems to be a little more accurate with regard to productivity, as the different components of labour
markets and demographic changes influence countries (unevenly).
Globally, total factor productivity development likewise has peaked in the 1990s. For Germany, the
strong years of growth are noted around its Reunification (i.e. 1989 with 2.8% TFP-growth). Germany
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generally outperforms the US (and many other countries) with regard to TFP/MFP numbers. This
should not tempt to express satisfaction, though, as the trend for Germany seems to be strictly
decreasing. Nowadays TFP-growth in Germany circulates around the 1%-mark (i.e. 0.9% in 2016).
Shrinking labour productivity can mathematically result from a decreasing numerator or a rising
denominator. Even though nominal GDP has increased up to around €3.4 trn. in 2018, real values
have dropped and growth rates have constantly fallen below the 2%-mark. It allows for the possibility
that labour productivity has decreased due to insufficient production in Germany.
As already proposed by equation (8), a decline in the capital-labour ratio can depress labour
productivity, too. This would be the result of insufficient amounts of capital formation. In Germany,
there is an ongoing debate on the likelihood of an investment gap. For both sectors - the public and
the private one - declining trends have been identified. In addition to declining rates of investment,
the amount of fixed assets has shrunk over time, especially when compared to the 1990s. It implies a
loss of the degree of modernity for the capital stock and provides insufficient conditions for business
development in Germany - forming “headwinds” for (future) economic growth.
Especially negative net capital formation for the public sphere seems to be a significant problem,
as it is responsible for the supply of infrastructure. Infrastructure in this context has been defined
mainly by traffic and the special case of digital infrastructure. Whereas the former relates to the
transport of goods (and services), the latter is responsible for the requirements in course of the new
wave of technological change. Especially access to broadband technologies is a potential bottleneck for
economic progress. Broadband coverage and speed falter economic growth if supplied on an insufficient
level. Even though the trend for broadband coverage is positive, having led to more than 80% of
households equipped with modern technology, coverage in rural areas and speed limits provide obstacles
for companies (i.e. a target of 50 Mbit/s by the Bundesregierung (2017) is considered as insufficient
according to entrepreneurs’ opinions).
Equation (10) has decomposed labour productivity with regard to labour market related variables
(denominator). On the one hand, a reduction of the average working week since the 1980s has been
stated, depressing labour productivity. On the other hand employment volume has increased from
around 36 mil. in 1991 to around 41 mil. in 2017. In addition to the positive aspect of a higher
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employment volume, the potential of inhabitants available for work (LFPR) has increased, too.
The empirical section has not only provided several variables, which seem to be important for the
discussion about productivity puzzles. It also has already strived potential problems, associated with
quality aspects (i.e. GDP) or the necessity to provide targets (i.e. for capital formation). Moreover,
collecting data on an aggregate, economy-wide use and the fact that a variety of aspects are included
in the discussion about productivity trends also make measurement problems more likely. In the
next chapters, the issue of decreasing productivity is tackled. Two major strands of explanations are
provided. On the one hand and ultimately following the empirical section, there will be a discussion
about “real” economic causes, implying declining trends in productivity. On the other hand, it will be
tested, if there is the possibility of an insufficient measurement framework - so-called mismeasurement,
which is not able to reveal the correct data.
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9 The Productivity Puzzle
9.1 Preliminaries and the 1970s
As indicated, I accept Gordon’s view on the separation between less technological innovations - and
their impact respectively - (his major argument) and headwinds, creating a negative environment for
growth processes (his minor arguments). In fact, Gordon relates his analysis to the phenomenon of
secular stagnation with regard to economic growth - the idea, however, goes into the same direction
as for the productivity puzzle: what reasons can be identified for the weak economic performance of
developed economies in the 21st century - and in addition to Gordon, is the entire lack of productivity
growth just illusory? Therefore and for reasons of simplicity I separate between
• Problems associated with the measurement process (Mismeasurement) and
• Real reasons (as the separation between Gordon’s major and minor arguments is of less concern
for this study, one can summarize all real reasons under the definition of “headwinds”).
Before going on, and shifting the focus to the 21st century, the study shortly turns back to the 1970s,
when a similar scenario was laid out. In fact, many arguments Gordon (2012) states have been revived
and recycled from debates in the past.
So, a worldwide productivity slowdown is not a new phenomenon. Declines in productivity numbers
have hit the United States in the 1970s, as well as other economies - by some exceptions and of
course to the extent (i.e. Griliches (1988, p. 9)). After periods of strong economic growth and
productivity accelerations, in 1973 this era came to an end. Besides the second oil-price shock in
1979 and its economic consequences, the year 1973 represents one of the most important turning
points in economic history of the 20th century. In course of the Yom-Kippur (the holiest day in
Judaism on 6th October 1973) war and the subsequent conflict between Arabian countries, especially
Western economies suffered from sharp economic problems (Syria and Egypt were involved in the
war directly and supported by other (Arabian) countries - most of them part of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)). In order to maintain (political) pressure on the (Western)
countries backing Israel, oil production and export was cut by 5%, which led to a significant increase in
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barrel prices. As production in most Western economies was highly dependent on the supply of fossil
fuels, production dropped, unemployment rose and the financial burden for the public budget grew
significantly, resulting from the OPEC-embargo (for more information on the oil-crises of the 1970s
see i.e. Painter (2014)).
The post-1973 era was then characterized by high levels of unemployment and a decrease in pro-
duction; and characterized bythe switch of the German Bundesbank from fixed to flexible exchange
rates, after having left the Bretton-Woods-system. Many studies have explored the ramifications of
the OPEC-embargo afterwards (i.e. Cullison (1989); Denison (1985); Griliches (1988) and Nordhaus
(2004)).
Cullison (1989), with his analysis, refers to the exhaustive study by Denison (1985) for the US on
the productivity slowdown of this era. The four reasons (they can also be characterised as “headwinds”
in a broader general sense) for the slowdown, Denison (1985) sums up to, are the following:
• a declining capital-per-worker ratio (resulting from a decrease in capital formation per working
unit),
• regulatory issues (i.e. higher environmental protection and worker protection regulations),
• effects of significantly rising energy prices,
• the end of (a wave of) structural change (more precisely, the shift from low-productivity jobs in
the non-farm sector to higher-productivity jobs; as i.e. discussed in Frey and Osborne (2017),
Graetz and Michaels (2015) or Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014)), as well as
• general economic problems of business-cycle character, arising from the two (global) recessions
in the 1970s, implying a global downturn.
The last three reasons, Denison considers as having a larger impact on the slowdown, compared to
the former two. Even though the oil-price shocks (1973 and 1979) and the resulting energy-crises are
included only indirectly in Denison’s (quantitative) study, their contribution and impact are undoubted.
Especially long-term effects, so-called hystereses- and persistence-phenomena play a significant role.
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Hysteresis and persistence are derived from physics and describe the hang-over from any kind of
disturbances (i.e. a supply-side shock). The entire system just slowly converges back to its initial state
in the case of persistence; forces do not bring back the system to its initial state in the case of hysteresis.
Hystereses-phenomena appear in many shapes, often found in labour markets when business-cycle
unemployment is converted into a rise of the natural rate of unemployment (i.e. Blanchard and
Summers (1986), who discuss hystereses-phenomena for the Western European labour market).
The study of Denison (1985) claims to explain around 40% of the post 1970s-slowdown by the
four contributors named above – structural change (15%) and the recessions (16%) hereby playing the
major role. Taken together, Denison’s two major reasons are able to explain around one-third of the
entire slowdown (which is one-third (= 0.5%) of the total decrease in productivity of 1.5% for 1973 to
1982).
The remaining 1% of the decline in productivity growth (from 1973 to 1982) shall then be explained
by several other reasons (they explain around 60% of the entire effect). The remaining reasons, as
named and elaborated afterwards by Cullison, are (Cullison (1989, p. 11)):
• Measurement errors/mismeasurement
• Declining labour quality
• Rising energy prices
• Environmental protection regulations (as a form of regulatory issues)
• Depletion of mineral resources/natural resources
• Depletion of investment opportunities
Especially the appearance of the measurement error hypothesis is often cited when it comes to find-
ing explanations for declining trends, as it offers a large potential for modern economies (modern
economies are associated with a high fraction of services contributing to national product. Services
nowadays make around 69% (2015) of German GDP and are subject to measurement problems due
to their immaterial character (Statistisches Bundesamt (2015b)). If the arrival of modern technology
101
- or more broadly speaking- technological change - like modern communication technology, pharma-
ceutical improvements, electrical technology or even electricity in the late 18th century52- has been
identified incorrectly in National Accounts, also labour productivity (and TFP) might be subject to
underestimation. As chapter 9.3 will show, measurement of service-sector related goods and products
still hinder correct measurement and form the main research area for the mismeasurement hypothesis.
Nordhaus (2004) analyses the 1970s-slowdown by making use of data since WWII, precisely in-
dustrial data from 1948 onwards. Doing so, the author argues that the 1970s-slowdown is a rather
unusual event, however, not unique in history since the post civil war period in the US. He describes
the slowdown in the 1970s as a “major outlier for the period since WWII” (Nordhaus (2004, p. 7)),
finding its (natural) rebound in the mid of the 1990s.
Decreasing numbers are found in any sector of industrial production. Nordhaus introduces an
artificially constructed output-measure variable (so-called “well-measured output”; WMO), which tries
to account for inadequateness in measurement for services and finance sectors (Nordhaus (2004, p. 29)).
The WMO only contains those sectors with goods that are rather simple to measure due to the nature of
their outputs (i.e. manufacturing, transportation, forestry). One of his findings is that the alternative
productivity variable WMO exhibits stronger productivity growth, compared to ’classical’ variables
(i.e. total factor productivity), a result that could account in favour of potential mismeasurement and
in contrast to real economic reasons. Excluding some (and undoubtedly important) production sectors
is a shortcoming in his analysis, so that the results have to be used with a certain amount of care.
The magnitudes of the rates (WMO and traditional/classical), however, are quite similar. Addition-
ally, but not surprisingly, energy-intensive sectors were hit hardest by the slowdown (sharp increase
on the supply side due to oil embargo by the OPEC). The problems were solved and productivity
growth after the 1970s-slowdown went back to normal due to shifting from “the oil age to the elec-
tronic age” Nordhaus (2004, p. 30), implying a new wave of structural change and a reallocation of
sector’s production contributions.
Griliches (1988) also points on the energy-price related shock effects. Investigating the connection
52In 1775 Alessandro Volta invented the very first possibility to store up electricity - the invention of the battery.
In fact, however, many other starting points for “electricity” are likely, too. For information on Volta please see
<‌<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alessandro-Volta>‌>.
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between (poor) R&D-development in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, he claims “the rise
in energy prices and its macro consequences” (Griliches (1988, p. 19)) as responsible. This has not
only changed the production of companies (production structure, scrapped capacity, bad expectations)
but has also affected several other variables in the economy (i.e. negative consequences on aggregate
demand, trade balance effects at the expense of general economic problems for the US economy and a
period of prolonged underutilization).
Jorgenson (1986) explores the link between the rise in energy prices and decreasing rates of produc-
tivity. The author points on the reallocation effects as a result of the oil-price spikes. In these days,
workers have been reallocated from energy-intensive sectors towards less energy-intensive ones. If one
moves highly-productive workers (i.e. in the steel industry) to jobs, where they are less productive,
such a reallocation negatively affects aggregate productivity (Jorgenson (1986, p. 64 f.)).
Griliches (1988) makes an interesting statement by summarizing the issue; something, which is
(probably) valid for the productivity puzzle in the 21st century, too: there is no single variable or
reason, exhibiting sufficient explanatory power for the entire magnitude of the slowdown. Instead:
“Of course there may not be a single cause - one murderer. Perhaps it is more like the
Murder on the Orient Express - they all did it!” (Griliches (1988, p. 19))
This statement offers pretty much wisdom even for today’s productivity puzzle, as the subsequent
chapters will show. It will be shown that many contributors can be named and identified, all of them
providing potential for an explanation.
9.2 Less Innovations, Headwinds or a ’simple’ Measurement Error?
Potential reasons and hypotheses for the current53 slowdown are diverse. Chapter 9.1 has provided
several reasons for an ex-post explanation of the productivity slowdown in many Western economies
in the 1970s. Chapter 9.2 then is related to current developments, hereby expanding the view and
leading a more general discussion on the reasons of (general) weak productivity growth.
53’Current’ in this sense is related to developments in the 21st century. Depending on the country and definition of a
slowdown, one finds arguments for different inflexion points (i.e. the bust of the New Economy, the global financial crisis
in 2007 or especially for Germany the developments in the 1990s in the aftermath of the German Reunification). For
this section of the study, exact dates play less important roles, so that the term ’current’ can be interpreted for many
other points in time.
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As the mismeasurement hypothesis is of central concern for this part of the study, it shall be dis-
cussed seperately in sub-chapter 9.3. Before discussing the validity of the mismeasurement hypothesis,
I discuss (in short) other potential reasons for less productivity growth (and lower productivity levels)
in order to have a broader and more complete view about the issue.
Several approaches and studies analyse productivity slowdowns all over the world. Their reasons
and linkages are diverse and often depend on the country considered and sometimes on the respec-
tive time intervals (as well as the chosen inflextion points). The following discussion does not claim
completeness and tries to present a brief talk on potential channels for productivity slowdowns.
Generally, a slowdown can either be attributed to a statistical lack expression (mismeasurement)
or to ’real’ economic causes. It either only appears in the balance sheets of national accounts as a
result of miscalculations or it is really present, derived from ’real’ economic problems.
Whereas the mismeasurement hypothesis claims that there is no ’real’ slowdown but the one iden-
tified in the statistics, other possible reasons (’real’ reasons) state that an economy suffers from unfor-
tunate economic developments or conditions (in this context ’economic’ is not strictly limiting but also
attributable to any political, institutional, sociological and other maldevelopments, having a direct or
indirect effect on human well-being).
One might argue that the mismeasurement-hypothesis is of less concern, as economic activity is
’just’ underestimated and falsely published. To a certain point, one can agree, that ’real’ economic
problems are worse in terms of the (future) economic welfare of a country but false measurements have
to be corrected too, as they infer serious problems (Mokyr (2014, p. 88)).
Companies, consumers, policy-makers and any other agent in an economy derive and execute
(policy) actions based on various data. If this data is under- or overestimated, insecure, incomplete
or biased, the inferred decisions cannot be optimal in a sense of maximizing welfare of an individual,
company or economic level. Therefore, also policy implications vary, as the respective explanations
do. Additionally, the problem of time-lags has to be considered. If economic policy lacks reliable
and complete data, provided in time, executive actions can lead to (pro-cyclical) maldevelopments,
implying further instabilities and wrong developments in an economy.
For example, in a recession or after a shock (i.e. the global financial crisis 2007-2009), economic
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policy has to find reasonable and appropriate steps in order to overcome negative developments. These
steps target - in a short-run Keynesian sense - the stimulation of aggregate demand and can consist of
(e.g.) fiscal actions, like an increase in government spending, lowering the tax burden on consumers
or providing more/higher social welfare transfers.
Also, monetary and foreign trade actions provide possible solutions - interest rate adjustments as
examples for the former, tolls or subsidies as examples for the latter. Economic policy, therefore,
cannot exist without a reliable data-underlying (and of course a well-suited theoretical framework).
Not only does data provide a framework for an ex-post analysis, it also builds the base for forward-
looking decision-making processes. Pro-cyclical developments can occur, when policy actions are exe-
cuted to the wrong extent and/or at the wrong time and lead to even stronger maldevelopments (i.e.
over- or undershooting of GDP-growth, which is correlated with poor inflation or deflation processes).
Every ’real’-reason hypothesis (’headwind’) offers a vast research area for itself. It seems impossible
to fulfil the aim of completeness. For the purpose of this study, these reasons shall only be strived in
order to provide a suitable and more complete framework for productivity analysis, however, laying
the focus on measurement errors. For convenience, possible headwind-orientated explanations for
slowdowns are summed up prior to their discussion. In addition to chapter 9.1. They include:
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• (Less) technological progress or less innovations and poor knowledge diffusion (i.e. lack of
innovations, less R&D-expenditures)
• Weak demand (= the demand-side secular stagnation argument)
• Weak capital spending (i.e. decrease in gross capital formation)
• Demographic issues (i.e. maturing population, declining working population)
• Declining labour quality and the educational system
• Excess public debt
• Inequality
• Environmental protection regulations (as a form of regulatory issues) or negative effects from
globalisation
• Slowdown as a natural (business cyclical) phenomenon (i.e. assuming that developments gen-
erally occur in cycles)
• Other ’shock-related’ arguments (i.e. rising energy prices)
Secular stagnation captures the negative long-term developments of an economy. It is usually as-
sociated with an economy being characterised with a high level of per capita income, but negligibly
small rates of growth. Secular stagnation is expressed as a period of unsustainable financial expendi-
tures (Summers (2017)). Further, the employment situation suffers from rather low rates of economic
growth, too.
The reasons for the phenomenon of secular stagnation can be separated - as usually - into a demand
and supply side explanatory strand. Supply side effects are split up and will be discussed separately
(headwinds #2-8). Supply side secular stagnation focuses on the environment and conditions for a
(balanced) growth path of an economy. Many reasons do in fact overlap so that any try to categorize
might be discussable.
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Even though this elaboration tries to classify arguments, as a key to understanding secular stag-
nation and a general decline in economic development, one has to keep in mind, that:
“In the end, secular stagnation is not about just demand or supply but also about the
interaction between demand and supply” (Gordon (2015, p. 58)), as well as
“Lack of demand creates lack of supply potential” (Summers (2015a, p. 63))
For the analysis, I follow Gordon’s structure for the analysis of (supply side) secular stagnation (see
Gordon (2012) and Gordon (2015)). For the explanation of the stagnation process and connected
productivity puzzle, he separates between a major reason (less technological innovations) and minor
reasons, so-called “headwinds”, which themselves influence the poor productivity developments. These
“headwinds” provide a poor (business) environment for economic activity. However, depending on the
country considered (Gordon’s field of research are the US), these headwinds vary. Generally, they
include obstacles, a development process faces. Most of these obstacles have a rather structural char-
acter (like demographic aspects or the educational system) but also include business-cycle phenomena
like taxes or capital formation. The question, the present study tries to solve is, whether there are
’real’ reasons (no matter whether related to the major or minor arguments) or whether the slowdown
is just illusory and a result of a mismeasurement problem.
9.2.1 Technological Progress and Knowledge Diffusion (headwind #0)
Supply side secular stagnation captures the development of potential (real) GDP growth over time.
Potential GDP growth describes the natural boundary of an economy’s development and its ability to
grow. Decreasing trends in potential real GDP growth not only have a direct effect on the standards
of living but also an indirect effect on net investment, which itself leads to less growth in productivity
(Gordon (2015, p. 54)). Even though Gordon only labels his minor arguments as potential headwinds,
for the present study, his major arguments (technological progress and knowledge diffusion) can be
interpreted as potential obstacles. So, the notion “headwind #0” seems appropriate.
As technological progress is undoubtedly (one of) the main reason(s) for (potential) economic
growth, especially in the long run, its role for productivity slowdowns is more than noteworthy. There
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are, however, many ways, in which technology can work as a source of explanation for the missing
portion of output (the ’drop’ in productivity over time) - hereby representing a rather short run
perspective.
First, there is the hypothesis of (simply) less technological progress in the sense of less innovations
or less significant innovations in general over the last years. Lower productivity rates then must be
considered as quite logical. It is, at first glance hard to believe in this hypothesis, as several innovations
have taken place within the last two or three decades and significantly re-shaped the worldwide economy
and the working environment likewise (i.e. for the discussion about robots, potential automation and
computerization see for example Graetz and Michaels (2015) and Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014)).
On the onset (or even in the middle) of a new wave of technological progress, this explanation seems
highly doubtful (David (1990, p. 355)). This wave was created by the appearance of a new set of GPT
(general purpose technology), including innovations in healthcare but mostly due to innovations in the
sector of information and communication technology (ICT). Gordon (2012) calls it the third industrial
revolution (IR#3). His classification of ’industrial revolutions’ might confuse and shall be explained
in more detail in the remainder of this chapter.
Especially modern ICT has developed strongly within the 21st century. One just has to compare
the working environment of an office in the 1990s equipped with typewriters, fax machines and phys-
ical file cabinets. Nowadays, it is more accurate to describe everyday life at work with notions like
cloudcomputing, crowdworking and any kind of digital equipment. Digitalisation is pushing forward
at an enormous pace. It is hard to believe that there might be less innovation these days. The question
of whether data fits reality is not a new one. Griliches (1988, p. 10) for example raises suspicion for
the developments in the US of the 1950s and 1960s. Mining and construction have seen decreasing
rates of productivity in the data, financial and other service sectors at least stagnation. Developments
in the post-WWII period associated with strong economic growth correctly doubt on the numbers in
the data sheets.
However, and as discussed below, Gordon (2012) assumes, that the impact of innovations in the
latest past (in course of IR#3) is smaller, compared to those of IR#2. Less technological progress,
therefore, works as his major argument for the productivity puzzle.
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Secondly, another approach to technology in this context is related to the issue of knowledge
diffusion or diffusion of technology across an economy - or in a more global sense, across the entire
world (see Holwegler (2003, p. 9 f.) for the way how new technologies enter the economy).
One can separate firms into a first category, operating at the technological frontier and into another
one of those companies lagging behind. Global technology diffusion, however, cannot be taken for
granted (OECD (2015b, p. 3)). Even more, the OECD in one of their recent productivity reports
explicitly states, that “[f]uture growth will largely depend on our ability to revive the diffusion machine”
(OECD (2015b, p. 3) - a clear statement on the necessity of percolation in order to gain the benefits
from technological change.
Impact and benefits of innovations and modern technology in an economy become stronger if more
firms are able to adopt so-called ’frontier technology’ (i.e. Acemoglu (2002), Pissarides and Vallanti
(2007), OECD (2015b)). Frontier technology represents the latest technology set available, directly
emerging from R&D activities. It usually changes dramatically when a new wave of technological
progress is on the onset.
The more firms are able to implement the latest technology, the more productive on aggregate the
economy will become (Griliches (1987, p. 1)). A possible explanation for the productivity slowdown,
therefore, lies in poor (or slow) technology diffusion of an economy. Potential reasons for poor diffusion
are diverse (i.e. high fix costs, transaction costs or bureaucratic obstacles).
Firms, which “can drive one technological wave” (OECD (2015b, p. 46)), produce around five times
higher in terms of MFP and around ten times in terms of labour productivity (OECD (2015b, p. 45)).
Even more, and according to Andrews et al. (2015), the gap between frontier-firms and non-frontier-
firms has even increased in the 21st century, also implying less spillovers and therefore less technology
diffusion54 OECD (2015b, p. 46).
Less spillovers, slower technology diffusion and less growth in technological equipment development
at the firm level could, therefore, work as another possible explanation for decreasing productivity.
Knowledge and technology diffusion not only stimulate economic growth but economic (in-)equality
54The study takes an international approach. It defines the technology frontier by the 100 most productive firms
in each 2-digit sector in ORBIS, whereas all other firms are considered as non-frontier. ORBIS is a database, pro-
vided by the OECD, which contains data for more than 44 million firms on the micro-level all over the world (see
https://orbis.bvdinfo.com for further details).
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(headwind #6) likewise. The less firms diverge according to their technological underlying, the smaller
the inequality, measured in terms of related incomes, becomes.
The linkage between technological progress, knowledge diffusion and productivity development can
be described by evaluating the amount of expenditures in research and development (R&D). As already
stated, poor R&D-spendings might have caused negative ramifications for economic growth in the past
- and they still do. Griliches (1988) for example, confronts the productivity puzzle by investigating
the connection to R&D. He asks, whether poor R&D-spendings can account for the poor economic
development in the US in the 1970s and finds, that R&D-spendings cannot be blamed as possible
explanation but yet warns about possible mismeasurement errors, when it comes to R&D. Nevertheless,
knowledge diffusion and the distribution of modern technology (as a driver of productivity growth) is
ultimately connected to the investment behaviour and weak capital spending (discussed as headwind
#2 in this study).
In addition to the less technological innovations argument, Gordon (2012) states, that present
innovations can be considered as of inferior importance or less impact, compared to more meaningful
ones in the past. He doubts on the assumption of economic growth as continuously developing for
all time. Instead, Gordon (2012) understands growth as a sequence of discrete events and raises the
suspicion, that the period of substantial growth in the twentieth century has to be considered as rather
unusual, instead of taken as granted or ’natural’.
His analysis is not entirely focussed on the US economy. Despite the present evaluation of the
productivity puzzle for the US, he elaborates on a rather global view and understanding with regard
to frontier economies. Whereas Great Britain has been the frontier economy until the beginning of the
twentieth century, this position has been taken over by the US then.
Gordon (2012) elaborates the sequence of discrete periods of growth, by splitting into three indus-
trial revolutions Gordon (2012, p. 1):
• IR#1 (1750-1830). Main inventions: steam engines, cotton spinnings and railroads.
• IR#2 (1870-1900). Main inventions: electricity, machine power/the internal combustion engine,
and running water with indoor plumbing.
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• IR#3 (1960-today). Main inventions: found in the ICT-sector.
The innovative process has to be understood as a sequence of discrete events, followed by marginal
improvements. Follow-up inventions appear after substantial improvements in the course of an in-
dustrial revolution. According to Gordon (2012), the second industrial revolution (IR#2) has caused
the biggest impact and has required around 100 years (for IR#1 even more, at least 150 years were
necessary) to completely diffuse through the economy (Gordon (2012, p. 3).) In the 1970s slower rates
of economic and productivity growth have formed the end of the wave of IR#2. Since then, those
(high) rates of growth were out of reach, even in course of IR#3.
The effects of IR#2 lasted for 81 years (1891-1972), whereas those of IR#3 (2004-201255) only
lasted for 8 years - more precisely the impact on measured growth in productivity. IR#3 itself began
in 1960 with the commercial use of computers and peaked in the 1990s.
To highlight the importance of the IR#2 and non-continuous economic growth, the doubling in
productivity and the standard of living is taken as proxy for the speed of diffusion. There was almost
no growth at all at the beginning of the scenario considered back in 1300. It then took 500 years
(1300-1800) to double living standards and 100 additional years afterwards (1800-1900) for the next
double-up. The shortest periods, describing the most significant changes in the standards of living
in course of IR#2, were 1929-1957 (28 years) and 1957-1988 (31 years). Confirming the hypothesis
of scepticism and slow productivity growth afterwards, a doubling in the standards of living then
will (probably) take around 93 years (2007-2100) according to a (loose) approximation. It results from
expecting less (significant) impact from IR#3 and anything related to the “New Economy”-era (Gordon
(2012)).
Besides, Gordon (2012, pp. 12-14) calculates levels of productivity for a (hypothetic) scenario,
which describes a continuation of the productivity trend of 1948-1972 (strongest period of growth in
course of IR#2), compared to the actual values. His findings confirm the supposition, that there has
been a large gap between the actual level in 2012 of output per hour in 2005 US-dollars ($53.90) and
the (hypothetic) scenario, which assumes a continuation of the strong economic performance in course
55The impact of the global financial crisis is neglected insofar, as calculations last until 2007 and the consecutive years
are extrapolated under the assumption of not having the financial crisis.
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of IR#2 ($83.20). A gap of almost 69% of “missing” productivity.
Illustrating the argument, that economic growth not necessarily develops continuously but rather in
a discrete way - one of Gordon’s main proposals - can be executed by using the examples of urbanization,
speed of travel and (improvements with regard to) temperature of interior space. These one-time-only
events have all unravelled their effects and impacts without further improvements with regard to
productivity (Gordon (2012, p. 2)). Speed of travel is a well-suited example for this phenomenon
provided by the author.
Was travel by horse omnibus possible at a pace, that could have been easily achieved by walking
back in 1860, it has increased dramatically by railroads and subway systems in the following decades.
Their level of speed is a multiple of a horse-drawn carriage (3 miles per hour (1860), compared to 40
miles (1906) and little later at 80 per hour (1960)). Speed of travel, however, has then reached its peak
without further acceleration. Modern flight traffic runs at even slower paces, compared to decades ago,
in order to conserve fuel (Gordon (2012, p. 10)). Rather small steps (or none at all) followed the giant
leap - or even developed backwards.
A special feature of IR#2- and IR#3-inventions is that their effects are singular and non-repeatable.
Their inventions also narrow the possibility of further essential leaps in economic development (Gordon
(2012, p. 15)).
With regard to the mismeasurement hypothesis in this study, it shall be noted, that there is
another period of surprisingly less economic and productivity growth back in 1906-1928. One could
have expected IR#2 to fully unfold its impacts. As an explanation for this, David (1990) provides a
“diffusion lag”-hypothesis, leading to a delay in the exploitation of modern technology (David (1990,
p. 357 f.)). The author compares the computer-invention in course of the ICT-wave to the invention
of electrical technology almost one century before and claims - with regard to the famous quote of
Robert Solow (1987) - that “[i]n 1900, contemporary observers well might have remarked that the
electric dynamos were to be seen ’everywhere but in the productivity statistics!’” (David (1990, p.
356)).
In 1899 in the US, just a small fraction of households (below 10%) and other establishments
(such as factories) were equipped with electrical technology. In order to fully exploit the benefits
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from innovations, a decent amount of time was necessary to gain the benefits in the productivity
statistics. Regulatory changes in favour of the introduction of electrical technology to production (and
households) helped to unfold the effects of the innovation of electrical technology (David (1990, p.
356)) then, however, not immediately after the date of the (technical) availability.
In line with Gordon’s major argument for lower productivity growth rates, some studies favour a
rather natural development as explanation. Griliches (1988) hereby points on the necessity to separate
between a “cyclical fluctuation [and] ... a serious break in the underlying historical trend” (Griliches
(1988, p. 11)). Fluctuations associated with the business-cycle appear as rather natural, serious breaks
in the historical trend provide challenges for future economic growth.
According to the theory that weak R&D spendings56 have caused the 1970s-slowdown, Griliches
argues by making use of the “time-lag”-hypothesis. It requires time for technologies of IR#2 to com-
pletely diffuse through the economy in order to make visible the gains of innovation. Instead, he claims
the oil-price shocks and ramifications (price increase) of being responsible for the drop in productivity
(Griliches (1988, p. 9)) as well as general measurement problems “ in various incarnations” (Griliches
(1988, p. 11)). Whereas the exact mechanism of how rising prices for the supply of oil can be linked to
the productivity slowdown is unclear (the slowdown has appeared in many other countries and indus-
tries), arguments against R&D-contribution have been outlined and shall be discussed in the headwind
#2 category (chapter 9.2.3).
Jones (1997) argues in the same direction and addresses the slowdown to the discussion on whether
the US economy is/was on a steady state balanced growth path. His study rejects the (main) view,
that the US has been on a steady state balanced growth path. In opposite, being off this path, changes
in the level of globalisation and R&D-developments provide (or have provided) additional stimuli for
the US economy. The author in 1997 correctly anticipated the consecutive economic development (the
21st century) to reverse to the negative, when those stimuli weaken or even disappear. It is a matter of
definition then, whether it is a real cause or the natural ramification of the omission of real economic
developments, which have caused the slowdown.
56Griliches’ study is set up for the US. He states, however, that “[t]his drop in productivity growth was actually larger,
in absolute terms, in some other countries (such as Canada, Japan, and Sweden) than in the United States, making
explanations for these events which rely heavily on specifically U.S.-based causes or arguments somewhat less plausible”
(Griliches (1988, 9)) - therefore a quest for a more general explanation began.
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Syverson (2013), reviewing Byrne et al. (2013), describes the considered labour productivity trends.
Rejecting a “Jevonstype sunspot theory of labour productivity growth” (Syverson (2013, p. 39)),
Syverson shows the (cyclical) movement of productivity after every new wave following the introduction
of a GPT (general purpose technology). As we are currently riding the ICT-wave, Syverson illustrates
and compares it to the previous wave, the invention of electricity (1890-1915). Even though not
explicitly mentioning the circular character, Syverson states that “[h]istory shows that productivity
growth driven by general purpose technologies can arrive in multiple waves; it need not simply arrive,
give what it has, and fade away forever thereafter.” (Syverson (2013, p. 39)).
Despite the sceptical analysis of future growth and productivity development, Gordon (2012) as-
sumes productivity development to continue - albeit less strongly. His minor arguments on the poor
productivity performance concern the negative environment in an economy - his so-called “headwinds”.
He elaborates six fields of interest, which harm the development process: in original, they include
demographic issues, the educational system, globalisation, ecological environment, income inequality
and public and private debt.
The headwinds vary among the countries analysed. In the following chapters, it is tried to provide
a discussion on important factors shaping the economic environment and providing potential problems
for development processes. The discussion diverges from Gordon’s headwind-approach insofar, as the
importance of the respective headwinds for the US and Germany vary and the focus is shifted to the
latter. Also, the demand-side (headwind #1) finds entry into the “headwind”-categorization as stated
in the introduction of this chapter (9).
9.2.2 Weak Demand (headwind #1)
The demand-side explanation for secular stagnation phenomena was initially proposed by Alvin Hansen
(Hansen (1939)) back then and has been revived in the latest past by statements of Larry Summers
(i.e. see Summers (2014a; 2014b; 2015b; 2015a)). Summer’s demand side theory is related to the weak
capital spending argument (as discussed in chapter 9.2.3). At the core of his analysis lies the deviation
of (aggregate) savings from investment, leading to a decline of the natural interest rate, the one which
causes full-employment (full-employment real interest rate (FERIR)). A situation of stagnating growth
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in output and per capita income and higher ratios of unemployment can then be associated with a
decreasing FERIR - which has led to less investment in modern economies.
Summers also emphasizes the possible hystereses-effects of missing capital spending and the ram-
ifications for the supply side of an economy; he therefore also accuses policies of decreasing capital
formation (Summers (2015a, p. 63)). Summers names and discusses several reasons for the decline of
the FERIR, which then work as an explanation for the (demand side) secular stagnation theory (see
Hagemann et al. (2016, pp. 219-221) for a short summary).
Reverse population growth and declining innovations (or slower rates of technological growth)
generally name two very popular reasons in growth theory and have been met in many growth models
before (just to mention the Solow-Swan-growth model Solow (1956); Swan (1956) and the expansion
by Solow (1957)). Besides the two, Summers points out the possibility of capital-saving technological
progress in the course of the increasing importance of the ICT-sector. This has led to the relative
decline in capital costs and to the relative increase in wages respectively (which could then work as an
explanation for a poor employment situation).
Additionally, rising inequality of national income distribution, and wealth distribution likewise (see
chapter 9.2.7), could have led to distortions in the “natural” balance of investment and savings - in
favour of those cohorts, characterised by a higher propensity to save.
Furthermore and as the global financial crisis (2007-2009) has shown, many economies still suffer
from problems regarding their public budget (for a detailed analysis see chapter 9.2.6). Higher deficit-
to-GDP ratios and more generally an increase in public debt has led to a diversion of interest rates in
the banking sector - more precisely, it has led to an ongoing separation between low rates of profits
for savings, compared to higher lending rates, provided by the banking systems (the latter ones as
crucial for any kind of private investment). Therefore “secular stagnation” can also be interpreted
as “a prolonged period in which satisfactory growth can only be achieved by unsustainable financial
conditions” (Summers (2017)).
Other studies come to similar results and follow Summers. Rao and Li (2013), for example, in-
vestigate slow productivity growth in Canada based on a Verdoorn-model-approach (the productivity-
output-approach, developed by the Dutch economist Petrus Johannes Verdoorn (1949 in original,
115
Verdoorn (1980)), which was once made famous by Kaldor (1966)). Rao and Li (2013) find that for
the post-2000 era weak demand has contributed significantly to the productivity slowdown in Canada.
Weak internal and external demand not only decrease economies of scale and scope but also directly
affect R&D-investment. If this result can be taken for granted, the ramifications for Germany are
almost the same - German R&D-spending is, as chapter 9.2.3 will provide - compared to the OECD-
average, on a rather low level (in relation to general economic activity and development). Rao and Li
(2013) state that for Canada, 93% of the slowdown in the covered period (1981-2000 vs. 2001-2012)
can be attributed to the result of weak demand (Rao and Li (2013, p. 14)).
Not only R&D-investment but general gross fixed capital formation and less ICT-investment favour
these negative results. Besides economies of scale, economies of scope and increasing returns (modelled
and displayed for example in the Verdoorn-approach), Rao and Li (2013) find human capital, general
capital accumulation, technology diffusion and optimal sectoral allocation as key drivers for (Canadian)
productivity growth.
All these key drivers - in a sense of reverse causality - suffer from prolonged periods of weak
output growth, leading to less growth in measured labour productivity and less income per capita
likewise. Weak demand is not an internal problem only. Export-led driven economies are (additionally)
opposed to global shocks. Spiro (2013) points out the importance of the export sector for the Canadian
productivity puzzle. If we accept the importance of export sectors, this is valid for Germany even more,
as Germany is ranked among the top-exporting nations. In 2017 Germany was ranked in #3 among
the top exporting nations just close behind the US. In 2017, German exports had a value of almost
$1.5 trn. (Statista (2018)).
If external shocks harm the export sector, not only weak demand and less output growth is the result
- but also the labour force and labour market, in general, is affected. Losing their jobs make people
lowering their requirements for a new position. If on average, less people work in a position, where they
can fully extract their skills and knowledge - the result is a mismatch-scenario. Mismatch-scenarios are
generally linked to less productivity, as more persons work apart from their qualification level. External
shocks and weak demand therefore not only affects the numerator but also the denominator (the input
factor for productivity). Mismatch-scenarios between job position requirement and qualification of the
116
employee are therefore linked to the declining labour quality argument (see chapter 9.2.5).
Weak (aggregate) demand is often also assumed to show a high correlation with the issue of private
debt. If households are exposed to higher financial burdens, it will reduce the propensity to consume
and hereby depress aggregate demand (i.e. Jauch and Watzka (2012), who argue in favour of the
private debt-to-demand link by evaluating the case of Spain).
9.2.3 Weak Capital Spending and Infrastructure (headwind #2)
Another central argument is related to the capital equipment of the economy. As chapter 8 has shown,
labour productivity and TFP are connected via the capital-per-worker ratio k. Labour productivity
decreases either through less TFP-growth or declining rates of capital per working unit. Decreasing
rates of capital formation lead to a lower k and less productivity, therefore.
An increase (decrease) in labour productivity, therefore, can result from less technological progress
or less capital formation over time. Not only does positive (net) capital formation provide capacity
and income, it additionally transfers technological innovations (the “diffusion machine”). Its economic
relevance is multilayered.
In addition to discussions about declining rates of economic growth and productivity, there is an
ongoing debate on whether Germany was or still is experiencing a lack of investment over the last
decades (a so-called “investment gap”). As the time of the German Reunification has led to structural
changes in the German economy, 1991 is often used as a starting point for the empirical analysis.
Extensive research has tackled the investment issue over the last years (i.e. Hagemann et al. (2016),
Expertenkommission „Stärkung von Investitionen in Deutschland“ (2015), Sachverständigenrat zur
Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2014) or Daehre (2012)), testifying decreasing
rates of capital formation for many countries - including Germany and the United States and hereby
implying a shrinking of the (public) capital stock. Whereas most studies agree on a general decline
in investment, the question about an optimal amount of investment is another one (i.e. in contrast
to most other studies, SVR argues on minor needs to invest for the public sector and states that
private investment is not experiencing significant decreases. See Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung
der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2014, pp. 12 ff.) in contrast to i.e. Expertenkommission
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„Stärkung von Investitionen in Deutschland“ (2015) or Hagemann et al. (2016)). In general, the
quantification of the appropriate level of public capital spending is a sensitive topic and will always be
subject to discussion. In example Grömling et al. (2019), with regard to Expertenkommission „Stärkung
von Investitionen in Deutschland“ (2015), state that net capital investment of the public sector seems
to be an inadequate indicator for the evaluation of the public capital stock. Hereby, the study also
argues against the proposed financial rule for the public budget, which forces the government to at
least invest the amount of depreciation. Grömling et al. (2019) do not share the view of a decreasing
public capital stock but argue in favour of a stagnation. Moreover, the study states that structural
changes have shifted the scope to intellectual property and investment in research and development.
For (public) infrastructure and the respective capital stock, the authors, however, agree on the need
to re-evaluate the amount spent in the public sector, especially in the municipal area.
If there is weak capital spending over time, an economy’s capital stock deteriorates, leading to
declining rates of growth in output and productivity likewise. Some studies also emphasize economic
shocks, triggering the decrease in productivity (i.e. OECD (2015b, p. 28)). So this kind of (short
run) shocks can create ’base effects’ and imply tremendous ramifications for economic performance;
structural long-term development is of even more concern, as it shows a trend instead of rather cyclical
swing-phenomena. Short-term shocks must not be neglected, as they might ’convert’ themselves into
long-term effects (so-called “hystereses”- or “persistence”-phenomena57). Recent studies on German
investment development have shown, that weak capital spending is not a new phenomenon but lasts
(at least) back into the 1990s (Hagemann et al. (2016), Ragnitz et al. (2013) or Baldi et al. (2014), the
latter one addressing the issue to Europe in general).
Infrastructure58
Business environment in an economy is dependent on several aspects with regard to infrastructure -
and infrastructure itself is multilayered. It not only contains the field of traffic such as motorways,
railroads, shipping or air traffic but also the educational system, the tax system or other factors of
57A system not rebounding to its initial state after being shocked is exposed to a hysteresis-phenomenon. When
reaching its initial state but requiring a certain amount of time - this is a persistence-phenomenon.
58’Traditional Infrastructure’ in this context relates to any category of infrastructure except the digital components,
which are discussed separately in the next section.
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regulatory intervention. As the current wave of technological progress, the innovations in course of
“economy 4.0” and the respective structural changes, require a special case of infrastructure, namely
digital equipment, digital infrastructure (i.e. broadband coverage) plays an important role. The
educational system and respective implications on human capital stock are discussed separately (see
chapter 9.2.5), data on infrastructure in this chapter focus on traffic infrastructure.
Infrastructure in the traditional sense (traditional in a sense of excluding digital equipment) and
its trend over time provide information on whether the business environment is suitable for economic
development or whether it works as a potential bottleneck for economic progress. International com-
petitiveness of an economy is also highly dependent on the possibility to produce with high quality
and at low costs - the latter directly linked to infrastructure. If companies face obstacles in a sense
of higher transaction costs (i.e. due to higher costs of transportation), then a loss of competitiveness
and less output and employment growth result. Hagemann et al. (2016, p. 192) state that the current
level of German infrastructure seems to be on a sufficient level, at least when put in international
benchmarks. They base their conclusion on central studies on the state of infrastructure59 but admit
that deficits might exist. Again, the question about an optimal level of investment is different (and
way more complicated) to a description of trend behaviour over the last years.
Even though the private sector exhibits the same trend, public investment plays a special role in
an economy’s development process. An economy’s public capital stock has to be treated with concern.
Commonly speaking, it represents all the public goods of an economy. Infrastructure hereby plays
the most significant role and includes roads and rail traffic, highways, bridges, as well as technical
endowments and more - a matter of how to define infrastructure. In the course of a new wave of
technological progress. it also includes anything related to the requirements of modern information
and communication technology - digital infrastructure.
An economy, highly dependent on export-led growth like Germany requires a healthy business
environment for the challenges of international trade. Decreasing values of public infrastructure capital
do not fit this requirement. There are plenty of examples in Germany (i.e. the dilapidated Rhine-
bridge, close to Leverkusen, which has been closed temporarily due to cracks in the surface) in the
59Considered as central studies for the issue of infrastructure in Germany: World Economic Forum (2015), Dobbs
et al. (2013) and Woetzel et al. (2016).
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near past, when companies had to face obstacles with regard to transporting the produced services
within Germany or to a destination abroad. These obstacles mark additional (transaction) costs for
companies and in general a loss of international competitiveness for the German economy in total due
to rising prices in course of higher costs of transaction.
As provided originally by Aschauer (1988b), the theory of “crowding-in” (instead of a “crowding-
out”) of public investment states that gross capital spending for public purposes stimulates the economy
even more and provides a healthy environment for private investment (for a deeper understanding of
Aschauer’s “crowding-in”-hypothesis, see Hagemann et al. (2016, pp. 133-147) and in original Aschauer
(1988b)).
Public investments (i.e. in infrastructure, ecological environment or national defence) provide a
vital sphere for economic growth. Aschauer’s studies are in line with famous precursors like Adam
Smith (1776). They all stress on public capital and discuss the impact and relevance for economic
growth. More precisely, Aschauer values public capital as complementary (rather than substitutional)
to private investment, implying positive marginal gains in the private sector (see Hagemann et al.
(2016, pp. 133-138) and Aschauer ((1988b; 1988a; 1989c; 1989b; 1989a)). There is no crowding-out
but crowding-in effect of public investment instead. A present example of a “crowding-in” effect is found
in the establishment of subsidization of capital formation of ecological innovations (further discussed
in chapter 9.2.8) by the European Union. Under the headline “Horizon 2020”, the European Union
guarantees almost €80 bn., hereby also targeting incentives for complementary private investment
(Bundesminsterium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit (2017, p. 55)).
Gross capital formation in any sense is crucial for an economy’s growth and development process.
It hereby contributes in three ways. Firstly, a vital investment environment creates a substantial and
required level of aggregate demand. In the sense of a Keynesian point of view, aggregate demand
(at least in the short run) is responsible for the economy’s evolution process and its level of welfare,
therefore. Secondly, and in a rather long-term perspective, gross capital formation renews and increases
aggregate capacity. Capacity in this context can either be understood as physical capital (i.e. machines)
or non-physical capital (i.e. human capital); it marks the boundaries for every economy and sets its
potential to grow. Thirdly, investment is the prerequisite for the diffusion of technological progress
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and its innovations. Conversely to what former modelling approaches have assumed (i.e. the Solow
(1956)-Swan (1956) growth model and the ’manna from heaven’-story), technological progress is not
exogenously but is in need of certain requirements - most important of all this is investment.
Capital spending, however, is a rather imprecise variable, as it contains several sub-components
or separation possibilities (i.e. private vs. public sector, R&D, infrastructure, inhomogeneous goods
varying by quality).
For the post-WWII in the 1970s, a drop in R&D-investment was often assumed to be responsible
for the decline in productivity. Griliches (1988, pp. 13-16) for example has provided arguments against
the explanatory power. The timing of the slowdown was “right” in a sense, that the time-lag, associated
with the speed of diffusion of R&D, had the right amount. It had appeared, however, in other Western
economies likewise, without providing a significant correlation (between the extent of R&D-slowdown
and drop in productivity). In addition, R&D-investment has merely decelerated in governmentally
supported sectors, which appear to have a rather light influence on aggregate productivity (due to
their small contribution; i.e. see Lichtenberg (1984) for further details on the “too-small”-argument).
Digital Infrastructure
An insufficient environment or infrastructure falters economic growth and productivity development.
In the course of the new wave of technological progress and the innovations in the ICT, the current
re-shape of the economy (“economy 4.0”) digitalizes almost every aspect and part. It is a matter of
providing the appropriate conditions, in order to fully exploit the benefits of this wave of innovation.
Digital infrastructure hereby plays a major role. Several components are included, subsumed under
the headline of digital infrastructure - (one of) the most important variables already provided in the
empirical section, which is broadband internet access. Besides broadband coverage and speed, several
risks and opportunities are associated with the requirements of the “4.0”-era.
In 2017, the German government has presented a report for 2014-2017, which contains landmarks
in course of the process of digital transformation (Bundesregierung (2017)). Hereby, three main fields
of interest were outlined: growth & employment, access & participation and trust & security. The aim
is a formation of government, research and civilian population to push further the process of digital
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transformation and strengthen (or maintain) Germany’s role as a powerful and innovative economy in
the future. Hereby, the agenda presents several fields of action, digital infrastructure as one of them.
Depending on the understanding and definition of infrastructure, the notion, however, could be
expressed differently (i.e. Bundesregierung (2017) presents “Security, Protection and Trust” as an
extra chapter - but clearly, this section could be summed up under infrastructure, too). Broadband
coverage and speed support participation of all economic agents and inhabitants. According to the
Bundesregierung (2017), a download speed of 50 Mbit/s is targeted; appropriate fundings have already
been provided and successfully lead to changes. In 2016 around 75% of households were equipped
with broadband internet access, and in 2018 it was 86%, as the present study has shown (see chapter
8.5). Unfortunately, no target for upload speed is presented by the Bundesregierung, neglecting the
necessity to implement a fully workable structure for modern working technologies. As an example,
most forms of cloud-computing - the general definition for IT-services via cloud-solutions - require 50
Mbit/s of download but also upload speed to work properly (see Erber (2014)). If provided less upload-
speed, this will falter business development in the new working age and have negative implications for
productivity growth.
Aggregate numbers on broadband coverage and speed are just one part of the story. Certain
areas still lack sufficient coverage and fall behind in terms of business development. Moreover, this
supports heterogeneity and inequality. For a more detailed analysis of the supply of broadband access
in Germany, one can separate the analysis for households, the production side or on a state level. As
a useful source of information, the Bundesministerium für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur (2018a)
(in collaboration with the TÜV Rhineland) regularly provides a study on the issue of broadband for
Germany.
According to the Bundesministerium für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur (2018a, pp. 5-6),
around 83%60 of households were equipped with broadband coverage of a speed of 50 Mbit/s or faster
but only 66% with a speed of more than 100 Mbit/s. As technological innovations in the future will
likely make use of higher speeds than the current target (which is 50 Mbit/s, Bundesregierung (2017)),
60The study separates for wired and wireless connections, whereas the numbers from the ITU contain wired access
only. It seems that wired connections play a more significant role as the Bundesministerium für Verkehr und Dig-
itale Infrastruktur (2018a) states that “technologies over and above 6 Mbit/s are dominated by wired technologies”
(Bundesministerium für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur (2018a, p.6, own translation)).
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there is still room for improvement and further expansions.
For the private use, 50 Mbit/s seem sufficient - for business purposes not. According to a survey
of the IHK Berlin (IHK Berlin (2019)), most companies expect a demand of 100 Mibit/s in the near
future; 50 Mbit/s seem appropriate just for around 10%. Such a divergence between the needs of the
production side and the goals of the digital agenda (Bundesregierung (2017, p. 11)) will definitely lead
to problems and show up in the productivity statistics.
As provided, broadband coverage seems to cover most parts of Germany; a positive trend over
the last one and a half decades has been outlined, too. However, not all parts of Germany enjoy
access to high data speed. What about the remaining areas, disconnected from modern technologies?
Negative implications for households and companies are self-evident. An area, lacking of access to
broadband technology, is less attractive not only to households but also to companies. The latter
will then move their production to another area. Job losses and structural problems are inevitable
results. In addition to lower job availability, households will tend to move, implying further problems.
Usually, rural areas suffer from insufficient coverage and speed. As provided by Bundesministerium
für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur (2018a, p. 8), just around 50% of households in rural61 areas
have access to rates of 50 Mbit/s or more (in comparison, urban areas exhibit a coverage of around
94%). It is an instruction for the German government to set the appropriate actions, in order to fill
the gap. Unattractive rural areas, in a sense of broadband availability, not only falter economic growth
in general. They support the evolution of structural problems and imply further problems (i.e. the
trend for households to move to urban areas leads to additional pressure on residential lease prices).
In Germany, around 82% of companies have access to broadband technology. The larger the com-
pany, the more likely it is equipped with broadband technology. Logically, smaller companies face
excess financial burden for implementing the required digital infrastructure. As a potential solution
for smaller companies, there is private (broadband) access used for company purposes. Here, small
companies face the same conditions as households and almost the same numbers apply (Bundesmin-
isterium für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur (2018a, pp. 8+26)). The need for company-solutions
on a private base might work as a potential substitute but also lacks complete62 coverage.
61In the study, “rural” is defined by population density of less than 100 inhabitants per square kilometre.
62“Complete” not necessarily meant as 100% but meant as not having faltering effects on the allocation of companies.
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Several other aspects shape the digital infrastructure. One of the requirements in the course of
the digital transformation is the availability of huge amounts of data - the necessity and potential
to make use of a large amount of numbers. Big Data is the key for a new age, as the technology
available nowadays allows to work with huge amounts of data, traditional software and technology did
not (Chen et al. (2014, p. 173)). It allows to make useful applications work (i.e. Google Maps with
on-time availability of traffic data to find the best route) and creates patterns (i.e.) in consumption,
companies can make use of. Whereas broadband technology supplies the traffic infrastructure for data
premises, technological innovations have closed the gap towards any kind of smart-systems (i.e. smart-
homes or smart-factories). Without digging deeper, any change in the transformation of the economy
is related to opportunities and risks likewise. Moreover, there are plenty of other aspects (compared
to those discussed in the present study), with justification to be included into what we understand
of “digital infrastructure”. Besides the broadband aspect, another aspect shall be discussed in short
- security. More precisely, any aspect of security related to Big Data, digital infrastructure and the
developments in course of the current wave of digital transformation.
Increasing amounts of data require a legal framework to maintain personality rights and let “4.0”
work under acceptable conditions to preserve privacy rights. In 2018, the European Union has set
an important landmark by introducing the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)63. It is a
regulation for the work with personal data (more precisely, the automatic recording of personal data)
and aims to maintain personality rights. It is set up, in order to have an even generally agreed
framework for the EU. Besides, and only indirectly linked to “digital” are the implications on general
infrastructure - such as the social security system or labour laws in Germany. The social security
system in example, as part of the general infrastructure, has to be adjusted for (potential) structural
unemployment (i.e. providing additional funds for unemployment benefits or retraining) (i.e. Tiemann
(2016, p. 3), Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2017, p. 179)).
In addition, labour laws have to be brought in line with the change. As an example, all-time
availability for employees via modern ICT or the increasing fraction of people making us of home-
office, provide risks for the health, asking for more strict regulations (i.e. not to exceed a maximum
63See <‌<https://gdpr-info.eu/>‌>.
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daily working load or the right for work-absence in holidays) (i.e. Bundesministerium für Arbeit und
Soziales (2017, p. 122, 136, 138), Schweppe et al. (2016)).
9.2.4 Demographics (headwind #3)
As provided in the empirical section, output per person can be decomposed into:
GDPt
Popt
=
GDPt
ht
x
ht
Et
x
Et
EPt
x
EPt
Popt
(10)
Many studies propose a significant correlation between productivity and demography (i.e. see
Gordon (2015); Feyrer (2007); Westelius and Liu (2016)).
According to Gordon (2015, p. 54), labour productivity (GDPtht ) in the US has decreased due to slow
growth in the working volume per person employed (“average working time”, htEt ), which itself results
from a declining labour force participation rate (LFPR, EPtPopt ). Likewise, a decreasing population
(Popt) in total is stated - something even more applicable to Germany. Figure 30 shows the trend of
the overall population (Popt) in Germany. After reunification, German population has consisted of
around 80 mil. citizens. Its value has peaked in the early 2000s at around 82.5 mil. before dropping
to 80.3 mil. (2011). The last years are characterised by an increase back to 82.8 mil. (2017) - a trend
associated with significant flows of migration (the fraction of non-German residents has increased to
11.2% in 2016 according to Statistisches Bundesamt (2018a)).
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Figure 30: Population Germany, (Population Germany in Mil.) 1990-2017. Source: Statistisches
Bundesamt (2019b); own illustration.
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A declining LFPR reflects an economy’s labour market structure, more precisely, the structure of
the labour market supply side. It describes the fraction of the civilian labour force in relation to the
entire (non-institutional) population. Therefore it is the potential for an economy to make use of the
production factor labour (some kind of upper boundary or potential bottleneck in production). The
higher the ratio is, the more people are capable of taking part in the working life (no matter whether
employed or actively searching for employment, at least available for work).
For Germany, it is argued persuasively, that the demographic conditions are even worse. Among
the G7-countries, Germany ranks in #2 regarding the extent of the demographic impact just behind
Japan (Westelius and Liu (2016)). Compared to the US, German population will not only suffer from
an ageing process of the (working) population but - as seen in figure 30 - it will furthermore shrink in
total numbers, whereas the US is ’only’ confronted to ageing problems (Deutsche Bundesbank (2017a),
Herzog-Stein et al. (2017, p. 10) quoting Colby and Ortman (2015)).
Despite (positive net) migration, refugee embodiment, slightly rising birthrates, increasing female
labour market participation and increasing participation of the elderly, the German working volume
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(h) is about to decrease further in the near to middle future perspective (Fuchs et al. (2017)). Working
volume in Germany has already rebounded to values similar after Reunification, as chapter 8.6 has
provided.
In 1991 around 60 billion hours of work (Germany) have been noted on aggregate, dropping to a
low (for the time 1991-2016-interval considered) of around 55 billion in 2003 and back to 59 billion
in 2016. As employment, measured in persons, has increased, the average working volume per person
employed has (necessarily) gone down, as chapter 8.6.1 has already reported.
If one shares the pessimistic view of Gordon (2012), the reduction in the average working volume
per person offers a huge problem from the demographic perspective, providing headwind for economic
progress. Simply said, the less hours people work on average, the less they contribute to national
product and this, in turn, decreases productivity. If decreasing employment is forecasted for the
future under the assumption of stagnant per-person-working time, it necessarily has to lead to a
decrease in productivity growth. Arguing from a quantitative perspective, negative developments due
to a decreasing amount of suitable employees will then reduce the possibility for Germany to gain
satisfying rates of productivity growth. Connected to the aspect of the quality of labour, a mismatch
situation of applicant’s skills diverging from company’s requirements is then more likely to occur, if
highly-skilled employees become rare (at least sufficiently-skilled for the requirement of the changing
requirements in course of “Work 4.0”). Implications for the labour market supply side can be inferred
from the current transition to this new working environment. Effects of automation and robotics will
have further implications for the labour market, the demographic structure and in the end for economic
development. As the effect of automation and the connected probability of substituting capital (i.e.
robotics) for labour is mainly of interest for specific labour market discussions, it shall be neglected
in this study. Central arguments, examinations as well as forecasts can be found in many studies;
especially recommended are Graetz and Michaels (2015) with an analysis for 17 countries including
Germany and Frey and Osborne (2017), Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) as well as Arntz et al. (2017)
for the US labour market.
Deutsche Bundesbank (2017a) calculates employment projections for up to 2025 in terms of the
development of the working volume. Ageing (working) population goes in hand with a higher prob-
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ability of part-time working contracts. The working volume then is assumed to develop according to
an inverted U-shaped curve, decreasing after 2020 due to the effect of an ageing population. By 2025,
the study expects a deficit of around -0.75% compared to 2017, the start of the projection (Deutsche
Bundesbank (2017a, p. 42)). Knetsch et al. (2013) share this view by estimating the development
process of full-time equivalents and project a deficit of -1% in 2020, compared to 2012. This drop is
characterised by an ageing population, still (and even longer, compared to decades ago) taking part in
the working life but more often in non-full-time jobs.
Additionally, Fuchs et al. (2017, p. 6) provide data for the different cohorts of the working popula-
tion in a forecast scenario adjusting for migration, working behaviour (i.e. part-time preferences) and
demographic effects (i.e. change in female labour market participation or simply the ageing factor).
Under the most realistic forecast assumptions, Fuchs et al. (2017) confirm the possible shrinking of the
labour force. The youngest cohort (<30y.) in Germany in 2015 was composed of 9.5 million and since
then is expected to develop downwards steadily to around 8 million (2030) and 7.5 million (2060)64.
The middle-cohort (30-49y.) is about to develop similarily: from 20.2 million in 2015 it is expected to
be reduced to 19.6 million (2030) and more significant to 17.4 million in 2060. Until 2035 most of the
“baby-boomers” will still take part in the working life so that the demographic problems are covered
up a little bit (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2015,
p. 316) assume effects resulting from the “exit”, that will be starting in 2020 and fully launched there-
after). The oldest cohort (50-64y.) will grow steadily from 14.7 million (2015) to 16.2 million (2021)
before decreasing to about 12.1 million (2060), also due to the exit of the “baby-boomers”. Even under
the assumptions of having similar migration flows like those in the past, labour market potential will
drop below the 40 million-mark in 2060 (Fuchs et al. (2017, p. 7)). High migration rates do counteract
against negative demographic trends (i.e. ageing) but cannot fully compensate for.
Even though, one expands the view and ’corrects’ for a later retirement age (i.e. the Deutsche
Bundesbank (2017a) study calculates the working population from 15-74, in order to correct for the
fact, that many people - around one-seventh to be precise - still take part in the working life after
having reached the official age of retirement) the results show the same trends (a decrease of more
64The study makes use of three different forecast scenarios, hereby taking the most realistic one for the projection. In
this most realistic scenario a net migration of 200.000 people is assumed on average per annum.
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than 2 million people in the working age until 2025).
Likewise, ageing population and workforce have another notable effect, when it comes to innova-
tions in course of structural change (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung (2015, pp. 316-318)). Whereas the former developments just describe a quantitative ar-
gumentation for the bottleneck on the labour market, ageing population provides another challenge.
Modern technology and innovations are usually associated with the necessity to adapt to a modern
working environment, as well as the skills to make use of them. Different cohorts of age are associated
with different kind of skills. The younger the worker, the more likely developed are skills related to
innovation (so-called “fluid-cognitive skills”). Contrary, the older cohort contains a larger endowment of
experience, language skills and the ability to focus on the basic essentials (so-called “crystalline skills”)
(Herzog-Stein et al. (2017, p. 10), Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung (2015, pp. 317-318)). Especially the fast innovation pace in the ICT-sector and the
requirements in the working life yield the crucial necessity to regularly keep up and continue one’s
very own education. Ageing population, therefore, can be associated with a decline of the average
innovation capability (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung
(2015, 317)).
Older workers are more likely to lack the skills, which are required to perform on an adequate level
in course of technological change. As innovation capability matters, individual productivity, therefore,
highly depends on age and working age - the longer ago a period of education has taken place, the
higher its depreciation effect on the (individual) human capital stock is.
It is argued, however, for some good reason, that working-age itself might be correlated positively
to productivity (see Feyrer (2009) for example) due to learning effects and growing experience; an
effect, which is outperformed by the obstacles, technological change provides for the older working
cohort. In contrast to the ageing-population-problem, Feyrer (2009) analyses demographic issues,
leading to a change in the quality of (business) managers. More precisely, this study asks whether the
entry of the baby-boomers into workforce has an effect on productivity. When entering labour market
the average quality of the manager necessarily decreases (it is assumed, that quality is positively
dependent on years of working experience) and increases after gaining years of experience. Using
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a Lucas-model (Lucas (1978)), the author finds explanatory power of roughly 20% for the 1970s-
slowdown and foregoing developments in productivity, which emphasizes the relevance of demographics
for productivity analyses.
Further, labour market reforms affect general labour supply. The “Hartz reforms” at the beginning
of the 21st century have introduced many employees of lower quality into the labour market in Germany,
in order to increase employment volume and decrease unemployment (i.e. see Krause and Uhlig
(2011); Krebs and Scheffel (2013); Elstner et al. (2018)). Whereas the quantitative effect is remarkably
fine (if arguing from a simple perspective of having re-introduced more unemployed into the labour
market), effects on productivity due to less quality from the labour market supply side is noteworthy.
Productivity is not only dependent on the quantitative amount of work available but also from the
worker’s human capital. If more workers with low productivity are introduced to the labour market,
the average productivity necessarily drops. Labour market reforms were also meant to provide a higher
degree of flexibility, in order to better adapt the market to structural changes in course of technological
developments. Modern and more flexible working models (some of them subsidized by the government
or labour market institutions respectively) can contribute hereby. More important for the adoption
of the labour supply side of an economy is the duly adjustment to structural change by economic
policy. More precisely, an educational system is crucial, which not only offers education for “first-
timers” but also provides an extensive offer for “re-trainers” (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung
der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2015, p. 318)). As the educational system is of central
importance, this shall be discussed in chapter 9.2.5.
Especially from 2015 onwards, Germany has experienced larger flows of refugees, entering the
labour market. As a positive aspect, migration and refugee integration counteract shrinking working
population. It, however, requires some time to break down language and cultural barriers, to close
educational gaps and - a difficult undertaking - to abolish prejudices on the employer’s side, especially
when it comes to smaller and less internationally connected companies (Deutsche Bundesbank (2017a,
p. 42)).
Despite having most of the G7-economies being faced with ageing problems for the near to mid-
dle future (i.e. as stated by United Nations (2015)), Westelius and Liu (2016) provide a study for
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Japan, which is ranked in #1 (Germany #2) among the G7 regarding macroeconomic problems due to
shrinking and ageing population. One of their findings is that prefectures with a larger service sector
show less productivity growth over time (measured as TFP-growth; Westelius and Liu (2016, p. 11)),
strengthening the ageing-population argument. Ageing population in course of demographic change
exhibits another - rather indirect - effect on productivity. The larger the fraction of older people (or
generally speaking, the older the entire society is), the higher the demand for services becomes. This is
valid especially for the health care service sector. Increasing demand for services implies nothing else
than structural change and a re-shift of the economy’s focus in production and output. In the course
of the increasing importance of services, the labour market follows. Health care and the entire service
sector in total is characterised by a higher degree of labour intensity and less productivity likewise.
If the fraction of services in national products rises, productivity on aggregate necessarily declines
(Westelius and Liu (2016, p. 5)). Besides the indirect effect of increasing demand for services due to
the ageing of a population, there is the question which side of the direct effect dominates. On the one
hand, older employees have accumulated a significant amount of lifetime experience in the working
process, on the other hand, younger employees show a higher level of adaptability, the skill to satisfy
the requirements in the course of a changing labour environment.
Aksoy et al. (2015) even offer three channels, through which demographics affect an economy’s
productivity development. Besides ageing of the workforce and the different innovation capability of
the cohorts, lifetime consumption decisions, as well as human capital considerations, play a role (Aksoy
et al. (2015, p. 43)).
Innovation capability, as their first channel, is measured by using patent application as proxy. The
study finds a strong positive effect for the middle-age cohort (40-49yo.) on patent application, whereas
older cohorts show the opposite (Aksoy et al. (2015, p. 9 f.)). According to the results, an ageing
population and a decrease of the most important cohort for the innovation process, therefore, lead to
less innovational activity and shrinking rates of productivity over time.
Secondly, investment in human capital is an important linkage. Depending on the fertility rate
and/or ageing process of the population, different savings decisions can influence the rate of growth.
If, for example, ceteris paribus, fertility decreases (symbolic for an ageing population), workers have
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to increase their savings for retirement, implying less (current) investment. As the share of youngsters
(dependants) decrease likewise, capital spending per capita can be assumed to increase, leading to
more investment in human capital and implying higher growth rates (Aksoy et al. (2015, p. 39 f.)).
The third channel, the authors offer, is related to the life-cycle adjustment of consumption in course
of higher longevity of the population. If people expect to live longer, they have to adjust their savings
accordingly. Higher savings and higher asset accumulation in the course of the working life then, in
turn, reduces consumption. The additional savings made by the workers are then used for capital and
innovation investment, implying higher rates of growth. In contrast to the positive effect of higher
savings, the necessary decrease in consumption and corresponding negative effect on aggregate demand
can outperform or even falter the positive effect (Aksoy et al. (2015, p. 38 f.)).
Projections of the Aksoy et al. (2015)-study expect German long-term GDP-growth to drop by
about -0.91% from 1.66% p.a. (on average between 2000-2009) to 0.76% p.a. (2010-2019 and 2016 to
2019 as projections Aksoy et al. (2015, p. 21)). More generally, they state that “our results provide fur-
ther indication that OECD economies are more likely to experience episodes where aggregate demand
externalities may lead to stagnation in the following decades.” (Aksoy et al. (2015, p. 12)). Similar
results are shown by Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung
(2015, p. 318), which provides a drop of -0.6% GDP-growth per person and year.
Lindh and Malmberg (1999) also find evidence for the influence of the demographic structure on
labour productivity. According to their human capital augmented Solow modelling approach with
regard to OECD countries, the 50-64yo. cohort has a positive influence on productivity, young cohorts
provide ambiguous effects whereas retirees (>65yo.) exhibit negative implications for productivity
trends (Lindh and Malmberg (1999, p. 431)). Experience is the linkage, they base their study on;
shortcomings of the approach are admitted. In contrast to Aksoy et al. (2015), Lindh and Malmberg
(1999) do not include other channels in their empirical studies. Saving behaviour and effects on
aggregate demand are excluded so that they experience-argument in their study as explanation for the
productivity channel has to be used with a certain amount of care (Lindh and Malmberg (1999, p.
445)).
Like Gordon (2012) has proposed for the United States, the demographic headwind blows against
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Germany, too. Through various channels, productivity is and will be depressed. As Germany is not
only confronted with an ageing population but a shrinking one likewise, the headwind has increased
significance. When in the previous century the baby-boomer generation, as well as increasing rates
of female labour market participation, entered the economy, this has created a positive stimulus for
economic growth. It not only has come to an end but will be in “reverse motion” (Gordon (2012, p.
16)) - faltering economic growth. When the generation of baby-boomers will retire, total hours worked
per capita necessarily has to decrease, implying lower rates of productivity.
As demographic effects are connected deeply with the educational system of an economy and the
corresponding degree of labour market flexibility. The subsequent chapter deals with this linkage.
9.2.5 Human Capital and the Educational System (headwind #4)
Declining labour quality is another potential source of explanation. It is a component ultimately
linked to an economy’s (factor) endowment and hereby stimulates economic growth and productivity.
Its importance - more precisely the importance to establish a suitable system for the development
of human capital - is also linked to its rigidity in the short run. Ramifications of inappropriate
educational attainment become visible usually over longer time horizons only; the time required for
changes likewise. Such time-lags between (policy) actions and their respective outcomes encumber the
supply side of an economy in the short run. As a potential source of explanation for productivity
puzzles, an examination of the educational system of Germany has its entitlement.
Gordon (2014) examines the US educational system and its relevance for hampering productivity
and growth. This section of the study first follows Gordon (2014) by adressing secondary education
and higher education as the two relevant components of educational attainment. Two points are
added, however: numbers on non-academic education, as well as numbers on retraining, which deal
with separate career entry points (mobility).
Especially Germany with a traditionally strong middle class relies on a specific fraction of its
economic performance in the non-academic job market. The need to incorporate the non-academic
sector is crucial as in many countries and for many levels of profession a college degree is mandatory -
however, in Germany often it is not. Training and qualification on a high non-academic level work as
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a suitable substitute in the educational system and for the German labour market.
Secondary Education
Secondary education prepares for higher education. It forms the basement for the specialization in
skills, acquired in college or in any other tertiary education system. For most countries, it is compulsory,
at least until the age of 16 (in the US depending on the state). Secondary education is sometimes split
into sub-categories of schools, which makes a comparison often even more problematic. As a suitable
indicator for the quality of pupils, enrolled in secondary education, the OECD regularly (in a three-
year-cycle) ranks countries regarding crucial skills. Poor positions in the rankings provide information
on the relative (dis-)advantage of domestic pupils from a qualitative perspective and a possible lack in
the qualification for post-secondary education.
The program for international student assessment (PISA) regularly ranks OECD countries (and
some others) among the fields of mathematics, natural sciences and reading ability. It also provides
information on the effect of gender, social background and migration on education65. Test results then
estimate the quality of a country’s (future) labour endowment and allow implications on the structure
of the educational system.
All data of the PISA tests provided for the relevant OECD countries can be found in annex V. The
data for the 35 member states of the OECD are taken from OECD (2018). For mathematics no data
was available for 2000 and for (overall) science there were no data for the years 2000 and 2003.
When in 2001 the results of the first PISA test were made public and Germany was ranked in the
very bottom half among the OECD peer group (i.e. #21 in category “overall reading”; PISA study
2000), politics as well as general public discussed the consequences and implications for the future
of the educational system. Since then, in the reading category, Germany has moved up the scale to
position #9 in the latest test (2015). In the second field of testing - overall science - Germany was
able to maintain its position in the upper area (currently ranked #10; the same position as in 2006),
whereas in the category of mathematics it has improved from #17 (2003) to #11 (2015).
Top positions in all categories are shared traditionally by Japan, Finland and Canada, whereas the
65Data is collected in a three-year interval since 2000.
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United States are merely ranked in the bottom half of the table. Compared to the US and Robert
Gordon’s (2012) examinations, for Germany, we can first assess a better relative position, as well as
improvements over the last (almost) two decades. The United States, in contrast, have lost positions
(#14 in 2000 to #20 in 2015 in the category of overall reading and from #26 in 2003 to #32 in 2015
in the category of mathematics) and just slightly improved from #24 to #19 in the field of overall
science.
Secondary education and the related skills, measured by the PISA testing, do not necessarily
provide a bottleneck for educational attainment in Germany. Furthermore, the positive development
among the categories shows that, in contrast to the US, Germany is prepared better for the future.
Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement. As politics have set the goal to close the gap to
leading nations in technology and overall development, a top position must be the purpose (i.e. see
Wanka (2015)).
If PISA represents implications on the quality of a nation’s endowment of secondary education, a
quantitative analysis is complementary. In this context, it is interesting to analyse the amount of pupils
having completed secondary education (or by measuring the opposite - the so-called “drop-out rate”).
Studies provide fair grades for Germany’s secondary educational attainment (i.e. Herzog-Stein et al.
(2017, p. 11) who state stability of drop-out rates over the last 25 years in Germany and increasing
percentages of graduates with general university entrance qualification).
Over the last years, the amount of pupils leaving secondary school without graduation (drop-out
rate) has decreased in Germany. In 2008 (64 918) the value was almost the same compared to 1992
(63 560). In relation to total students in secondary schools, Germany has, in fact, reduced its drop-out
rate from 8.19% (1992) and 6.98% (2008) to nowadays 5.75% (2016). In contrast, the percentage of
students with the general university entrance qualification66 has increased from 24.73% (1992) and
30.20% (2008) to 34.82% (2016) (Statistisches Bundesamt (2017b, p. 561 f.)).
One, however, has to treat these numbers with care. Increasing numbers and fractions of people
equipped with the general university entrance qualification and lower drop-out rates from secondary
education do not necessarily lead to the implications of improvements in the educational attainment.
66No separation between “Fachhochschulreife” and “Allgemeine Hochschulreife” is made in this case.
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It can also be inferred by simply lowering the standards and requirements. This argument, however,
is met and weakened by the better performances in the recent PISA-tests, discussed above. Another
point noteworthy is the possible mismatch between qualification and skills on the one side and require-
ments by companies on the other. As in Germany, currently around 1.25 mil. vacancies (Institut für
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (2018)) exist (without having a full-employment situation on the
labour market supply side), a mismatch is likely, indicating defects in the educational system.
Higher Education / Tertiary Education
Higher education is defined as “all post-secondary education, including both public and private univer-
sities, colleges, technical training institutes, and vocational schools.”67. It “includes both theoretical
programmes leading to advanced research or high skill professions such as medicine and more vocational
programmes leading to the labour market.” (OECD Statistics (2018b)).
Figure 31 shows the development of the 25-34 year-olds, equipped with tertiary education, in G7-
countries, as well as numbers for the OECD-average. Even though implications for the educational
attainment can be derived from other age-groups as well, the 25-34 year-olds are the primary target
group for tertiary education (note that to be included in the statistics, one must have successfully
completed tertiary education, not just started). Usually, people aiming for tertiary education get
enrolled right after having finished secondary education, which is at the age of around 2068.
67See <‌<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/tertiaryeducation#what_why>‌> for further details.
68For a better and more broad analysis, data for 20-24 year-olds should be taken into account. Unfortunately, data
for this age-group is not provided by the OECD.
136
Figure 31: Fraction of Tertiary Education, (in per cent) 1990-2016. Source: OECD Statistics (2018b);
own illustration.
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Currently, around 30% of the 25-34 year-olds in Germany are equipped with tertiary education
(2016: 30.5%). It represents an all-time high, despite low rates of increase within the past years
(2012: 29%). Figure 31 shows the flat curve feature, starting at around 20% in the 1990s and only
moderately growing afterwards (1991: 21.2%, 2000: 22.3%). Remarkably to note is Germany’s poor
position among the G7-countries and its relative position to the OECD-average (OECD currently
provides a value of 43.1% (2016) of tertiary education among the 25-34 year-olds).
The United States showed a level similar to Germany back in 1991 (23.8%) but managed to increase
to a value of almost 50% (2016: 47.5%). Italy caught up over the years and has closed the gap to
Germany. Starting at a rather poor level of 6.6% in 1991, it nowadays offers similar levels to Germany
(25.6% in 2016 for Italy).
Generally, the highest values are offered by Canada and Japan. Despite a long-lasting tradition of
a high percentage of tertiary education (Canada started 32.1% in 1991, Japan at 45.7% in 199769),
both countries have hit the 60%-mark in 2016.
Other cohorts (not displayed graphically and of less importance for implications on tertiary educa-
69Unfortunately, for some years and countries data lacks completeness; therefore 1997 has to be taken as starting point
for Japan.
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tion) show similar trends. Canada and Japan again performed outstandingly by almost doubling their
values over the years in the respective time interval. Pretty remarkable is the increase in the 45-54
and 55-64 year-old-cohorts. Here, the fraction of people equipped with tertiary education has almost
tripled (i.e. Canada 55-64 year-olds: 16.7% in 1991 to 46.2% in 2016; Japan 55-64 year-olds: 13.7% to
39.7%). Whereas the United States shows a similar trend (from 17.1% (1991) to 41.9% (2016), 55-64
year-olds), Germany increased its fraction from 16.5% (1991) to 26.3% (2016).
It is interesting to note, that the leading countries show similar trends over all age groups nowadays
(2016: i.e. Canada: 60.2% (25-34 y.-o.), 62.8% (35-44 y.-o.), 55.7% (45-54 y.-o.) and 46.2% (55-64 y.-
o.)). Italy as counterpart provides a negative correlation between age and fraction of people equipped
with tertiary education (25.6%, 20.5%, 14.0% and 12.4% for the respective age groups).
Only by implying statements from quantitative analyses on the tertiary educational system might
lead to distorted points. If the supply, provided by universities, colleges and other institutions of
the tertiary level, does not meet the demand of labour, structural problems are inevitable. Such a
mismatch situation can be displayed by the amount of graduates ending up in unemployment. This
point, already stated for secondary education, becomes valid for tertiary education, too.
According to Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (2017a), the unemployment rate of
graduates with tertiary education is on an all-time low (since 1980). Currently (2016) only 2.3% are
unemployed; the rate has slightly decreased from 2015 (2.4%). The opposite is true for unemployed
without any kind of educational form (2016: 19.1%). When separated into Western and Eastern
Germany, the numbers also imply structural problems. In Eastern Germany, more precisely states of
the former GDR, show significantly higher unemployment rates: 29.2% in Eastern Germany and 17.7%
in Western Germany (2016). Even though the heterogeneous labour market situation in Germany is
a problem of unevenly benefitted regions, the trend over the last (almost) three decades goes into the
right direction. Eastern Germany was able to reduce its unemployment rate for non-graduates from
an all-time high of 55% (1997) to 29.2% (2016) and for overall population likewise (from 19.9% in 2004
to 8.1% in 2016).
However, as the overall unemployment rate in Germany has decreased within the last years, it
allows for the statement of an overall improvement of the German labour market. For 2016, 6.2% have
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been unemployed (overall German unemployment), showing a three-in-a-row reduction since 2013.
Double-digit unemployment rates at the beginning of the 21st century continuously shrink - which in
fact benefits all groups of people regarding their qualification level. It seems, the very best option to
evade unemployment still represents education.
Another point worth to note with regard to tertiary education is the financial aspect. Traditionally,
tuition fees in the United States have accumulated a serious amount of student debt. American students
owe around $1 trn. in total college debt Gordon (2014, p. 10 f.). Even though a college degree generally
offers a higher probability of finding a decent job and higher income likewise, Gordon (2014) states,
that around one quarter of college graduates fail to find a well-paid job right after graduation, Many
graduates then end up being worse off: firstly, the benefits from higher education are out of reach and
secondly, they are burdened with a serious amount of debt70.
Besides a service fee for each semester (currently, 2018, at approximately €100-200), there are no
tuition fees for public universities in Germany71. In addition, the qualificatory gap between public
and private schools seems to be smaller in Germany, compared to the US. Attending public schools in
Germany is quite more common and with the effect of similar education (compared to private schools),
it is more than an adequate substitute. Numbers on tuition fees and graduates, however, only provide
one side of the coin. Increasing numbers of students at university often go hand in hand with structural
problems when faced insufficient equipment and infrastructures.
Crowded lecture halls, the simple lack of desks for individual learning in libraries, an increasing
student-to-tutor ratio and generally speaking a worsening college infrastructure (due to insufficient
investment over the past years) will have a significant impact on human capital in Germany if no
adequate measures are executed soon.
In the United States, it is more expensive to attend college - as relevant tertiary education. Average
yearly tuition fees range from $3.500 to $24.000, depending on the duration of study and university
chosen (College Board (2018), tuition fees increase significantly for students from other districts or
70Furthermore, they have invested living time for - which seems- nothing and have to depreciate individual human
capital with every day working apart from their qualification level.
71For some years and states in Germany tuition fees were set up. All (former) countries of Western Germany charged
€500 per semester except Bremen, Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein. So from around 2006 to 2014, there
was a minor fee for students to pay - ridiculously low compared to tuition fees of US-colleges.
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even states). Private colleges on average even ask for around $32.000 per semester, which burdens
private budgets for schooling expenses. In this comparison, any other costs besides from tuition are
neglected as they appear for any student (and vary depending on the place of study and personal
preferences; i.e. accommodation or food).
In Germany - and probably in many other countries, too - the main reason for increasing private
debt is (still) unemployment (Creditreform Wirtschaftsforschung (2017, pp. 70 ff.)). According to
Creditreform Wirtschaftsforschung (2017), there are five main reasons for private debt in Germany:
parting and divorce, (addictive) illness or accident, uneconomic household management, failed self-
employment and unemployment. In sum, the “big five” name the reasons for around two-thirds of the
debtors, unemployment the major reason.
In 2010 for 28.2% of the debtors unemployment was the main issue, in 2017 this number has
decreased to 20.2%. The overall debt-ratio of households in Germany has slightly increased. In 2004
3.10 mil. households were considered as indebted, in 2010 3.19 mil. and currently, this number
has increased to 3.41 mil. (2017). The good news in this context is that the average sum of debt
per household has decreased. On average an indebted household in 2006 was burdened by €36.000,
nowadays €30.200 € (2017). This is valid for the overall sum of debt, which has declined over the
years (from €265 bn. in 2006 to €209 bn. in 2017). Less debt in total but an increasing number of
debtors may have a contrary effect on the likelihood of taking on tertiary education.
If one considers debt as an obstacle for proper education in Germany, the implications of the rising
debt in German are rather negative. Debt not only prevents people from taking on further education
(as many are forced to earn money instead of investing in their own human capital stock), debt also
depresses effective demand for goods and services - the issue already discussed in chapter 9.2.2.
Non-academic Educational System
Another component of the educational attainment is the non-academic sector. For some professions
- usually lower quality jobs - no academic education is required. Even more - for some jobs a more
practice orientated training, so-called vocational training, can be considered superior. The quality of
college education varies among countries, so does the quality of the non-educational component. Many
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countries are endowed with a well-functioning non-academic sector. For those, non-academic training
can be considered as an alternative on a high level (Herzog-Stein et al. (2017, p. 11)). Whereas
Germany owns a well-functioning non-academic educational system, the US does not. Moreover, for
Germany, for any profession, there are central rules and regulations, set by the federal government. In
the US, no such regulations exist - the US constitution does not include aspects of education, which
allows states to individually establish non-academic standards - a potential bottleneck for mobility and
allocative efficiency.
Dual schooling in Germany connects theoretical education with vocational training. Students not
only benefit from this nexus but also from a limited time required to be trained for ambitious tasks.
For the examination of the German non-academic schooling level, the quantitative development of
apprentice positions can be inferred.
According to Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (2018, pp. 14 ff.), the supply of apprentice positions
in Germany in 2017 has increased for the first time since 2011. In 2017 around 572.000 positions were
offered (peaking in 2011: 600.000). The number of 2017 marks a +1.5% increase, compared to 2016.
As usually, the supply side is only one side of the coin. Again, mismatches can occur, when demand
does not fit supply. And for Germany, there is a significant gap. Put differently, the divergence between
supply and demand dissipates potential for additional employment and welfare development.
The demand for apprentice positions has decreased from around 653.000 to around 604.000 in the
time interval considered (2009-2017). A more precise indicator for the performance of the non-academic
educational attainment is the number of signed training contracts. From 2009 onwards, this number
has decreased (564.000 in 2009) to around 523.000 (2017). Compared to 2016, a first-time increase in
the time interval marks a slight improvement in the matching process (+0.6%).
In addition to cold numbers, there is a quality aspect of non-academic training. As stated initially,
the German non-academic system provides high-quality training. In Germany, many levels of profession
and positions, which require a college degree in other countries, can be obtained through the non-
academic channel.
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Retraining and Mobility
A big problem connected with drop-out rates is social mobility and (income) inequality. Headwind
#6 will discuss the inequality aspect in more detail. For schooling and educational attainment, the
financial background (and parental support) still plays a significant role. Despite rather low study
costs (especially when compared to the US) and more possibilities to receive financial support from
government, Germany still lacks equally distributed possibilities in the schooling system (i.e. Pollak
(2012)).
Correlated with mobility in the educational system is the mobility across incomes and earnings (see
chapter 9.2.7). Human capital and inequality (of incomes primarily) show mutual leverage. The higher
the mobility in the educational system is, the more likely it will prevent an economy from having a
high level of any kind of income inequality.
Bönke et al. (2015) explore the relationship between annual and lifetime earnings and the connection
to mobility. Even though ’mobility’ in this context relates to mobility of persons of the same age
(expressed in cohorts; so-called intra-generational mobility) regarding labour incomes, one can find
implications for the educational system in total. Flexible educational systems support an individual
to move up in the income ladder - lifelong learning becomes possible and supplies employees with
the latest tasks required, resulting in higher incomes. The authors show that at the beginning of a
(working) life cycle (in a person’s twenties) mobility is rather high but steadlily decreases and does
not exist any more after the age of forty (Bönke et al. (2015, p. 28)). What can we infer from this
result? If an economy does not allow its (older) citizens to move up (or down), this will show a high
degree of inflexibility and enforces the issue of inequality.
Besides implying a dysfunctional schooling system, drop-out rates are also subject to unequally
distributed possibilities and chances. There is a strong correlation between the rate of poverty of a
region and its probability of dropping out (Herzog-Stein et al. (2017) quoting Geis and Schröder (2016)).
Even more and regarding social mobility, childrens’ careers often exhibit the same development patterns
like their parents’. In this context, Pollak (2012) marks Germany with poor grades in terms of social
mobility.
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Positive implications of education on productivity and economic well-being are usually assumed
as self-evident. Berger and Fisher (2013) for example explore this linkage on US-state level and find
a positive impact of education on wages. More precisely, higher median wages are associated with a
better-educated work-force. But education not only directly increases well-being by higher returns.
Positive spill-over effects of higher levels of education are outlined as well as positive implications for
the public budget. In the long run, the higher the levels of education, the higher the return and the
higher (income) taxes will be. The authors provide empirical evidence for the link (Berger and Fisher
(2013, pp. 3-5) making use of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics): higher education →higher
productivity→higher incomes (as a suitable proxy/component for/of well-being). Higher productivity
not only allows an economy to pay higher wages and profits. If goods and services can be produced in
a shorter amount of time, shorter work weeks and more leisure time are the consequences ultimately
increasing economic utility (Berger and Fisher (2013, p. 10 f.)).
In a recent study, Elstner et al. (2018) point on the productivity-labour market linkage. In course
of the restructuring of the German labour market (by the already discussed “Hartz reforms”) in 2005,
around 5 million low-skilled and low-productivity workers (which was an increase by around ten per
cent) have been introduced to the German labour market, leading to a decline in the overall rate of
productivity. Many of the low-skilled workers newly introduced to the market became employed in
the traditional low-productive service sector (compared to the high-productive manufacturing sector),
which had strengthened the effect on aggregate productivity (Elstner et al. (2018, p. 19)).
Further, the study states that the magnitude of technological progress has slowed down after 2012,
implying an additional depressing factor for productivity growth. Even though decreasing rates of
productivity have existed prior to 2012, a slower pace of technological progress further limits current
productivity growth. The study also supposes that the gains from technological progress in the ICT-
sector have mainly stimulated the employment sector and to a lesser extent GDP, implying only
moderate effects on productivity. In addition, the study provides evidence for low spill-over effects
regarding technological change from other economies like the US (an explanation is not offered) (Elstner
et al. (2018, p. 34 f.)).
In course of the obvious effects the education-productivity-income channel, implications on the
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base of cost-benefit calculations can be inferred. Expenditures in the educational system usually yield
overproportional returns. As an example, French and Fisher (2009) find a cost-benefit ratio of 2:1
(double increase in earnings in relation to a single increase in expenditures) for any postsecondary and
technical education in Tennessee (USA). Even more, for the entire US, a (roughly) 5:1-ratio (five times
increase in income due to single increase in expenditures) was exhibited by creating more employment,
output, labour income and tax incomes (French and Fisher (2009, p. 11) quoting Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2008)).
9.2.6 Public Debt (headwind #5)
When discussing the environmental quality and growth potential of an economy, there is an important
variable, which limits the leeway of economic policy - public debt. As the public sector provides a huge
amount of crucial goods for the economy (i.e. infrastructure, educational system), the costs can be
covered by taxes and other submissions - or by loans. The latter technically subsidiary but practically
considered as an essential part in public budgets.
For members of the European Currency Union (ECU) like Germany, the upper ceilings of public
indebtedness are defined in the treaty of Maastricht (European Union (1992)). Besides other criteria,
which aim for a homogeneous character of the European Currency Union, boundaries for public deficit
and debt (cumulative deficit) are defined.
Countries must not overshoot a -3% deficit per annum. Deficit is calculated as net value of expen-
ditures and revenues of the public space and related to a country’s national product (GDP). For the
debt criterion, a limit of 60% (in relation to GDP) is set. Even though the punishing mechanism of
the European Currency Union is rather weak and subject to discussion (with regard to moral hazard
aspects), there is the challenge and of course the legal requirement for every country to balance its
budget according to the criteria of the Maastricht treaty. Checks on every country’s economic situation
are executed when joining the currency union and on a regular base afterwards.
Public debt and its boundaries work as a constraint for investment and limit growth potential not
only in the short but also in the long run.
Figure 32 provides the trend for the G7-countries with regard to the annual deficit ratio, whereas
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figure 33 provides the (cumulative) debt72. Data is taken from International Monetary Fund (2018b)
and International Monetary Fund (2018a).
Figure 32: Annual Public Deficit, (in per cent of GDP) 1991-2022. Source: International Monetary
Fund (2018b); own illustration.
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72Please note, that any data after 2016 is a forecast only.
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Figure 33: Cumulative Public Debt, (in per cent of GDP) 1991-2022. Source: International Monetary
Fund (2018a); own illustration.
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After German reunification, there have been years of excess budget deficits (i.e. -9.4% (1995), -4.3%
(2003), -4.2% (2010)). For the majority of the years, however, Germany fits the Maastricht criterion
on annual deficit. As for France, the situation is less positive. Besides some years of moderate deficits
around the turn of the millennium, France regularly overshoots the budget criterion. Remarkable at
this point is the post-crisis development. Whereas Germany only had to suffer from one year of excess
budget deficit (-4.2% in 2010) and reversed the trend to only around +1% (2011) afterwards, France
did not follow. Budget deficits in France only shrunk slowly from around -7% in the years after the
global financial crisis to -5% in (2011, 2012). In contrast to Germany, it still misses the deficit criterion
(-3.4% in 2016) in the latest past.
Coming from substantially high deficit ratios, Italy was able to reduce the deficit within the last
decades. Having two-digit deficits (-11%) in 1991 and (-10%) in 1992, the trend can be considered as
positive. Despite having some problems of fulfilling the legal requirement, Italy now constantly shows
budgetary discipline. Within the last five years (2012-2016) it has performed well, though only little
below the -3%-boundary (i.e. 2012-2014 exactly hitting the maximum legal requirement).
Canada, Japan, UK and the US do not require to balance their budgets according to the Maastricht
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treaty. Whereas Canada can be considered as rather stable, the other three countries offer higher deficit
ratios. Besides the beginning of the 1990s and the aftermath of the global financial crisis (2009-2011
deficit ratios of around -3% to -5%), Canada showed a budget that can be considered as almost
balanced. Some years even show a surplus (2005-2007 at around +1.5% to 2%).
Connected to the (cumulative) debt, Japan naturally provides deficits over and above -5% (around
-5.5% on average for the time-interval considered), which necessarily mounts up a large amount of
public debt.
For the UK and US only within the last years, a positive trend is found. Ranging from two-digit
values the UK was able to reduce the annual budget to a ratio of around and below -5% within the
last four years. After the impact of the global financial crisis slowed down (peaking in 2009 with -10%
for the UK and -13% for the US), the trend for the US can be interpreted as positive (though still
exhibiting deficit ratios of in between -4% and -5% for the last post-crisis years).
For the second fiscal criterion of the Maastricht treaty - cumulative debt not to exceed 60% (of
GDP) - Germany could not provide a single year of fulfilment after 2003 for many years. In 2010,
German debt hit the 80%-mark (peaking at around 81% in 2010), since then it was reduced to 68%
(2016), 61% in 2018 and is expected to fall below 60% in 2019 - a first year of fitting the threshold.
Therefore, the trend for last years can be considered as positive. It was also supported by a phase of
decreasing interest rates, which has led to a decline in the interest rate payments (Deutsche Bundesbank
(2017b, p. 36) and Deutsche Bundesbank (2019, p. 58*)).
The French trend, in comparison, is monotonously rising to values of almost 100% (2016: 96%).
For Italy, the same trend is exhibited, on a higher level, however. Italian debt has exceeded 130% GDP
over the last three years (2014-2016). Canada, UK and the US likewise were not able to reduce its
cumulative debt. Their values rise without a sign of reversal and improvement (2016: Canada at 92%,
UK at 98% and the US at 107%). Japanese debt is extraordinary but in a negative sense. Over nearly
three decades Japan has mounted up a significant amount of debt. Starting with a debt to GDP ratio
of around 66% in 1991, the cumulative public debt has nowadays peaked to 238% (2015)73.
How does a change in the trend of public debt affect an economy? The effect is twofold.
73No values were available for 2016 at the date of publishing.
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Firstly, increasing public debt limits potential policy measures in the future; directly as a potential
source of public income dries up and indirectly by increasing interest rate payments. The trend for
interest rate payments mainly depends on two factors: on the one hand the amount of public debt,
which has to be financed by loans and on the other hand the (average) interest rate, a country has to
pay (which itself results from aggregating the individual debt titles).
Even more, increasing public debt can worsen a country’s rating and lead to higher interest pay-
ments for loans on the international markets in the future - a scenario the so-called PIIGS74 faced in
the aftermath of the global financial crisis. So is the average interest rate (measured over a specific time
interval, which is relevant for calculating the interest rate payment costs) separated into a risk-free
real interest rate, and other components depending on run-time of the loan, inflation and (overall) risk
(Deutsche Bundesbank (2017b, p. 36)). The risk-premium then depends on the expected solvency of
a country, so that a higher debt-to-GDP ratio necessarily increases the average interest rate payment
costs. It offers potential for a (negative) coil or vicious circle, as interest rate payment costs and public
debt mutually influence each other. Currently, interest rate payment costs for Germany, as well as for
other member states of the European Currency Union, are on an all-time low for most of the countries
(Deutsche Bundesbank (2017b, p. 36)). It implies quite beneficial conditions for commencing further
loans (i.e. for investment purposes).
Besides the trend for public debt, average interest rate, as well as interest rate to GDP ratio, have
dropped significantly over the last three decades. The interest rate payment to GDP ratio is important
for the public budget, as it shows the costs for external financing. Despite positive developments in
terms of the total public debt, one has to be careful with a too positive outlook. An inversion of
the interest rate trend in the future would lead to significant problems for the German budget, as it
nowadays highly benefits from the low-level interest rate environment. At the beginning of the 1990s,
the average interest rate for Germany was at about 8%; it was then reduced to almost half at the
beginning of the 21st century (around 4.5% in 2005). Since then it steadily declined to values of only
2%, a development, which unburdens German policy and could (should) be seen as a major opportunity
for renewing the public capital stock (as discussed in chapter 8.5). The interest rate payment to GDP
74Countries experiencing major problems in course of the global financial crisis. The acronym consists of Portugal,
Ireland, Italy Greece and Spain.
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ratio shows a similar trend. Starting at values of about 3% in the 1990s, the amount of GDP, which
has to be used for loan payments was reduced to 1.5% and is expected to decrease further. Deutsche
Bundesbank (2017b, p. 40) expects the trend to continue until 2019 (ceteris paribus) and only slightly
increasing afterwards (2% in 2021 to be expected).
Secondly, decreasing public debt (usually) goes hand in hand with contractionary fiscal policy
actions - negative stimuli for the economy via the linkage of aggregate demand. Depending on the
channel and tools, the policy actions are executed (i.e. increased taxes or decreased government spend-
ing), contractionary fiscal policy reduces private consumption and investment. Negative developments
of the economy’s national product are inevitable (even further, there will be an absence of positive
multiplier-effects via the aggregate demand channel); additionally, technology development and diffu-
sion will suffer from lower investment, too.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010, p. 574) have set up debt-thresholds for countries and provide numbers
on debt for a time interval since the global financial crisis (up to 2010, when their study was pub-
lished). Whereas the German debt-to-GDP-ratio is 4%, Ireland (44%), Iceland (69%), Spain (42%),
UK (72%) and the United States (84%) perform significantly worse (debt-to-GDP ratio expressed as
the cumulative increase in real public debt in between 2007-2009).
It is persuasive to mark Germany better and rate its debt-headwind as rather weak. This, however,
only provides a little data window and should be treated with a serious amount of care, when discussing
long-run economic endowments. The authors define the debt-to-growth connection as “non-linear” and
compare war-related and peacetime-related debt occurrence. War-time-debt is usually related to excess
government activity and can be considered as “natural”, whereas “peace-time debt explosion (which
many economies suffer from) often reflects unstable political economy dynamics that can persist or
very long periods” (Reinhart and Rogoff (2010, p. 574)).
In order to explain the non-linear behaviour, the authors follow the argumentation and method of
Reinhart et al. (2003). They make use of data for more than two centuries and find an important debt-
to-GDP-threshold75. Any ratio over and above 90% leads to remarkably slower growth in economic
75This threshold is valid for emerging markets, as well as for advanced economies. Another threshold is found for
emerging markets (60%), causing adverse outcomes. As the focus of this dissertation is on developed countries, the focus
is on the 90%-threshold only.
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output. From this perspective, the authors provide another argument against the importance of the
debt-headwind for Germany. By overshooting the 90% debt-to-GDP ratio, GDP is (roughly) cut in half
in the future (Reinhart and Rogoff (2010, p. 573)). When debt ratios overshoot specific boundaries,
this results in an increase in the interest rate causing “painful fiscal adjustment[s] in the form of tax
hikes and spending cuts, or, in some cases, outright default” (Reinhart and Rogoff (2010, p. 574)).
The approach of Baum et al. (2013) argues in the same direction. Their empirical results state
that there is a positive short-run significance for public debt until a debt-to-GDP ratio of 67%. Any
further increase shows zero significance, whereas debt-ratios of above 95% provide negative stimuli of
additional debt (Baum et al. (2013, p. 17)).
Kaas (2014) focusses on the direct relationship between public debt and (total factor) productivity.
His model is set up for the US and separates for two effects from a change in the budget deficit.
A reduction (increase) of the budget deficit leads to an increase (decrease) of capital formation (via
lower (higher) interest rates and the resulting credit expansion (reduction)). If public budget deficit
decreases, the credit expansions will, on the one hand, provide a positive stimulus to economic growth
but will keep low productive companies in the market; the latter effect - which dominates the author’s
computation - then will lead to a reduction in overall (aggregate) productivity (Kaas (2014, p. 2)).
Compared to other benchmarks (G7-countries, member states of the European Currency Union)
Germany has performed better over the last decade. Even though public debt still misses the Maastricht
criterion, the German trend has improved. Supported by an era of historically low interest rates,
Germany was able to find a way back to a balanced budget - a goal, which has been particularly
stressed in politics76. From the headwind-perspective public debt should play a smaller role on the
productivity slowdown, as the average interest rate is expected to remain constant or just modestly
rising (Deutsche Bundesbank (2017b, p. 40)).
The less important role of public debt as headwind for German productivity trends is supported
by the evaluation of benchmark countries, which perform significantly worse (G7-countries, member
states of the European Currency Union). However, when concluding this sub-chapter, one has to keep
76In fact, former federal finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble successfully balanced German public budget in 2015 for
the first time since 1969 (http://www.die-schwarze-null.de/). There is large controversy about the costs and benefits of
these policy measures, however. Criticism often emphasizes on the contractionary moves, a budget consolidation goes
hand in hand with (i.e. less investment for infrastructure or the educational system).
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in mind that decreasing public deficit and debt is usually associated with contracting (and therefore
painful) fiscal policy actions77, which could falter economic growth and productivity in the future.
9.2.7 Inequality (headwind #6)
The distribution of income and wealth is not just a normative issue. Inequality and wealth concen-
tration provides potential for significant obstacles for economic development. In the course of the
global financial crisis and the publishing of Piketty’s (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century, the
discussion on income and wealth concentration has been renewed. It is argued, that a concentration
of wealth and income can hinder economic progress.
Economic inequality can be measured and expressed through various variables: there is labour
and capital income, wealth, wages or more general the questions whether measured per person, on a
household level, on annual base or regarding the entire life of a human being (i.e. see Battisti et al.
(2016) for a brief overview and data related to Germany).
A strict separation, however, seems inappropriate, as there is mutual dependency. Whereas the
accumulation of wealth is only possible if income flows deliver surplusses, higher income flows usually
are supported by a certain amount of wealth. Wealth in this context not only contains the financial
(asset) situation of an individual but also includes any kind of real asset and of course human capital.
The stock of skills and knowledge, accumulated over time, allows an individual to step on a higher
level of income, which then, in turn, results in higher wealth accumulation. Financial and real assets,
in turn, allow postponing income streams to the future. Mutual dependency of income and wealth
shows a reason and a necessity likewise for policy-makers - a reason for the self-reinforcing dynamics
of inequality and the need to establish a suitable tax system and other distributional tools by the gov-
ernment. Regarding recent developments (of the twenty-first century), discussions among economists,
politicians and the general society have occurred and determined the political agenda (i.e. Fratzscher
(2016), Peterson (2017), Atkinson (2015), Stiglitz (2013)).
When considering income inequality, Germany is ranked below OECD-average, showing higher
77Another possibility is to benefit from a general economic recovery and improving conditions of the economic envi-
ronment. Deutsche Bundesbank (2017b, 39) has stated, that the decrease of German debt after 2010 (up to 2017) is due
to business cycle recovery, large tax incomes, low interest rate payments and good labour market outlook.
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levels of income inequality. Market incomes in Germany (before any distributional effects) exhibit a
Gini of around 0.51 (2015), the OECD-average of just around 0.45 (2015) (OECD Statistics (2018a)).
Figure 34 shows the trends for the German market and disposable incomes, expressed as Gini
coefficients. The higher the value, the higher the degree of inequality. All values from 1990 to 2011 are
based on the old definition, whereas values from 2012 to 2015 [and any following, O.Z.] base on the new
income definition of the OECD: “Compared to previous terms of reference [the old OECD-definition,
O.Z.], these [new values] include a more detailed breakdown of current transfers received and paid by
households as well as a revised definition of household income, including the value of goods produced
for own consumption as an element of self-employed income.” (for additional information please see
OECD Statistics (2018a)).
Figure 34: (Gini Market Income and Disposable Income) 1990-2015. Source: OECD Statistics (2018a);
own illustration.
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After having experienced a sharp increase in inequality in the 1990s from 0.43 (1990) to 0.50 (2004)
for market incomes, the values have remained stable since then. Also, this trend is valid for disposable
incomes (0.26 to 0.29 for 1990-2004). Fratzscher (2016) acknowledges the developments and relates
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the discussion to the distribution policy of the government. Germany is among the countries with
the highest degree of inequality of market incomes but is very successful in decreasing the level due
to distribution policy. The necessity for high government activity is clearly subject to discussion but
definitely uncovers a dysfunctional income distribution (Fratzscher (2016, p. 585)).
It is also evident for a lack of a suitable framework of regulatory policy. Fratzscher (2016) claims five
parts in Germany to be re-shaped and re-organised: educational policy, family and gender policy, tax
system, labour market policy and private precaution - more precisely, these parts should be re-designed
and equipped with a higher degree of efficiency. It will then reduce the necessity for the government
to intervene so that the benefits of a more solid public budget and higher (social) equality could be
realised. From this point of view, (market) income inequality falters economic growth and productivity
via an indirect channel. The higher the financial burden of distributional policy, the lower the potential
for setting economic stimuli (i.e. investment in public goods). The “slower economic growth due to
efforts in reducing inequality”- argument is shared by Conard (2016) and Watson (2015).
In addition to the common measures of inequality as mentioned above, different socio-economic
positions have to be taken into account. Depending on the economy considered, there is a type of
inequality arising from different perceptions of gender, race or personal characteristics. This type of
inequality has been labelled as “existential” or “horizontal” inequality. When deriving implications
upon income dispersions, the issue of “horizontal” inequality has to be kept in mind for the sake of
completeness (Peterson (2017, p. 2 f.) quoting Therborn (2013)).
Besides internal inequality, which is inequality in an economy itself, there is external inequality,
which is an unequal distribution of incomes among countries. Both problems influence the domestic
level of inequality likewise. As the degree of global inequality is significantly larger than in any domestic
economy, its relevance for the inequality issue is even more important (Peterson (2017, p. 4) quoting
Milanovic (2011)). Global inequality determining paths of economic development can be linked to the
factor endowment of a country’s early state. Engerman and Sokoloff (1994; 2005) show that North
and South America, both equipped differently at their very beginnings, have then followed a process
of economic divergence.
For the purpose of this study, the effects of inequality on economic performance are of major
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importance. Peterson (2017, pp. 13-15) states that countries exhibit higher rates of productivity
if income inequality after taxes and transfers is low (disposable income). Stiglitz (2013) shares the
opinion by emphasizing the savings effect of the wealthy cohort. Two arguments are presented for
this channel. First, in relation to their income, wealthy people spend less money on consumption
implying lower levels of aggregate demand for the economy, compared to a situation of a more equal
distribution of income. Second, a more concentrated distribution might lead to economic inefficiencies
and instabilities due to increased lobbyism by politicians, benefitting high-income recipients (who
usually prefer less investment in public goods, i.e. infrastructure).
Another linkage is outlined by Ku and Salmon (2012), who emphasize a “discouragement effect”.
Workers being confronted with an unequal income distribution become discouraged. The implied
reduction in individual productivity then, in turn, leads to a reduction in aggregate productivity
and economic growth over time (and can translate inequality into a long-run phenomenon if - from
a behavioural perspective - no incentives are set to encourage workers improving their poor relative
position). Regarding work effort workers not only respond to absolute returns but also to relative
returns. According to Ku and Salmon (2012), individuals facing inequality on the job in terms of
lesser rewards, respond by less job work effort (Ku and Salmon (2012, p. 47)). A possible counter
effect (“encouragement effect”) - workers responding to inequality by working even harder - can be
denied, according to the authors’ study. The “discouragement”-linkage has been exposed by studies
before, varying in their explanatory power (i.e. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and the “fair wage effort
hypothesis”).
Brueckner and Lederman (2015) emphasize the circumstances for the inequality-productivity link-
age. More precisely, there is a difference in the result, depending on the level of development of an
economy. Brueckner and Lederman (2015) claim that for poor countries (low level of development)
higher levels of inequality can be beneficial. Their estimates are linked to the investment and invest-
ment in human capital channels but lack of causal explanation for the positive relationship of inequality
and productivity for poor economies (expressed as low GDP per capita).
Gordon’s main focus is on headwinds #3-6 (#1-2 have been counted to the demand-side and are
often associated with the reviving works of Larry Summers). Additionally, Gordon discusses globali-
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sation and the ecological environment as possible bottlenecks for further (productivity) development.
However, there is no explicit quantification of the effects “as the headwinds discussed above [demogra-
phy, debt, inequality and education, O.Z.] are sufficient to validate the pessimistic forecasts contained
in the 2012 paper” Gordon (2014, p. 15). Effects of globalisation are also channelled through the
inequality-headwind and hard to be considered isolated.
A last headwind, Gordon names without further elaboration, is the medical system in the United
States. There is a study for a hypothetical scenario of the US implementing a medical care system
as Canada possesses. It calculates a huge bulk of resources saved, which could be used otherwise (in
fact, $1 trn. is calculated by Cutler and Ly (2011) for this scenario) and additionally could raise life
expectancy (Gordon (2014, p. 15)).
9.2.8 Ecological Environment (headwind #7) and Globalisation (headwind #8)
In Gordon’s studies, ecological environment (“energy and environment” in the original classification in
Gordon (2012)), as well as the impact of globalisation, play a neglected role78 for the US growth path
explanation. Instead, the two amplify the other headwinds in a non-stand-alone fashion (Herzog-Stein
et al. (2017, p. 16)). For the present study, they shall be strived in short.
Globalisation
Globalisation in this context is mainly linked to the inequality headwind (#6) by the effects of outsourc-
ing and offshoring. Gordon finds a negative impact for the US-middle class. A loss in international
competitiveness due to a relative price-disadvantage has forced companies to shift their production
abroad, resulting in a loss of job opportunities. In addition, indirect effects79 shift the wage-level
downwards, implying lower standards of living for the middle-class, the primary target of the job-loss
scenario (Gordon (2012, p. 20)).
Also for Germany increased outsourcing-activities have been noted over time (Sachverständigenrat
zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2015, p. 293)), at least until 2009. A
78Neglected in this sense also means that the effects of globalisation seem inevitably for modern economies when the
gains from technological progress shall be realised; a headwind not subject to discussion (Gordon (2012, p. 20)).
79Factor price adaptions in the sense of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson factor-price equalization theorem due to the
import of cheap products from abroad instead of producing in the domestic economy (Gordon (2012, p. 19)).
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significant part of the increase in aggregate productivity was realised due to shifting abroad the rather
unproductive stages of the value creation process in the manufacturing industry. For the US and
Germany likewise, the degree of vertical integration in the manufacturing industry was at around
38%80 in 1991 and has decreased to around 31% (GER) and 34% (US). Currently, there is stagnation
in the US, whereas Germany has even experienced a slight increase in the level of vertical integration
(around 34% in 2014).
Outsourcing and the degree of vertical integration has a two-sided effect for an economy’s de-
velopment process. If companies shift unproductive jobs abroad this could, in turn, raise aggregate
productivity by getting rid of unproductive tasks in the statistics as well as by increasing the level of
labour division and specialization. On the other hand and with negative implications, a loss of job
opportunities not only raises probability of unemployment in the respective sectors, it also raises the
potential claims for social security actions, as well as the depressing effects on aggregate demand (see
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2015, pp. 291-298)
for a discussion about outsourcing-effects on Germany with regard to the manufacturing sector).
Nevertheless, an economy has to be prepared for outsourcing-activities in a sense of reintegrating
unemployed workers. It is necessary to provide possibilities of retraining and mobility - requirements for
the educational system (also discussed in #4). Compared to the US, Germany provides a more flexible
and better-equipped labour market policy, allowing better integration of unemployed (Herzog-Stein
et al. (2017, p. 16) quoting Bothfeld et al. (2012)).
With regard to the productivity linkage, Mann (1997) explores the relationship between effects
of globalisation and productivity in the United States and Germany by providing two channels, the
relation flows81 - effects from changes in demand and international competition. It is interesting to
note that the results for the two countries diverge. For the US the author finds a strong link between
globalisation and productivity, for Germany not. As a try for explanation, Mann (1997) suspects a
difference between “being global” and “going global” (Mann (1997, Abstract)). German exposure to
international trade seems to have changed less significantly in the covered time period.
80Levels of vertical integration are calculated as the fraction of gross value added in relation to the (total) value of
production (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2015, illustration p. 93)).
81Results and implications of this study have to be used with care as the time periods covered (1987-1995 for the US
and 1981-1994 for Germany) provide a rather calm period of productivity growth.
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Ecological Environment
Including “energy and environment” into the discussion reminds of the 1970s-discussion (chapter 9.1),
whereas the circumstances have changed a bit. Challenges and requirements for politics to include the
ecological sphere into the catalogue of macro goals have gained importance. Providing a vital ecological
sphere for the people health is crucial. Within the last years and decades, more legal requirements
have been introduced in many countries (Germany as a role model for this issue). Spendings for the
provision of a vital ecological environment is crucial for the inhabitants but burdens and limits the
government’s budget. A large portion of increasing debt (headwind #5) therefore can be associated
with environmental regulations (Herzog-Stein et al. (2017, p. 17)). Before setting appropriate policy
actions, it is crucial to correctly measure ecological aspects with regard to productivity growth, as
for national accounts, only market transactions are included. Moreover, conventional measurements
and evaluations do not contain ecological damages (i.e. depletion of natural resources); just the “value
of extracting or harvesting”(Forsund (2018, p. 287)). Including environmental concerns has brought
up attempts like the formation of an alternative welfare indicator “green national product” (Forsund
(2018, p. 291), who refers to Nyborg, K. and Aaheim, A. (1995)). As Forsund (2018) presents in his
study, relying on green national product or similar indicators allows for a more comprehensive view of
economic welfare, compared to standard national accounts. It is a matter of further research in this
field, not only to raise accuracy in productivity measurement but also to imply more suitable policy
actions.
It is, however, important to find the right balance for the amount of taxes and regulations. Rising
prices for energy decrease disposable income, therefore creating a negative stimulus for aggregate
demand. The cost argument is valid even more for the production-side. Taxes for ecological purposes
force entrepreneurs to increase prices (with additional implications for the consumption-side) as well
as to invest in modern technologies. Whereas the latter can be considered as beneficial for achieving
the ecology-goal, it can have depressing effects on economic growth (Herzog-Stein et al. (2017, p. 17)).
In addition to the intuitive discussion about the direct cost argument of ecological taxes and
requirements, Gordon provides another linkage. Neglecting the climate goals and requirements in
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the past has brought up more extreme climate conditions - an outcome, which could force insurance
agencies to increase their risk premia (Gordon (2012)). As a result, companies, as well as consumers,
could face additional limitations for their budgets and more uncertainty for future investment activities.
According to Bundesminsterium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit (2017, pp.
50 - 59) climate policy and the change of the ecological environment has and will have significant
effects for Germany in the near future. It provides potential for an increase of job opportunities
(around 430.000 new job opportunities are expected until 2020 - the potential job loss in other sectors
not taken into account, however).
As mentioned, globalisation and ecological environment seem to amplify other headwinds. By
doing so, investment in ecological sectors not only form a healthy environment, but they also create a
suitable business enviroment for the future (i.e. providing infrastructure for the efficient use of resources
allows companies to produce at lower costs and hereby make Germany attractive as a location for
production). Moreover, the current wave of technological change and the effects of digitalization have
introduced climate aspects into an entrepreneur’s calculation. It seems that international competition
is also dependent on the aspect of ecology. Modern and sustainable technologies not only allow for
an improvement of the ecological sphere, but they also contribute to aggregate productivity. I.e., the
possibility to work together via videoconferences reduces transaction costs (time and cost of travelling),
support a higher degree of work-life-balance (home offices) and reduce the impact of the ecological
footprint.
An internationally known and highly effective policy action is the opportunity for loans provided
by the KfW (a state-owned development bank82). These loans represent an investment aid for a
variety of projects (usually in the field of construction), provided at low costs in terms of interest
rate payments if ecological and sustainable standards are followed. In addition to the availability
of state-supported loans, German government actively promotes the implementation of sustainable
technologies, as described in the “digital agenda” (Bundesregierung (2017)) - and it seems they have
already been successful. As a fraction of the degree of vertical integration, sustainable technologies in
82In original, the KfW - Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (engl. Reconstruction Credit Institute) - was part of the
Marshall-Plan after WWII, aiming to support economic reconstruction in Germany. See <‌<https://www.kfw.de/KfW-
Konzern/%C3%9Cber-die-KfW/Identit%C3%A4t/Geschichte-der-KfW/KfW-Jahrzehnte/>‌> for further information.
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Germany make up 13%, for the rest of the world only 3% (Bundesminsterium für Umwelt, Naturschutz,
Bau und Reaktorsicherheit (2017)). Even though it seems to be an impressive number, “rest of the
world” is an imprecise benchmark for one of the most developed economies in the world so that its
evaluation has to used with care
9.3 Mismeasurement
“But part of the job of economics is weeding out errors. That is much harder than
making them, but also more fun.” (Robert Solow (1963))
9.3.1 General Notes on Mismeasurement
According to a recent study in the analysis of productivity trends, Byrne et al. (2016) have argued that
the declining growth in TFP and labour productivity cannot be traced to mismeasurement problems
in (IT-)service and -goods sectors, like many studies have suggested before (i.e. Brynjolfsson and
McAfee (2014); Mokyr (2014)). Byrne et al. (2016) do not find a significantly (growing) relationship
between IT (intensity) and economic performance in the US, an indicator for a potential source for
mismeasurement. Even in contrast, US-production of IT-products has shifted to places abroad, leading
to an even smaller impact of IT-production in US national accounts over the last years. Also, the
authors find similar patterns in IT even prior to the productivity slowdown - a weighty argument
against the theory of mismeasurement (Byrne et al. (2016, p. 2)).
Besides, Byrne et al. (2016) also reject the argument that modern technologies create additional
value for consumers, which does not appear in the statistics (see also Syverson (2016) for this aspect).
This and other general measurement problems cannot account for the large gap, the mismeasurement
hypothesis has to explain. Their effect is simply too small (Byrne et al. (2016, p. 48); the “too small”-
argument is also shared by Syverson (2016) and will be presented for the US and Germany in this
study).
According to Mokyr (2014) mismeasurement in the service and information sectors is a rather
natural fact. Productivity numbers and the ’traditional’ measurement in statistics (i.e. provided by
the Bureau of Labour Market Statistics (BLS) or the Statistisches Bundesamt)
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“are designed for a steel- and wheat-economy, not one in which information and data
are the most dynamic sector (sic!)” (Mokyr (2014, p. 88)).
It could indicate that there is mismeasurement but related to a poor and old-fashioned measurement
framework. If there is an “interplay between science and technology [which, O.Z.] creates a self-
reinforcing or ‘auto-catalytic’ process that seems unbounded.” Mokyr (2014, p. 87) but “economists
are trained to look at aggregate statistics like GDP per capita and its derivatives such as factor
productivity.” (Mokyr (2014, p. 88)), there is no real problem with poor productivity statistics in the
classical sense. As already stated in the previous chapter though, an indirect problem exists, when
policy-actions are based on wrong data.
However and even before any of these measurement problems were emphasized (they must have
existed earlier, as for example Griliches (1988) correctly states; the decade of the energy price problems
of the 1970s offers the vast bulk of research in this field), declining trends in productivity can be
identified, which were not able to be explained. As serious analyses of productivity slowdowns can be
traced back (at least) to the 1970s, the current era in economic history might work as a starting point
(or re-starting) for a discussion on measurement errors.
Falling numbers in productivity trends caused by measurement errors can be explained, at least
partly, by emphasizing the effect of better technologies on working and non-working activities, which
do not show up in the statistics. A phenomenon Robert Solow (1987) has already questioned many
years before. He once famously commented in a review article of Cohen and Zysman (1987) in The
New York Times in 1987: “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics”
(Solow (1987, p. 36)). A try for explanation has been met by Sichel (1997), emphasizing the small
impact factor83 of computers as part of the capital stock on economic growth and development - an
argument not tenable nowadays. Besides the “too-small” argument by Sichel (1997), David (1990)
argues on the base of a “diffusion-lag” explanation, so that there is a lag between the actual invention
and the time when the effects become visible (see chapter 9.2.1 for further details on this discussion).
Non-working activities’ utility, more precisely non-market activities’ utility, is derived from a com-
83More precisely, Sichel (1997) argues that the share of computer hardware in relation to the US economy’s capital
stock is too small. It seems highly doubtful, whether this explanation still holds for today.
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bination of market products, sold at a market price, and the ’investment’ of the consumer’s time (Byrne
et al. (2016) relating to Becker (1965)). These activities are not limited to the provision of a higher
degree of consumer benefits (i.e. gaining more benefit or utility from the same amount of leisure-time).
Availability of information almost everywhere and every time (i.e. due to modern information and
communication technology) make consumers use their living time more efficiently in general. This
also includes less waiting time for public transport, less time spending searching due to availability of
modern GPS-based services and many more.
When discussing welfare effects in the context of productivity numbers, the missing link towards
people’s utility has to be established and explored. National accounts and any GDP-related indicators,
however, do not provide information on the final utility of a person.
Cardarelli and Lusinyan (2015) argue in the same way in a study based on US-state level. Tremen-
dous effects of superior technology have improved efficiency of consumers, using their non-market time
to produce services they value. Modern communication via smartphones, to provide an example, has
shifted efficiency in data availability by years, more likely by decades. Information nowadays is avail-
able ’24/7’ and can be shared with others immediately. Business communication via email can be
executed whilst walking across the streets or riding public transport; saving up time which was spent
as “non-productive” prior to the modern communication age.
The authors also reject an ICT-service-productivity-pattern (declining numbers in productivity-
growth correlated to ICT-producing and ICT-using sectors). Not only do certain states in the US or
only specific sectors show poor TFP-developments84; it is also shown, that such effects are widespread
over the entire country. If the source of measurement errors were found in the ICT-industry, a statis-
tically robust relationship between labour productivity developments and the so-called ’ICT-intensity’
is required.
Syverson (2016) and the subsequent analysis on mismeasurement in this study tackles this propo-
sition and finally rejects it. No stable (and statistically significant) relationship between labour pro-
ductivity and the ICT-sector of an economy is identified. Even though there is the possibility of
measurement error patterns arising in many countries simultaneously (independently from their spe-
84Cardarelli and Lusinyan (2015) use multifactor-productivity (MFP/TFP) as a relevant measure for productivity.
For the purpose of the hypothesis and as trends of labour and MFP both decrease, the statement can be transferred.
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cific ICT-intensity), this makes the validity of the mismeasurement hypothesis less likely, however.
Cardarelli and Lusinyan (2015) argue that TFP-decline in the US indeed reflects a true loss of
efficiency and/or market dynamism over the last two decades. If ICT-impact were to account for
the missing portion in national accounts, then this pattern should appear in more countries. Their
conclusion draws a rather dark picture of the (US) economy, as declining efficiency is ultimately linked
to international competitiveness and finally less welfare for the US economy.
However, data and a bulk of studies show that there is no significant relationship between a coun-
tries’ ICT-sector and the decrease in productivity trends (see Syverson (2016), Cardarelli and Lusinyan
(2015), Byrne et al. (2016), Mas and Stehrer (2012), Connolly and Gustafsson (2013), Pessoa and
Van Reenen (2014) for example, who provide studies on the ICT- and productivity relationship in
other countries).
Syverson (2016) instead uses labour productivity as the relevant measure for productivity but also
dismisses mismeasurement as an explanation for the slowdown. Addressing to the mismeasurement-
hypothesis, the author provides four reasons (patterns) not to believe in mismeasurement causing
decreasing productivity in the statistics. As a side note on his study, he also shows that there is no
significant relationship between the size of an economy’s ICT-sector and productivity trends.
9.3.2 Price Effects, Real Values and Hedonic Price Indexes
Another category, offering potential for measurement errors, is price deflation of (nominal) variables in
national accounts. In order to set up indexes (i.e. the consumer price index (CPI)) various methods for
the calculation are available. Commonly, price indexes are set up according to a Laspeyres-, Paasche-
or Tornqvist-Index.
In order to calculate an index, the mathematical product of price and quantity is taken. Depending
on the base year chosen, the results vary - more precisely, the weights, which make up the quantity.
The Laspeyres-Index chooses the weights from a base period, whereas the Paasche-Index makes use of
the current period (Goodridge (2007)). The CPI calculated accordingly is:
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Laspeyres-Index:
CPIL =
∑
i PitQi0∑
i Pi0Qi0
(13)
Paasche-Index:
CPIP =
∑
i PitQit∑
i Pi0Qit
(14)
Both indexes take the sum of all products i = 1, ..., n (price P times quantity Q) of period 0 and t
(i.e. the price of the base period 0 is Pi0).
An alternative possibility is provided by so-called Tornqvist-Indexes, often used for long historic
time-series. The main property of the Tornqvist-Index is that its weights are calculated as averages
from the current and base period (Goodridge (2007, p. 56)). The respective Tornqvist-Index, which
is calculated geometrically instead of arithmetically then becomes:
Tornqvist-Index:
IT0t =
∏ Pit
Pi0
(
wit+wi0
2 )
(15)
with weight w expressed as wit = PitQit∑PitQit
Also, Tornqvist-Indexes avoid ’time-reversal’-problems and the allowance for the weights to change
(Goodridge (2007, p. 57)). A Tornqvist-Index also is not subject to the so-called “item substitution-
bias”. If, for example, prices for goods with a high weight increase and goods with a low weight remain
constant, a substitution in the consumer’s demand behaviour would lead to an overestimation (under-
estimation) of the price level, if a Laspeyres-Index (Paasche-Index) would be in use. Put differently, a
Tornqvist-Index restrains from changes in the consumption behaviour due to a change in the relative
price system (Neves and Sarmento (1997, p. 27)).
Price deflation of national products and implications on the change in prices regarding the standards
of living is then executed by converting nominal values into real values by making use of an index like
the CPI. Many goods and services, however, provide significant obstacles in the measurement process
(i.e. Griliches (1988, pp. 17-19), Fixler et al. (1999, p. 2)). In order to capture quality effects
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in the national accounts in an accurate way, an alternative measurement possibility is provided by
the so-called hedonic price indexes - more precisely by the hedonic correction for quality changes.
Put differently, hedonic price correction separates for the individual properties of a good and “view[s]
products as bundles of characteristics” (Baltas and Freeman (2001, p. 601)). A hedonic price index
(correction) therefore not only displays the actual change in the price level but also lays out the effects
arising from technological progress (Fixler et al. (1999, p. 3)).
One of the pioneering studies with regard to quality correction is provided by Chwelos (2000). The
author measures the change in costs of a computer by separating for its main properties (Chwelos (2000,
pp. 43-46), i.e. computer performance, compatibility, RAM or network connectivity). As properties
change and comparison over longer time horizon offers weaknesses, other studies (i.e. Nordhaus (2007))
focus on a single task of computing (in his study: computer performance) and its development over
time.
According to the Statistisches Bundesamt, it is crucial to correct for quality changes in price indices,
as otherwise, a liable interpretation of the prices is not possible (see Statistisches Bundesamt (2019c)
for an explanation of the construction of (consumer) price indexes). The method has a long-lasting
history, going back at least to the 1960s. Examples here include Griliches (1961) for an application of
the hedonic price method on automobiles, the study of Moulton (2001), the implementation of an entire
research area for hedonic price measurement at the Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
(ZEW) 85 or works even going back to the beginning of the 20th century (i.e. Waugh (1928)). Griliches
(1961) also emphasized the problem of changing properties of goods over time: “The common notion
of quality change relates to the fact that many commodities are changing over time and that often it is
impossible to construct appropriate pricing comparisons because the same varieties are not available
at different times and in different places.” (Griliches (1987, p. 4)).
After having dismantled a good into its properties or tasks, a regression analysis is executed in
order to measure the respective influence of the properties on the price. The result is a separation for
quality-induced price effects on the one hand and pure price effects (Linz and Eckert (2002)) on the
other hand. Please note that quality-induced price-effects also include the ’simple’ change (quality-
85<‌<https://www.zew.de/forschung/european-hedonic-centre/>‌>.
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neutral) of the good’s properties (in this context Fixler et al. (1999, p. 2) names it the ’new goods
problem’). A picturesque example of a change of the characteristics of a good over time and the
problem associated with the price measurement is given by Linz and Eckert (2002). Over time, air
conditioning in cars has become standard equipment. If prices of cars shall be measured, this can lead
to biased results, as before air conditioning was not an essential part of a car - it was an additional
one, subject to an ’extra-fee’.
Without correcting for the change of the properties, one would clearly compare heterogeneous
goods, implying false conclusions on prices (Linz and Eckert (2002, p. 859 f.)). In addition to the
description of changing products (or product properties), Fixler et al. (1999, p. 2) names three ways
how products can change and exhibit problems regarding quality measurement. Products can either
change regarding their characteristics (see the air condition example), new products can pop up and
provide the same functions but perform in another way or completely new products arrive, which fulfil
latent consumer needs (increasing the “value of variety” for a consumer).
For the purpose of the present study, hedonic price correction might offer potential for the missing
gap in output and therefore productivity. Real output values, representing the quantitative change
in the production, are obtained by deflating nominal values with a price index. If prices decrease or
grow slower, the results would show higher growth rates for real output values. Assuming that prices
for goods, which are subject to rapid technological change, are overestimated, this could account for
a missing portion in the productivity statistics (Linz and Eckert (2004, p. 688 f.)). Correcting for
(quality) changes is crucial, as from the consumer’s view they do matter for economic welfare and
would be underestimated otherwise. In addition, any price increase could be indicated as a rise in
quality if not corrected for the quality-effect (Statistisches Bundesamt (2013, p. 2)).
In line with the general argument of wrong measurement in national accounts, correction for quality-
effects can exhibit explanatory power for a missing gap in the productivity statistics. Statistisches
Bundesamt (2013), however, admits that the potential for Germany has to be considered as rather
small (i.e. around 0.1 percentage point for the consumer price index on yearly average for 2005-2010).
In the US, there has been an increase in national products; for Germany, however, also Linz and Eckert
(2004) do not expect significant changes.
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In Germany, the Statistisches Bundesamt has introduced hedonic price correction with the begin-
ning of the 21st century. Before, there have already existed similar methods to correct for quality
changes (i.e. the so-called Matched-Model-Index Method). For a comparison between the matched
model-index and the hedonic price index please see Kim and Reinsdorf (2015) and Chwelos (2000,
especially pp. 30-32). Matched model indexes do not use a hedonic form and only seem applicable,
when the price change of the goods in the market equal the price change of the goods leaving the
market (i.e. so-called “discontinued goods”, due to innovation), substituted by new goods, which have
not existed in the previous period (Chwelos (2000, p. 31)).
However and quoting Erickson and Pakes (2011), Kim and Reinsdorf (2015, p. 296) state that price
effects arising from technological or quality change tend to be higher than price effects arising from
product replacements. The former can be measured by Hedonic-Price-Indexes, the latter displayed by
matched model indexes. In contrast, other studies provide similar trends for both methods (i.e. see
Doms et al. (2003), who are in line with Chwelos (2000) and show that when the matched model index
faces low entries and exits - the relation between discontinued and new goods - , the results are similar
to hedonic measurement approaches). A central concern for hedonic price indexes is the (sometimes)
limited possibility to separate for the individual components of a product (Kim and Reinsdorf (2015,
p. 323)). Another possibility to account for a swap in products (when a product or item disappears)
is to take a substitute into account (Fixler et al. (1999, p. 5)). Substitutes have to be chosen with
care as they still might offer potential for over- or underestimation - they are a proxy to the original
good at best with regard to price measurement.
Currently, in Germany, the prices of a hand full of goods are corrected with the hedonic price index
method, including personal computers, printers, hard disks, notebooks, processors, RAM, servers, used
cars and residential properties (Statistisches Bundesamt (2013, p. 2)). The reason for inclusion is that
these goods show rapid changes (in technology or quality) over time. For the calculation of certain price
indexes, a specific fraction of goods then are subject to the adjustment for quality changes; depending
on the index, this fraction varies (i.e. the consumer price index only contains around 1% of corrected
goods, the housing price index in contrast contains 100%) (Statistisches Bundesamt (2013)). For the
US’ CPI currently there is hedonic price correction for apparel, televisions, computers and housing
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(Fixler et al. (1999, pp. 6-12)).
A study by Nordhaus (2007) provides a performance-based approach. Instead of focusing on the
components of a product, the study analyses the change in the tasks of goods. In order to separate
for the price- and property-changes of a good (property here represented by performance as measured
in computations of certain tasks per second), it would be an ideal method to have data for both.
Computer performance (the task and main object of the author’s study) could ideally be calculated
as a standard Tornqvist-Index with a bundle of (changing) tasks (i.e. mathematical addition, flight
simulation or internet access. See Nordhaus (2007, p. 135)) multiplied with their respective price
behaviour. It seems, however, not as a realistic project due to data shortcomings. Tasks change
over time so that instead the author measures “computer power as the number of times that a given
bundle of computations can be performed in a given time; and the cost of computation as the cost of
performing the benchmark tasks” (Nordhaus (2007, p. 135)). His purpose is to provide a time series
for computer performance over time for a long time horizon (from around 1850 to present)86.
The author finds an enormous increase in computer performance from manual calculating up to
present. Depending on the variable chosen, performance has increased by a factor of in between 2
mil. to 73 mil., so did average annual growth rates between 18% and 21%. The measures provided
are computer power (calculated in millions of computations per second (MCPS)), price per calculation
(MCPS in 2003-$) and labour cost of computation (MCPS per hour worked).
For the purpose of productivity analyses, especially the price per calculation, as well as the perfor-
mance index, seem important. Nordhaus (2007) finds an improvement in pure computer performance
over time. Especially after WWII there is a sharp increase. Total increase from 1850 to 2006 is at
around a factor of 2 trillion. For the cost per computation, a sharp decline is stated by a factor of
around 7 trillion. Improved computer performance and a decrease in prices (in relation to labour costs)
have not only led to a higher degree of computer utilisation; it also offers potential for a “correction”
of productivity statistics.
86In addition to shortcomings of his method compared to the ideal approach, Nordhaus (2007) also admits that the
missing incorporation of the change in complementary inputs is a problem due to being solved, as distortion in output
and productivity statistics might arise from the change of complementary inputs, too. The change in complementary
facilities has already been discussed in this section (see also Fixler et al. (1999) for further details).
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9.3.3 The Mismeasurement Approach of Syverson
Syverson (2016)87 explicitly asks for a general separation between ’real’ economic causes and a ’simple’
mismeasurement issue. His interpretation of the mismeasurement hypothesis is, that the gains from
new and better products (in the sense of technological progress) are not reflected in the productivity
statistics - however, these gains are present and create utility for the consumption side, for the person’s
utility respectively. More precisely, these gains are not reflected in prices, so that technologies, created
from 2004 onwards (almost anything related to ICT-innovations, such as social media, smartphones or
the general use of internet-services like Google) create utility for the user’s welfare, but are available at
(almost) zero costs (Syverson (2016, p. 2) and Mokyr (2014, p. 88)). If there is additional incremental
value, which is not reflected in the statistics, this must raise GDP and GDP per capita ceteris paribus.
The additional gains in output in Syverson’s analysis, which have to be explained by the mismea-
surement hypothesis, are represented and calculated by a so-called ’counterfactual’ scenario (YC ; the
amount of output ’lost’ due to the productivity slowdown). Syverson’s counterfactual scenario states
that $2.7 trn. of additional incremental value is not reflected in the statistics of the United States 88 -
the amount, that has to be explained by insufficient measurement. The author provides four challenges
(patterns), the validity of the hypothesis faces. In other words, four obstacles challenge the hypothesis
and raise doubts on its informative and explanatory content. Other studies support this amount of the
calculation of the counterfactual scenario (i.e. Byrne et al. (2016), who calculate $3 trn. in a similar
study). Syverson’s results also show, that although poor measurement cannot be ruled out, its impact
(the effect of the combined weight of all four patterns),
“makes clear, that the intuitive and plausible empirical case for the mismeasurement
hypothesis faces a higher bar in the data [in order to] to account for a substantial portion
of the measured output lost to the productivity slowdown” (Syverson (2016, p. 19)).
He concludes that even though measurement problems might exist, the shrinking numbers in the
87As already indicated, for the current study, the working paper version Syverson (2016) was used (published later as
Syverson (2017) with some minor modifications).
88In fact, Syverson (2016) creates a range of a minimum of $2.4 bn. and $3.5 trn., so that the $2.7 bn. are considered
as rather conservative and in a sense of in favour of the validity of the hypothesis.
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productivity statistics imply a ’real’ economic/productivity slowdown (Syverson (2016, p. 19 f.)) and
therefore shares the view of the “true loss in efficiency”-hypothesis (i.e. see Cardarelli and Lusinyan
(2015)).
The first out of the four patterns, Syverson’s mismeasurement-hypothesis faces, is referred to the
ICT-intensity of a country and a general country-by-country comparison. Information and communica-
tion technology (ICT), more precisely the ICT-intensity of a country, is often blamed for the majority
of a countries’ measurement problems, as services generally are subject to mismeasurement - compared
to ’physical’ goods of the manufacturing sector (i.e. see Hartwig and Krämer (2017)).
Following other studies (Syverson (2016) quotes Mas and Stehrer (2012) for Europe, Connolly and
Gustafsson (2013) for Australia, Pessoa and Van Reenen (2014) and Haskel et al. (2015) for the UK),
the author finds, that a slowdown has occurred in other countries as well (all of them having different
degrees of ICT-intensity). The possibility of measurement errors in all countries similarily exists, a
missing (strong) correlation between the ICT-intensity and amount of the slowdown makes is less likely
though (the author hereby follows the results of Cardarelli and Lusinyan (2015)). Connecting ICT
and productivity reminds of the discussion of the 1970s and the debate on whether declining R&D has
caused the 1970s-slowdown (i.e. see Griliches (1988, pp. 13-15) as well as chapter 9.2.1 of the present
study).
The second pattern is attributed to the consumer surplus of internet-linked technologies (consump-
tion side). By using broadband internet access as the relevant proxy, the author presents his calculation
in the course of other studies. They all have in common, that they contain additional utility from
’unpriced’ technologies (i.e. internet, social media platforms, Google). The results range from $17 bn.
(Greenstein and McDevitt (2009)) up to $132 bn. (Nevo et al. (2015)) of potential additional value,
which can be considered as ridiculously small compared to the missing gap of $2.7 trn. of US-American
output (as calculated in the counterfactual scenario and which is already very much in favour of the
validity of the mismeasurement-hypothesis).
Syverson (2016) himself follows an approach of Goolsbee and Klenow (2006), who evaluate the time
people spend online as their relevant indicator. By fixing leisure time with the average US-after-tax
wage of $21.90 they calculate the gap, the indicator has to close. The result is an amount of $842 bn.
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and still stands for roughly a third of what needs to be explained ($2.7 trn.).
The third pattern concerns the industries, which provide the incremental output related to ICT-
technologies (production side). More precisely, the amount of real value added (and revenues as second
potential calculation method) of these industries considered has to be a multiple times higher, if the
measurement hypothesis can be made responsible for the missing output in the productivity statistics.
In more detail, the author finds that the incremental real value added must be five times higher and
industry-wide productivity must have risen by 363% over around one decade (Syverson (2016, p. 3)).
A result the author correctly doubts on, as its values are simply too high to believe.
The fourth pattern compares time-series of gross domestic product (GDP) and gross domestic
income (GDI). A 0.4%-gap p.a. in relation to GDP has grown over the last two decades between the
two numbers (GDI outperforming GDP). If incomes have risen at a faster pace than products’ prices,
this could confirm the hypothesis of the ’products given away for a smaller price or even for free’-
argument (compared to the costs of production). In the context of the mismeasurement hypothesis,
it could suggest evidence that the growing gap between the two series reflects the missing data. The
author, however, rejects evidence in this case, too. By comparing the labour income share with gross
operating surplus, Syverson finds, that the GDI gains are not related to missing data but growing
capital income (reflecting a structural change in the national income situation in the US). All the four
patterns shall be explained in more detail in course of the evaluation of and application on the German
case.
Providing four reasons not to believe in mismeasurement, the author comes to the conclusion
that the declining numbers in the productivity statistics reflect a true economic problem and not a
measurement one. The drop in productivity then correctly represents a true loss in efficiency and/or
as a result of poor economic circumstances - a result in favour of real economic causes and hereby
promoting the importance of the “headwinds”-discussion of chapter 9.2.
In the remainder of this part, Syverson’s calculatory base and findings are accepted and applied on
Germany by connecting German data with the Syverson (2016)-study and its underlying measurement
methodology.
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10 Applying the Syverson - Approach on Germany
Syverson (2016) has delivered an analysis for the US, challenging the mismeasurement hypothesis and
the argument, that the current productivity slowdown is mainly illusory. This section applies his
calculations on Germany and therefore asks, if the developments in the German productivity statistics
can be traced to mismeasurement or whether other (real) explanations have to be considered.
In order to have the same (at least close to the same) conditions and assumptions as provided in
Syverson (2016), I make use of data from the Statistisches Bundesamt Germany89 and the OECD 90
for international comparisons for the same time-intervals, except the non-used post-WWII-intervals
from 1947 to 1994 due to a lack of availability. Also, any German data before 1991 has to be treated
by a certain amount of care. The German Reunification process has clearly led to structural changes in
the economy, implying potential biases in the statistics. A separation between the two intervals (1991-
2004 and 2005-2015) is taken, because an inflexion point in the growth process of global productivity
indicators is identified at the end of 2004 (Syverson (2016) quoting Byrne et al. (2013)). Applying
the same time intervals makes sense here to have the same conditions as in the base study (Syverson
(2016)).
In order to have the highest degree of independence in the data set, I make use of the original
values, not being subject to seasonal or business cycle adjustments (hereby following the Statistisches
Bundesamt, which admits, that any adjustment (might) distort(s) the original values and conceivably
biases the statistic’s message, i.e. see Statistisches Bundesamt (2015b, p. 15)). With regard to the
discussion on which denominator to take (8.2), I also make use of the per hour worked approach, in
order to adjust for potential changes in the average working day and other developments on the labour
markets. Also, and in contrast to Syverson, I use annual labour productivity data instead of quarterly
data due to better availability (data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2015c)).
89<‌<www.destatis.de>‌>
90<‌<http://stats.oecd.org/>‌>
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Calculating the Missing Output
Following the method of Syverson (2016), at first, the missing output of the German economy has to
be calculated. Hereby the following steps are executed:
1. Taking annual labour productivity growth for the calculation of the time intervals 1995-2004 and
2005 to 2015 from (Statistisches Bundesamt (2015c)).
2. Deriving the ’drop’ between the two intervals out of step 1.
3. Calculating the ’counterfactual’ output according to
Yc = Ya(1 ∗ drop)q (16)
where Yc represents counterfactual output, Ya represents actual output, q represents the number
of periods (here: years) used and ’drop’, which simply stands for the difference in average annual
labour productivity growth between the two intervals, as calculated in step 2.
4. Adjusting current annual GDP by the percentage value resulting from step 3.
5. The missing portion of output calculated in the previous four steps can then be interpreted as
aggregate value, as per capita value or on a household level.
Germany
The results for Germany are displayed in the illustration 10 for convenience, their calculations and
explanations can be found below.
Figure 35: Overview of missing output calculations for Germany
Per person
employed, whole
economy
Per person
employed,
producing sector
Per hour worked,
whole economy
Per hour worked,
producing sector
Drop in average annual
labour productivity [%]
-1.111 -0.7578 -0.71169 -0.89935
Missing output in 2015
[bn.€]
391.96 262.61 246.05 313.90
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Even the calculation variant in most favour of the validity of the mismeasurement hypothesis
calculates a missing portion of output of €246.05 bn. for Germany. In short, the calculations for the
measurement per person employed and per hour worked are provided - both variants calculated on the
base of the entire economy and on the production sector only.
I. Per Person Employed
1. Producing Sector For the interval 1991-2004 (Q4) the average annual growth rate of labour
productivity in the producing sector91, calculated as per person employed is 2.32143% and for the
interval 2005-2015 (Q4) it is 1.56363%. These values imply a drop of -0.7578% on average each year.
In the next step, I calculate the counterfactual output, which has to be explained by mismeasurement.
First, I derive the percentage of the lack in growth:
Yc = Ya(1.007578)
11 = Ya ∗ 1.08659⇒ 8.659%
By taking the actual annualized value of nominal GDP in 2015 and adjusting it by the percentage
value, this yields:
Yc = Ya ∗ 8.659% = €3032.82bn. ∗ 1.08659 = €3295.43bn.
The ’missing’ gap, therefore, is €262.61bn. (= €3295.43bn.−€3032.82bn. = Yc − Ya).
2. Whole Economy For the whole economy average annual labour productivity, measured as per
person employed, is 1.99286% (1991-2004) and 0.88182% (2005-2015), implying a drop of -1.11104%.
This yields a lack in the growth process of:
Yc = Ya(1.0111104)
11 = Ya ∗ 1.12924⇒ 12.924%
The missing output then is calculated in the same way as above:
Yc = Ya ∗ 12.924% = €3032.82bn. ∗ 1.12924 = €3424.78bn.
The ’missing’ gap then is €391.96bn. (= €3424.78bn.−€3032.82bn. = Yc − Ya).
91Producing sector excludes farming and services.
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II. Per Hour Worked
1. Producing sector As discussed above, the per hour worked approach usually is more robust
against developments on labour markets and shall be provided therefore, too.
For the interval 1991-2004 (Q4) the average annual growth rate of labour productivity, calculated
as per hour worked is 2.53571% and for the interval 2005-2015 (Q4) it is 1.63636%. These values imply
a drop of -0.89935% on average each year. In the next step, I calculate the counterfactual output,
which has to be explained by mismeasurement.
First, I derive the percentage of the lack in growth:
Yc = Ya(1.0089935)
11 = Ya ∗ 1.1035⇒ 10.35%
By taking the actual annualized value of nominal GDP in 2015 and adjusting it by the percentage
value, this yields:
Yc = Ya ∗ 10.35% = €3032.82bn. ∗ 1.1035 = €3346.72bn.
The ’missing’ gap then is €313.90bn. (= €3346.72bn.−€3032.82bn. = Yc − Ya).
2. Whole Economy For the whole economy, average annual labour productivity measured as
per hour worked is 1.25714% (1991-2004) and 0.54545% (2005-2015), implying an average drop of
-0.71169% per year. This yields a lack in the process:
Yc = Ya(1.0071169)
11 = Ya ∗ 1.08113⇒ 8.113%
The missing output then is calculated in the same way as above:
Yc = Ya ∗ 8.113% = €3032.82bn. ∗ 1.08113 = €3278.87bn.
The ’missing’ gap, therefore, is €246.05bn. (= €3278.87bn.−€3032.82bn. = Yc − Ya).
In 2015 Germany has consisted of 40 774 thsd. households (approx. 40.7 mil.) (Statistisches
Bundesamt (2017c)) and a population of around 82.2 million (Statistisches Bundesamt (2017c) Code:
12411-0001).
Before proceeding and discussing the gap in output, there is an important point to note. German
consumers have benefited from this missing output, which is not reflected in the data. The additional
value of missing output does not represent consumer surplus. GDP measures and values products
174
(and services) at their respective market prices. Consumer surplus is the willingness to pay for prices
above any market price. The ’lost’ or ’missing’ output, calculated by the comparison between the two
intervals does not capture additional consumer surplus. It measures the (possibly) missing benefit over
and above any market price + consumer surplus, not captured or included in any kind of calculation
Syverson (2016, p. 6).
Several results for the gap are likely as calculated above (see table 10). In favour of the plausibility
of the mismeasurement hypothesis, I use the lower bound of the results, implying a €246.05bn. gap
in 2015. This makes an additional value of €6034 per household and around €3000 per person (based
on the entire population) over and above market price and consumer surplus, the hypothesis needs to
explain. It is the “incremental and unmeasured value above and beyond any consumer surplus that
already existed in goods and services present in 2004 and was brought forward to 2015” (Syverson
(2016, p. 7)).
After having calculated the missing portion in output, the four obstacles (patterns) for the validity
of the mismeasurement hypothesis shall be checked for Germany.
10.1 Labour Productivity Drop and ICT-Intensity (Pattern 1)
For the first pattern, values of labour productivity and ICT-intensity of several countries are considered.
More precisely, it is examined whether there is a link (more precisely a correlation) between the
development in labour productivity and the dependency of a country’s national product on ICT.
Information and technology sectors are often blamed for poor measurement, as already discussed in
chapters 9.1 and 9. Even more, it is of popular opinion to believe that structural changes, leading to
a higher focus on services and modern technologies, represent a key challenge for measuring wealth
(i.e. see Mokyr (2014, p. 88), who asks for a more appropriate framework to quantify ’modern’
technologies and services; the ’classical’ framework, still used in the national accounts, infers problems
when it comes to the quantification of modern developments).
Nevertheless, and even by using the ’classical’ measurement framework, the relationship between
the trend in labour productivity and ICT-intensity can be set up. Making use of the same procedure
as in the base-study of Syverson (2016), I first take a look on the trend in labour productivity by
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using data from the OECD and indicators for the ICT-profile of an economy. Contrary to Syverson’s
study (24), I find 27 countries, which show a sufficient data set. The data set includes multiple years
of measured and reported labour productivity growth from 1991 onwards until 2015 and data for the
ICT-intensity of the respective countries considered. The extent, an economy is ’dependent’ on ICT
can either be measured and interpreted from the production- or consumption side.
Production-side measured ICT-intensity here is calculated as the share of the country’s value added
accounted for ICT-related industries, whereas consumption-side ICT-intensity is measured as the frac-
tion of a country’s households, equipped with broadband internet access (which is merely a proxy-
solution). Labour productivity in this scenario is measured as ratio of GDP per hour worked (in
constant prices). The magnitude of the (potential) slowdown of the countries then is measured as
provided above (see chapter 10), by calculating the ’drop’ between two intervals of time (1991-2004
vs. 2005-2015). It seems noteworthy, that for some countries data was not available for all the years
of the first interval (1991-2004). These (average) growth rates then base on less values but should not
distort the overall results (trends). A more detailed calculation and the respective data can be found
in appendix V.
Figure 36 depicts the result from the calculation for the consumption-side, figure 37 for the
production-side respectively.
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Figure 36: Labour Productivity vs. ICT-intensity (consumption-side). Source: OECD Database (2014,
2017); own calculations and illustration.
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Without going into detail, the first intuition from figure 36 is that a relationship between the
magnitude of the slowdown and their broadband coverage percentage does not exist. All 27 countries,
by the exception of Spain, show a drop in (average) labour productivity growth. Spain’s labour
productivity growth has risen from 0.8% (1991-2004) to 1.2% (2005-2015) on average each year. The
largest losses in this calculation are reported for Estonia (-3.2%), Norway (-2.8%) and Poland (-2.8%),
the most decent ones for Switzerland (-0.2%), Ireland (-0.4%) and Austria (-0.4%), and of course Spain
as an outlier. Note that Greece, commonly taken as an example for rather poor economic development
in the latest past (drop of -2.7%), was excluded from this calculation, as it lacks of data for the
production side.
Values for broadband coverage among the countries included in this sample range from 94.1%
(Korea) to 25.3% (Italy). Germany’s value was 49.6%. All values are from 2011 and might have
changed significantly meanwhile (i.e. as discussed in 10.2, in 2015 Germany has reported around 82%
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broadband penetration). Due to the problem of simultaneous availability of data for all countries and
years, 2011 was the only year possible to be taken as a reference scenario.
Covariance for the consumption-side measurement is -0.6097, the coefficient on correlation -0.0409.
As the covariance provides a statement on the direction between two variables’ relationship, the neg-
ative covariance indicates an inverse relationship between labour productivity drop and broadband
penetration and implies positive importance for labour productivity growth of a country. However
and a bit surprising, as the correlation coefficient is rather low, this indicates a weak relationship (an
interpretation in a sense of ’no relationship’ seems reasonable, too).
Figure 37 then provides data for the production-side measurement, with ICT as the share of a
country’s value added for ICT-related industries.
Figure 37: Labour Productivity vs. ICT-intensity (production-side). Source: OECD Database (2014);
OECD Statistics (2019); own calculations and illustration.
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For the production side a similar result can be obtained. No stable relationship is identified at
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first glance. The share of ICT in an economy (production-side), measured as value added in national
accounts, has a smaller standard deviation, however, compared to the share of households with broad-
band internet access (consumption-side), which implies less mean variation. Ireland (11.9%), Korea
(9.6%) and Japan (8.1%) can be considered as ’ITC-heavy’, whereas Norway (3.9%), Iceland (4.3%)
and Austria (3.8%) as rather ’ICT-light’. Germany provides a value of 5.1%. Covariance for the
production-side is -0.0141, correlation coefficient -0.0088. Like adopted for the consumption-side, also
the production-side analysis shows a negative covariance (inverse relationship between labour produc-
tivity drop and share of ICT, relative to the economy’s GDP). As the coefficient on correlation is also
close to zero, a relationship between the two variables can be rejected.
Pattern 1 works on the connection between the information and technology sector and the develop-
ment in labour productivity of several countries. If a relationship between the two variables exists, one
could argue in favour of the mismeasurement hypothesis, as ICT-sectors are often identified as having
issues providing correct measures in terms of national accounts. As there is no stable relationship,
however, (possible) poor measurement in these sectors are not the reason for the productivity slow-
down. No pattern could have been identified, making ICT-sectors unlikely as a source for potential
mismeasurement.
10.2 Consumer Surplus of the Internet (Pattern 2)
The second pattern concerns the large consumer surplus of the internet (or more broadly speaking:
the surplus of internet-linked technologies). It shares the belief that modern technologies require
(broadband) internet access to fully exploit their entire utility (i.e. Greenstein and McDevitt (2009),
Rosston et al. (2010), Goolsbee and Klenow (2006)). Broadband coverage works as an excellent proxy,
therefore. Unmeasured surplus for the consumption side hereby exceeds expenditures and might lead to
an understatement in the productivity statistics. In order to derive implications from this connection,
unmeasured surplus has to to be calculated or at least estimated.
179
Syverson (2016) follows the approach of Goolsbee and Klenow (2006), who take ’time people spend
online’ as the indicator for “full expenditure” (Syverson (2016, p. 11)) and define92:
Total Utility of a Good = Financial Expenditure + Consumption Time
Goolsbee and Klenow (2006) conclude that internet-related surplus now made visible could represent
around 3% of total income, creating additional $3000 per person. Total income per definition, in this
case, is the sum of disposable income and the (estimated) value of leisure time. Syverson exceeds
the ’value-of-time’-analysis (Syverson (2016, p. 12)) by evaluating and measuring leisure time more
accurately. A total of $86.300 of annual value of leisure time per person is calculated as average after
US tax wage in 2015, which is $21.90. Then times the daily non-working-related time according to the
American Time Use Survey93, which is 10.8h, multiplied by 365 days makes up average annual leisure
time per person.
Full income per person then is $42.100 (disposable income) plus the added value of leisure time
($86.300), resulting in $128.400. Broadly speaking, it is the amount, which captures and values the
living time for an average person in the United States in 2015. As assumed in Goolsbee and Klenow
(2006), a surplus of around 3% of full income can be traced to broadband internet access. Equivalently,
this is $3.850 per-person in 2015. In the last step, Syverson estimates the aggregate effect for the entire
economy by multiplying with population data.
Adjusting the calculation by 80% (for 2015; and 12% in 2004) due to broadband internet cover-
age/availability in the US, the author finds an incremental, additional surplus from internet-linked
technologies of around $990 bn. (2015) and $842 bn. in 2004 (less broadband coverage) for the entire
US economy. Compared to the missing gap/missing output calculated ($2.7 trn., Syverson (2016, pp.
4-6)) the additional surplus created by the internet only yields for around one third. Missing gains from
internet access cannot account for the entire explanatory power of the mismeasurement hypothesis.
Its impact is simply too small.
Applying the calculation on Germany yields similar results. In order to value leisure time, I also
92An extensive overview of various studies, dealing with the internet-linked technology-connection can be found in
Syverson (2016, 9-12).
93The American Time Use Survey (ATUS) is measured by the American Bureau of Labour Statistics
<‌<https://www.bls.gov/tus/>‌>.
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take the average after-tax wage for the entire economy94. The after-tax wage in my calculation is
defined as the sum of aggregate labour income (net value, after taxes) divided by the total volume of
working hours in Germany. To have a common base with Syverson, for 2004 an average after-tax wage
of €13.42 per hour and for 2015 of €16.60 per hour is the result. Note that the total volume worked
includes full-time-, part-time- and also side-jobs (see Statistisches Bundesamt (2015a) and Institut für
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (2016) for the data) - a definition, that clearly offers potential for
discussion.
To evaluate leisure time per person and year I apply the 10.8 hours, a person on average does not
spend working per day (Syverson (2016, p. 12)). It yields a value of leisure time of €52.900 per person
and year (2004) and respectively €65.400 per person and year in 201595.
Total income can then be defined in different ways, depending on which income the calculation is
related to. In national accounts, personal income is defined as the sum of labour income and capital
income. Disposable income is defined as personal income minus taxes (’after-tax income’). As I have
calculated leisure time by using the after-tax wage rate, I also make use of the after-tax variable when
it comes to income. Total income in Germany, as already indicated above (see the ’original’ calculation
by Syverson), the sum of disposable income and the value of leisure time per person is €70.400 (2004)
and €87.000 in 2015 (data for disposable income for Germany can be found in Statistisches Bundesamt
(2016)).
According to the data, Germany’s population in 2004 and 2015 has been 82.5 mil. and 82.2 mil.
respectively (Statistisches Bundesamt (2017c), Code: 12411-0001). Taking total income per-person, I
adjust it by the 3% ’impact factor’ of the internet (as estimated in Goolsbee and Klenow (2006) and
also used by Syverson (2016)) and multiply it by the number of inhabitants of the two years.
In a final step, the estimated broadband coverage has to be taken into account. In 2004 around
18% of households in Germany had access to broadband internet, according to the OECD Database
94Several aspects are noteworthy at this point. Average after-tax wages can either be calculated based on the entire
working volume or only based on full-time jobs only. It is possible to calculate after-tax wages based upon households,
so that the wage income has to be spread out on all persons living in the household or it can directly be linked to the
person, who brings in the workload. A calculation can also be based on producing sectors only, as services might offer
additional biases.
95Calculated as average after-tax wage per hour times 10.8 hours of leisure time per day times 365 days.
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(2017). In 2015 it was already 82% according to the Statistisches Bundesamt (2017a)96. As a final
result, I receive around €31 bn. in 2004 and around €176 bn. in 2015 of (potential) additional value
created by the internet, which does not show up in the statistics. The incremental gains result from
the difference between the two values (€176 bn. - €31 bn. = €145 bn.). All calculations for this
pattern can be found in appendix V.
Under the assumptions of having similar broadband coverages as in the US (even though there
might be larger differences, the overall statement would change only slightly) one can compare this
to the missing output (as shown in table 10). The scenario in most favour of the validity of the
mismeasurement hypothesis (around €246 bn.) is still not entirely explained by possibly hidden
incremental gains from the internet. In fact, the internet-hypothesis only explains around 59% of the
missing data (€145 bn. in relation to the missing output of €246 bn.).
Having in mind that the scenario was set up in favour of the mismeasurement hypothesis, one
is confronted with a disappointing result. Only 59% of the missing could be explained, which is
insufficiently small and therefore provides another argument to reject the mismeasurement hypothesis.
As Syverson finds for the US, German data also insist that real economic causes are responsible for
the productivity slowdown in Germany.
10.3 Incremental Real Value Added from ICT-industries (Pattern 3)
As for the third obstacle, Syverson analyses products and respective industries, associated with 2004-
technologies which could be associated with problems resulting from the migration of value added to
consumer surplus (Syverson (2016, p. 13)). More precisely, the author extracts data for real value
added (and for the second potential calculation method revenues97) of those industries, providing the
goods which are most likely of the character of underestimating consumer surplus.
Firstly, the relevant sectors at central concern for the mismeasurement hypothesis are defined.
Secondly, the growth in real value added of the industries within the period 2004-2015 is calculated.
96A combination of the two sources had to be used as the OECD does not provide data further than 2010 in this
category, nor does the Statistisches Bundesamt provide data going back before 2008.
97The present study focusses on the value-added calculation only.
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Real values for 2004 are expressed in 2015-$ in order to provide the same price base98. As a result,
Syverson (2016) receives $545 bn. in total for the change in real value added in these industries.
If the problem of (missing) migration from output to consumer surplus is to account for the gap in
productivity (and therefore in favour of the mismeasurement hypothesis), the incremental consumer
surplus has to be equal the missing portion of $2.7 trn. or at least close to it. Total change in real value
added of $545 bn., however, is just around 20% of the ’gap’ in the statistics and makes underestimated
growth in the ’problem’-industries very unlikely as potential explanation.
Data for the German calculation is taken via Eurostat from the Structural Business Statistics
database (SBS). The statistics describe the “structure, activity, competitiveness and performance of
economic activities within the business economy down to the detailed level of several hundred sectors”
(see Eurostat (2018b)). Applying the method from Syverson for this pattern forces to include the same
sectors like in his study. As the US and Germany make use of different sectoral classification systems,
this does not only provide the need for a comparison of the NAICS-classification system (used in the
US) and the NACE-classification system (used in Germany). In addition, the results of this calculation
have to be used with an extra amount of care. At first, I make a comparison for both systems in order
to filter the relevant sectors, which shall be included in the calculation. In original, Syverson includes
(Syverson (2016, p. 13)):
• computer and electronic products manufacturing (NAICS 334)
• the entire information sector (NAICS 51) and
• computer systems design and related services (NAICS 5415)
The comparison and resulting sectors (and sub-sectors) for the German analysis can be found in
appendix V. The relevant sectors used for the German calculation (according to NACE 2) are:
• for the manufacturing sector: reproduction of recorded media (18.20), manufacture of electronic
components (26.11), manufacture of loaded electronic boards (26.12), manufacture of computers
98Syverson approximates values for 2015 and for the price base 2015, as at the date of publication data was restricted
to 2014.
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and peripheral equipment (26.20), manufacture of communication equipment (26.30), manufac-
ture of consumer electronics (26.40), manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring,
testing and navigation (26.51), manufacture of watches and clocks (26.52), manufacture of irra-
diation, electromedical and electrotherapeutic equipment (26.60), manufacture of optical instru-
ments and photographic equipment (26.70), manufacture of other electrical equipment (27.90),
manufacture of railway locomotives and rolling stock (30.20), manufacture of air and spacecraft
and related machinery (30.30).
• for the service sector: book publishing (58.11), publishing of directories and mailing lists (58.12),
publishing of newspapers (58.13), publishing of journals and periodicals (58.14), other publish-
ing activities (58.19), publishing of computer games (58.21), other software publishing (58.29),
motion picture, video and television programme production activities (59.11), motion picture,
video and television programme post-production activities (59.12), motion picture, video and
television programme distribution activities (59.13), motion picture projection activities (59.14),
sound recording and music publishing activities (59.29), radio broadcasting (60.10), television
programming and broadcasting activities (60.20), wired telecommunications activities (61.10),
wireless telecommunications activities (61.20), satellite telecommunications activities (61.30),
other telecommunications activities (61.90), computer programming activities (62.01), computer
consultancy activities (62.02), computer facilities management activities (62.03), other informa-
tion technology and computer service activities (62.09), data processing, hosting and related
activities (63.11), web portals (63.12), news agency activities (63.91), other information service
activities n.e.c. (63.99), photographic activities (74.20),
• Sector 91.01 “library and archive activities” is not included in this calculation, as no data are
provided99. Its weight for aggregate value added in the sectors is limited and can be neglected
without concern.
In a next step, data from the SBS is taken (Eurostat (2019a) and Eurostat (2019b)), in order to
calculate value added for the sectors chosen. I aggregate value added for these sectors for the years
99Please see <‌<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Structural_business_statistics_overview>‌>
and the explanations on “Coverage, units and classifications” for further information.
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2015 and the 2004100. This results in nominal value added for the selected sectors. For the year 2004
it is €74.386,2 mil. and for the year 2015 the value is €102.592,6 mil.. In order to receive real value
added for the sectors, I make use of sectoral price-deflators (the alternative approach of the Syverson-
calculation, see Syverson (2016, p. 14 footnotes)). For the manufacturing sector, the calculation was
pretty straightforward. A sectoral deflator is available and real value added of the industries can be
constructed (Statistisches Bundesamt (2017c), Genesis Code: 61241 - 0001). GDP deflators for the
service sector are not provided back to 2004 by the Statistisches Bundesamt. In fact, data only for a
certain amount of services are available (Statistisches Bundesamt (2017c), Genesis Code: 61311-0003).
In order to calculate real values, I make use of an approximation by taking the unweighted average of all
service subsectors, providing data for 2004. The respective calculations can be found in the appendix
V. Expressed in 2015-€ this yields real value added for 2004 of €62.410,8 trn. and €102.592,6 trn.
for 2015, implying a change of €40.181,81 trn. for the selected sectors. Compared to the missing
portion (€246 bn.) this is around 16% and provides similar results and implications as for the US
by the Syverson-study (around 20%) - a result of minor value for the validity of the mismeasurement
hypothesis.
10.4 GDI versus GDP (Pattern 4)
The last pattern relates to the argument that there has been income created without respective output
or result in production (value). If products are sold at lower prices (compared to the costs of produc-
tion) or even given away for free, then aggregate income necessarily must outpace national product.
In theory, GDP and GDP are supposed to be equal, as they are connected by an identity. In prac-
tice, however, they diverge by a small amount - so-called statistical discrepancy101(Bartelsman and
Beaulieu (2004, p. 9)). For the US no significant trend of a growing gap was observable - even though
for most of the years, gross domestic income (GDI) was slightly larger than gross domestic product
(GDP) (Syverson (2016, pp. 16-18 and p. 26)).
100As data is missing for several years, I calculate the missing points by applying the average annual growth rates, as
Syverson did, too. The average annual growth rate for value added in the manufacturing sector from 2008-2015 was
2.783563546%. Please see the appendix V for further information.
101Statistical discrepany is explained by different methods of calculations. In this case data sources for expenditures
and incomes are used (Syverson (2016, p. 17)).
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As mentioned, one way of calculation and interpretation of GDP is that it is the aggregate value
of products and services produced in a specific period of time and within geographic boundaries
(expenditure approach). As production generates income, GDP can also be calculated via incomes
generated in the geographic boundaries (income approach, here: GDI). For the income calculation
not only labour and capital compensation are relevant but also taxes & subsidies (net taxes) and
depreciation (capital consumption), as well the balance of primary incomes with the rest of the world.
More precisely, the method for calculation is (Statistisches Bundesamt (2019e)):
NI (National Income= labour compensation + capital compensation)
Plus Balance of (+Taxes and −Subsidies)
Plus Depreciation
Plus Balance of Primary Incomes from (+) and to (−) the Rest of the World (here: PIRW)
Equals Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
For the calcluation, data is taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (2018c) and Statistisches Bundesamt
(2017c) (Code: 81000-0005). Results are presented table in appendix V. If incomes (GDP income
approach, here: GDI) exceed products’ values (GDP expenditure approach), this could indicate and
verify the hypothesis, that some part of the missing amount is embodied (and hidden) in products,
given away for a lower price or even for free. Syverson (2016), however, rejects the hypothesis as the
worker’s share has in fact fallen within the last decade (from around 55% to 53% for the US).
Figure 38 shows the trend for the gap between GDI and GDP for Germany.
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Figure 38: Gap GDI vs. GDP. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2018c, 2017c); own calculations and
illustration.
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For Germany, the potential gap (calculated as GDI minus GDP in relation to GDP) between
the income and expenditure approach (GDI vs. GDP; which reflects statistical discrepancy) can be
separated into two parts. In the 1990s, most of the years exhibit negative gaps, implying GDI being
larger than GDP. For the year 2003 and every subsequent one, however, GDP outperforms GDI, which
is very much against the supposition that products were given away for free. Moreover and like in
the US, labour share has decreased little from around 54% at the beginning of the 1990s to 49% in
2018. These two results (“wrong” prefix of the gap and the slightly declining labour share) indicate
that there is no wisdom in the hypothesis that products were given away for free.
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11 Concluding Remarks on Part III
At the beginning of part II, an empirical investigation with regard to productivity variables and
relatives was set up. It has been shown that Germany, as well as other developed economies, is
exposed to declining numbers of productivity. Several possibilities to capture the efficiency of the
production factor labour were outlined - all of them pointing into the same direction. Over the last
decades, Germany was not able to maintain its rates of productivity growth. Depending on the
denominator chosen, rates have decreased from around 3% to 5% to values of slightly below the 1%-
mark. The same applies for total factor productivity, which captures all production factors in use and
- as the first part of the present study has suggested - represents (at least approximately) technological
progress. Even though Germany has performed relatively better compared its fellow countries (i.e.
the US), its negative trend cannot relieve. As investment and productivity are linked to each other,
capital formation - with a specific focus on infrastructure - has been analysed. Negative trends for
productivity indicators, as well as for other economic variables (i.e. capital formation), are outlined.
They seem to confirm the fact that there is the necessity for a trend reversal. Even though it has
been argued correctly (i.e. by the Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung (2014)) that it is also a matter of defining appropriate benchmarks (or some kind of
optimal amount), these negative developments over the last decades are definitely faltering economic
development in Germany.
The empirical analysis represents the base for the further elaboration of the productivity puzzle
in Germany, as it argues in favour of the existence of real economic causes as potential explanation.
On the opposite, studies have claimed poor measurement for the loss in the statistics. Their central
argument is that if measurement is executed properly, then this can account for the missing portion
in the data sheets.
At first, a short revival (and some kind of recycle) of the arguments of the 1970s-slowdown has
been brought up. In course of the oil price shocks and other economic turmoils in the 1970s (and of
course its ramifications still working in the 1980s), there already has been an ongoing debate on the
causes of slowing rates of productivity growth. Interestingly, many of the arguments brought up then,
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still play a role for the current slowdown (i.e. insufficient capital formation or energy-price related
developments burdening the public budget).
On the basis of the so-called theory of secular stagnation, the “real” causes were examined, laying
the scope on Germany (and for the reason of comparison on the US). Applying Robert Gordon’s
classification as “headwinds faltering economic growth”, business development in Germany is analysed.
His main argument of simply having less (important) technological innovations nowadays and the
acceptance that it is some kind of natural rebound now, has been laid out - the major argument is not
set up country-specific, so it is presented without specific application on Germany. An insufficient level
of effective demand, usually associated with short-run business-cycle developments, plays a role - but
more in a sense of amplifying the other channels (headwinds). I.e., by the need of setting an expansive
stimulus for the level of demand, a government’s budget faces additional burdens. The evaluation
of the headwind of public debt then allows for argumentation in both directions. On the one hand,
the issue of public debt does not represent a strong headwind as, compared to other countries of the
European Currency Union, Germany provides deficit- and debt-ratios at the lower end of the scale.
However, it constantly shows years of missing the (legal) financial requirements, set by the Treaty of
Maastricht.
A headwind clearly providing explanatory power is the one with respect to capital spending and
infrastructure. Not only does Germany show decreasing trends of capital formation (especially for the
public sector), it is also exposed to an insufficiently equipped infrastructure (i.e. traffic, broadband
technologies). As the endowment with capital goods not only supplies the capacity in any sense, it
also delivers and diffuses technological change. Shrinking degrees of modernity for fixed capital assets
in Germany do not fit the image of an economy, which is ready for the developments in course of the
current wave of technological change.
The evaluation of headwind #3, the demographic one, is a little complicated. Germany has an
ageing and shrinking population and expects to diminish further, which limits the potential labour
market supply as well as the probability of finding high-quality employees in order to avoid mismatch
situations. In addition, the average working week in terms of hours has declined from almost 40 hours
per week in the 1980s, to 32 in 2016. One could be tempted to attest a negative impact. By taking
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overall working volume into account, which has remained (almost) constant over time, employment
must necessarily have gone up (from around 36 mil. in 1991 to around 41 mil. in 2017). It seems that
the demographic headwind is of big concern for the future of the German economy but works less as
an explanation for the declining trends of productivity over the last decades.
Headwind #4 concerns the educational system and its effects on human capital. Compared to
the US, a better non-academic system is provided in Germany, hereby functioning as complementary
rather than substitutional for education purposes. Germany was also able to catch up over the years
with regard to the requirements of secondary education (here represented by the PISA-testings). A
big advantage, one might speak of a tailwind instead, is the easy access to the academic system by
the meaning of student fees. Whereas the US limits its potential by excess financial needs, Germany
provides academic schooling almost at zero costs.
A headwind of major concern for Germany is the effect of rising inequality - expressed in terms
of income, wealth or any other variable. Studies and data show that Germany exhibits a high degree
of inequality. This not only amplifies other channels (headwinds) but itself represents a headwind by
providing unequal conditions for citizens and the danger of social imbalances.
Headwinds and the elaboration of “real” economic causes represents one major strand of explana-
tion. Potential mismeasurement of aggregate variables in national accounts represents the other one. A
first step into mismeasurement is made by pointing on the process of deflating. Prices generally do not
only contain a component that captures the true price effect, but another part of the price behaviour
is also related to the changing property of a good. Hedonic Price Indexes try to separate and correct
for these changing properties or tasks. The main hypothesis is that if the effect of changing properties
and qualities can be corrected for, the remaining (true) price effect is lower, implying a lower effect of
deflating nominal values. Higher real values could then fill the gap in productivity statistics. Besides
the fact that not all goods and services are corrected for quality by national accounts and the problem
of general problems in the measurement process, the effect seems too small to account for the missing
productivity.
In line with the “too small”-argument is the mismeasurement hypothesis of Chad Syverson. After
calculating a counterfactual scenario, which works under the premise of constant productivity growth
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rates over time, the author elaborates whether false mismeasurement can account for the missing gap
in productivity. More precisely, four obstacles hinder the validity of the mismeasurement hypothesis.
The obstacles are related to the problems of correct measurement of ICT-related data (sectors and
intensity), an underestimation of the benefits from the internet or the estimation of prices of goods
differing from production costs. For the US (Syverson-study) as well as for the application on Germany
(present study), it can be concluded that there is some wisdom in the argument of mismeasurement.
However, the amount, due to be explained ($2.7 trn. for the US and €246 bn. for Germany), is simply
too large.
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Part IV
General Conclusion
In course of a wave of technological progress, shrinking rates of productivity puzzle scientific research.
It seems illogical at first glance that - to speak with the famous words of Robert Solow - we can find
the ICT-age everywhere but in the statistics. As technological progress is the ultimate driver of welfare
of an economy, the productivity statistics provide puzzling results - if the fruits of innovations are not
in reach, this will imply a negative outlook for economic development. For an evaluation of potential
reasons for productivity puzzles, at first, the general linkage between technology and productivity has
to be examined. If all factors in production are measured regarding efficiency, the resulting variable
must be of technological taste.
In the first main part (part II), the present study elaborates on the variable commonly used to
represent technology, which is total factor productivity (TFP). Robert Solow once promoted the TFP-
residual as major source of explanation for US economic growth and labelled it as effects in technology.
It is discussed to what extent the residual actually describes technological effects. Moreover, the debate
on it has brought up three potential views on how to interpret the catch-all variable. Additionally, the
history and evolution of the corresponding measurement framework - the growth accounting approach
- has been presented. It allows to theoretically analyse the individual contributors to economic growth
and provides a possibility to take it over for empirical analyses.
In the subsequent main part (part III), at first, an empirical section is outlined in order to draw an
image on productivity trends - hereby laying the focus on Germany as the main object of the study.
In order to avoid structural changes at best, the starting point of the empirical section is set after
German Reunification 1989/90.
Labour productivity and TFP are presented in several ways, all of them showing a rather dark image
for Germany. This view is also shared by the outline of several other economic variables (i.e. labour
market dynamics or data on demographics). Summing up the empirical section allows for stating that
over the last (almost) three decades, Germany is subject to declining trends in productivity and is
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exposed to other negative developments (i.e. insufficient capital formation).
At the heart of the present study, there is the dichotomy of poor measurement and the existence
of real economic causes for the explanation of the decreasing rates of productivity, implying less
(significant) technological progress. By following the supply-side theory of secular stagnation by Robert
Gordon, the present study adopts Gordon’s concept for the evaluation of the real economic causes
argument. German (economic) environment is discussed under the notion and logic of headwinds
faltering economic development. Based on the empirical section, the relevance for the individual
headwinds for Germany is analysed. Whereas a minority of aspects provide fair marks for Germany,
most of the headwinds and respective components state that Germany is exposed to obstacles and
depressing effects for the economic and business environment. Rising inequality, ageing population
and insufficient capital formation (especially in the public sector) are a few examples.
For the second strand of explanation, potential mismeasurement is examined. Mainly by applying
a study of Chad Syverson on Germany, which asks for insufficient measurement ability of national
accounts. More precisely, it is asked whether the increasing importance of services and developments
in the ICT-sector provide potential sources of ’lost’ productivity. Explanatory power of the mismea-
surement would make the productivity puzzle illusory.
As a result for Germany, similar to the one by Syverson for the US, the present study’s calculations
find that the amount, the mismeasurement hypothesis has to explain, is simply too large. Acknowledg-
ing that the measurement system of national accounts seems not perfect for the recording of output
in the 21st century, it cannot function as a reason for ’the’ explanation of productivity puzzles in
Germany.
To put the results in a nutshell, real economic causes must offer the explanatory potential, as
mismeasurement is not able to do so. Though there does not exist one single reason, one could infer
the decreasing trend to - it seems that a combination or nexus of several aspects in the economic
environment in Germany play its role. And like the variety of potential reasons increases, so do policy
implications.
Unfortunately, there is no call for a single policy action. Many deficiencies in the economic envi-
ronment in Germany build the challenge to correctly identify the responsible aspects. In example, one
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could ask for higher amounts of investment, especially in digital infrastructure, supplying the prereq-
uisites for a successful implementation of the current wave of technological progress - the developments
in course of “economy 4.0” or “work 4.0”. Also, it seems important to apply labour market changes of
any type in order to prepare for ageing and shrinking population and labour supply side, therefore (i.e.
by promoting high-quality migration or a better financial payment of jobs in the health care sector).
Based on the study, it has been shown that inequality not only is a problem per se but enforces other
headwinds. Appropriate elements in the system of distributional politics have to be implemented,
supported by the perpetuation of the German social service system.
The variety of potential aspects faltering economic growth and productivity in Germany also calls
for further research in the respective fields. Moreover, neglected headwinds of globalisation and eco-
logical environment have to be taken into consideration as their relevance is still increasing.
In addition and as a general claim, there is the necessity to re-evaluate the system of measuring
economic output by national accounts. Even though there have been adaptions in the past to improve
its accuracy (i.e. Hedonic Price Indexes to correct for quality effects), it still seems to offer deficiencies
with regard to the increasing relevance of services as a fraction of national output.
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Part V
Appendix
Appendix A
Pattern 1, Germany
Figure 39: Broadband Coverage and ICT Value Added, Pattern 1 (Germany)). Sources: OECD
Database (2014); own illustration.
Broadband Coverage ICT Value Added 
Austria 46,10 Austria 3,80 
Belgium 56,40 Belgium 4,50 
Canada 64,20 Canada 5,10 
Czech Republic 28,1 Czech Republic 5,70 
Denmark 69,50 Denmark 5,20 
Estonia 47,60 Estonia 6,90 
Finland 62,90 Finland 6,40 
France 42,90 France 5,10 
Germany 49,60 Germany 5,10 
Hungary 33,00 Hungary 7,30 
Iceland 76,10 Iceland 4,30 
Ireland 31,20 Ireland 11,90 
Italy 25,30 Italy 4,90 
Japan 51,70 Japan 8,10 
Korea 94,10 Korea 9,60 
Luxembourg 57,80 Luxembourg 7,00 
Netherlands 73,80 Netherlands 5,10 
Norway 66,70 Norway 3,90 
Poland 29,60 Poland 4,10 
Portugal 30,40 Portugal 4,10 
Slovak Republic 26,50 Slovak Republic 5,90 
Slovenia 43,60 Slovenia 4,70 
Spain 39,20 Spain 4,60 
Sweden 66,60 Sweden 6,80 
Switzerland 63,00 Switzerland 7,40 
United Kingdom 56,70 United 7,40 
United States 50,80 United States 7,10 
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Data for labour productivity growth, annual changes, %, real GDP per hour worked was extracted
from OECD Statistics (2017).
Figure 40: Summary and Estimates, Pattern 1 (Germany)). Sources: OECD Database (2014); own
illustration.
ICT (cons.) ICT (prod.) 
1991-2004 2005-2015 drop 
Austria 1,6 1,2 -0,4 46,10 3,80 
Belgium 1,9 0,6 -1,3 56,40 4,50 
Canada 1,5 0,9 -0,6 64,2 5,10 
Czech Republic 3,4 2,1 -1,3 28,1 5,70 
Denmark 1,8 0,9 -0,9 69,50 5,20 
Estonia 5,8 2,6 -3,2 47,60 6,90 
Finland 2,9 0,5 -2,4 62,90 6,40 
France 1,9 0,8 -1,1 42,90 5,10 
Germany 2 0,9 -1,1 49,60 5,10 
Hungary 3,5 2,1 -1,4 33,00 7,30 
Iceland 2 1,3 -0,7 76,10 4,30 
Ireland 4,4 4 -0,4 31,20 11,90 
Italy 1,1 0,1 -1 25,30 4,90 
Japan 2 0,8 -1,2 51,70 8,10 
Korea 5,6 3,5 -2,1 94,10 9,60 
Luxembourg 1,6 0,4 -1,2 57,80 7,00 
Netherlands 1,3 0,7 -0,6 73,80 5,10 
Norway 2,7 -0,1 -2,8 66,70 3,9 
Poland 5,3 2,5 -2,8 29,60 4,10 
Portugal 1,7 1 -0,7 30,40 4,10 
Slovak Republic 5 2,9 -2,1 26,50 5,90 
Slovenia 3,9 1,6 -2,3 43,60 4,70 
Spain 0,8 1,2 0,4 39,20 4,60 
Sweden 2,6 0,9 -1,7 66,60 6,80 
Switzerland 1 0,8 -0,2 63,00 7,40 
United Kingdom 2,5 0,5 -2 56,70 7,40 
United States 2,1 1,1 -1 50,80 7,10 
Statistical Mean 2,66296296 1,32592593 -1,33703704 51,24 6,00 
Standard Deviation 1,45949099 1,02002737 0,87887522 17,6362421 1,88169318
Variance 2,13011396 1,04045584 0,77242165 311,037037 3,54076923
Correlation ICT-consumption and ICT-production 0,10879241 
Sample Size 27 27 27 27 27 
SqRo. Sample Size 5,19615242 5,19615242 5,19615242
Standard Error of the Mean 0,16913961 3,39409638 0,36213202
GDP per hour, constant prices 
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Appendix B
Pattern 2, Germany
1. Average after-tax wage per employee and month (Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2017c), Code:
81000-0007)
2004: €1.498
2015: €1.804
Multiplied with total population in the respective year (Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2019b))
yields total sum of wages:
2004: €628.51 bn.
2015: €834.56 bn.
Amount of hours worked (including full-time, part-time and self-emplyoyed):
2004: 46.817 (in mil. h)
2015: 50.393 (in mil. h)
Dividing sum of wages by amount of hours worked yields average wage per hour worked (hours
worked taken from Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (2016)):
2004: €628.51bn.46.817mil.h = 13.42
€
h
2015: €834.56bn.50.393mil.h = 16.60
€
h
2. Calculating average value of leisure-time per person:
Average leisure-time per person = average wage per hour worked x average amount of leisure time per
person and day x 365 days 102:
2004: 13.42€h x10.8h x 365 = €52.901
2015: 16.60€h x 10.8h x 365 = €65.437
3. Calculation of total income (income per person taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (2016)) :
Total income = average income per person + value of leisure time (rounded)
102The average amount of leisure time (10.8 hours per day on average) is taken over by Syverson (2016).
ix
2004: €17.500 + €52.900 = €70.400
2015: €21.600 + €54.437 = €87.000
4. Adjusting with the influence of the internet (3%-estimation taken from Goolsbee and Klenow
(2006)):
2004: Total income x 3% = €70.400 x 3% = €2.112 per person
2015: Total income x 3% = €87.000 x 3% = €2.610 per person
Multiplying with total population (rounded):
2004: €2.112 x 82.5 mil. = €174 bn.
2015: €2.610 x 82.2 mil. = €214 bn.
5. Adjusting by availability of broadband internet coverage (rounded):
2004: 18% broadband coverage ⇒€174 bn. x 18% = €31 bn.
2015: 82% broadband coverage ⇒€214 bn. x 82% = €176 bn.
⇒Difference (€176 bn. - €31 bn. = €145 bn.) yields potential increase of non-visible
consumer surplus.
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Appendix C
Pattern 3, Germany
Figure 41: Sectors included for Germany, Pattern 3 (NACE 2-classification)). Sources: Eurostat
(2018a); own illustration.
26.20 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 59.14 Motion picture projection activities
26.20 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 59.14 Motion picture projection activities
26.20 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 59.12 Motion picture, video and television programme post-production activities
26.20 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 59.12 Motion picture, video and television programme post-production activities
26.70 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 59.13 Motion picture, video and television programme distribution activities
26.30 Manufacture of communication equipment 59.20 Sound recording and music publishing activities
26.30 Manufacture of communication equipment 59.20 Sound recording and music publishing activities
26.51 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation 59.20 Sound recording and music publishing activities
30.30 Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery 59.20 Sound recording and music publishing activities
26.30 Manufacture of communication equipment 59.20 Sound recording and music publishing activities
26.51 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation 60.10 Radio broadcasting
27.90 Manufacture of other electrical equipment 61.20 Wireless telecommunications activities
30.20 Manufacture of railway locomotives and rolling stock 60.10 Radio broadcasting
26.40 Manufacture of consumer electronics 61.20 Wireless telecommunications activities
26.11 Manufacture of electronic components 60.20 Television programming and broadcasting activities
26.11 Manufacture of electronic components 61.20 Wireless telecommunications activities
26.11 Manufacture of electronic components 60.20 Television programming and broadcasting activities
26.11 Manufacture of electronic components 61.20 Wireless telecommunications activities
26.11 Manufacture of electronic components 61.10 Wired telecommunications activities
26.11 Manufacture of electronic components 61.30 Satellite telecommunications activities
26.11 Manufacture of electronic components 61.20 Wireless telecommunications activities
26.12 Manufacture of loaded electronic boards 61.30 Satellite telecommunications activities
26.11 Manufacture of electronic components 61.90 Other telecommunications activities
26.60 Manufacture of irradiation, electromedical and electrotherapeutic equipment 61.90 Other telecommunications activities
26.51 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation 61.90 Other telecommunications activities
26.51 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation 63.11 Data processing, hosting and related activities
26.51 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation 74.20 Photographic activities
26.51 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation 63.91 News agency activities
26.52 Manufacture of watches and clocks 91.01 Library and archives activities
26.51 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation 58.11 Book publishing
26.51 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation 58.12 Publishing of directories and mailing lists
26.60 Manufacture of irradiation, electromedical and electrotherapeutic equipment 58.13 Publishing of newspapers
26.52 Manufacture of watches and clocks 58.14 Publishing of journals and periodicals
26.51 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation 58.19 Other publishing activities
18.20 Reproduction of recorded media 58.21 Publishing of computer games
18.20 Reproduction of recorded media 58.29 Other software publishing
58.13 Publishing of newspapers 59.20 Sound recording and music publishing activities
58.14 Publishing of journals and periodicals 60.10 Radio broadcasting
58.11 Book publishing 60.20 Television programming and broadcasting activities
58.12 Publishing of directories and mailing lists 63.12 Web portals
58.19 Other publishing activities 63.99 Other information service activities n.e.c.
58.11 Book publishing 91.01 Library and archives activities
58.19 Other publishing activities 62.01 Computer programming activities
58.21 Publishing of computer games 62.02 Computer consultancy activities
58.29 Other software publishing 62.03 Computer facilities management activities
59.11 Motion picture, video and television programme production activities 62.09 Other information technology and computer service activities
59.13 Motion picture, video and television programme distribution activities
xi
Figure 42: Calculations, Pattern 3 (Germany)). Sources: Eurostat (2019a,b); own illustration.
Value Added in factor costs, expressed in Mil. € 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Manufacturing sectors 
(selection) 266,2 266,2 266,2 266,2 273,66 263,4 286,2 309,2 306,2 311,9 317,2 334,6 
Services sectors 
(selection) 74141,0 76419,9  79499,8 85027,3 91542,3 86458,3 89402,4 90411,7 91603,2 96911,8 102000,1 102258,0 
Sum (nominal) 74407,2 76671,9 79758,8 85293,5 91815,96 86721,7 89688,6 90720,9 91909,4 97223,7 102317,3 102592,6
GDP-deflator 
manufacturing 2004 = 84,2 (taken directly from GENESIS database, Code: 61241 - 0001) 2015 = 100 
GDP-deflator services 2004 = 83,9 (calculated indirectly as unweighted average of secors available for 2004, GENESIS database, Code: 6 1311-0003) 2015 = 100 
Manufacturing (real) 206,5 334,6 
Services (real) 62204,3 102258,0 
Sum (real) 62410,8 change (2004-2015): 40181,81 102592,6 
(= €40.18 trn.) 
Calculated via average annual growth rate extrapolation.
Real values are calculated as nominal values adjusted by GDP-deflator to obtain values expressed in 2015- €. 
Appendix D
Pattern 4, Germany
Figure 43: National Accounts Germany, Pattern 4 (in bn. €)). Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt
(2018c, 2017c); own calculation and illustration.
Labour
Compensation
Capital
Compensation
Taxes & Subsidies Depreciation Balance PIRW GDI (income) GDP (expenditure) GDI (income) minus
GDP (expenditure)
("GAP")
"GAP" in % of GDP
(expenditure)
Labour Share**
(Source / Digit) Digit 1.3 Digit 1.3 Digit 1.3 Digit 1.2 Code: 81000-0005 Own Calculation Digit 1.1 Own Calculation Own Calculation Own Calculation
1991 856,75 369,76 123,27 246,01 15,994 1611,79 1 579,80 31,99 2,024813268 53,15550184
1992 928,75 377,86 136,92 267,17 15,374 1726,07 1 695,32 30,75 1,813698889 53,80720806
1993 950,55 376,21 148,20 284,69 11,109 1770,77 1 748,55 22,22 1,270652827 53,68032402
1994 975,54 399,97 158,93 296,39 0,544 1831,38 1 830,29 1,09 0,059444132 53,26797635
1995 1 010,68 418,48 158,54 307,42 -3,755 1891,37 1 898,88 -7,51 -0,395496293 53,4365037
1996 1 019,83 429,18 160,45 315,09 -1,777 1922,77 1 926,32 -3,55 -0,184496864 53,03957944
1997 1 024,16 447,65 166,18 323,26 -5,842 1955,41 1 967,09 -11,68 -0,59397384 52,3757726
1998 1 045,82 455,37 172,44 331,16 -13,444 1991,34 2 018,23 -26,89 -1,332256482 52,51830173
1999 1 075,96 444,25 187,63 339,62 -17,429 2030,02 2 064,88 -34,86 -1,688136841 53,00213495
2000 1 117,39 437,51 193,16 354,35 -14,063 2088,35 2 116,48 -28,13 -1,328904596 53,50572748
2001 1 134,33 462,52 198,36 366,28 -18,359 2143,13 2 179,85 -36,72 -1,684427828 52,9285177
2002 1 141,86 464,80 201,58 374,57 -26,486 2156,32 2 209,29 -52,97 -2,397693377 52,95401699
2003 1 143,60 469,08 208,63 378,71 -20,06 2179,96 2 220,08 -40,12 -1,807142085 52,4597699
2004 1 146,15 546,39 208,14 385,90 15,956 2302,53 2 270,62 31,91 1,405431116 49,77767953
2005 1 144,02 572,83 211,65 392,81 20,439 2341,74 2 300,86 40,88 1,776640039 48,8532449
2006 1 164,38 646,75 220,54 402,82 41,225 2475,70 2 393,25 82,45 3,445106027 47,03215252
2007 1 197,19 685,13 244,85 423,03 36,966 2587,16 2 513,23 73,93 2,941712458 46,27414132
2008 1 241,65 655,26 249,23 440,30 24,703 2611,15 2 561,74 49,41 1,928611022 47,55176463
2009 1 246,67 574,87 243,22 450,79 55,275 2570,83 2 460,28 110,55 4,493390996 48,49305477
2010 1 283,81 639,41 247,95 459,73 50,832 2681,72 2 580,06 101,66 3,94037348 47,87237613
2011 1 339,73 688,36 267,71 475,54 68,213 2839,55 2 703,12 136,43 5,046982746 47,18102823
2012 1 391,20 663,34 276,12 492,28 64,687 2887,63 2 758,26 129,37 4,690420773 48,17798932
2013 1 429,92 674,04 279,98 506,19 63,897 2954,03 2 826,24 127,79 4,521696671 48,40557015
2014 1 485,44 701,71 288,08 520,85 57,487 3053,56 2 938,59 114,97 3,912556702 48,6460084
2015 1 542,90 736,89 298,49 536,36 65,773 3180,41 3 048,86 131,55 4,314596275 48,51270561
2016 1 600,98 762,75 306,61 552,08 62,655 3285,06 3 159,75 125,31 3,965820081 48,73503071
2017 1 668,81 787,58 316,76 573,13 68,942 3415,22 3 277,34 137,88 4,207192418 48,86385198
2018 1 746,04 785,30 327,00 600,04 72,382 3530,76 3 386,00 144,76 4,275369167 49,45221487
*PIRW = Primary Incomes with the Rest of the World.
**Calculated as labour compensation in relation to GDI.
xii
Appendix E
PISA data
Figure 44: PISA, category: Mathematics. Sources: OECD (2018); own illustration.
1 Finland 544 Finland 548 Korea 546 Korea 554 Japan 532 
2 Korea 542 Korea 547 Finland 541 Japan 536 Korea 524 
3 Netherlands 538 Netherlands 531 Switzerland 534 Switzerland 531 Switzerland 521 
4 Japan 534 Switzerland 530 Japan 529 Netherlands 523 Estonia 520 
5 Canada 532 Canada 527 Canada 527 Estonia 521 Canada 516 
6 Belgium 529 Japan 523 Netherlands 526 Finland 519 Netherlands 512 
7 Switzerland 527 New Zealand 522 New Zealand 519 Canada 518 Denmark 511 
8 Australia 524 Belgium 520 Belgium 515 Poland 518 Finland 511 
9 New Zealand 523 Australia 520 Australia 514 Belgium 515 Slovenia 510 
10 Czech Republic 516 Estonia 515 Germany 513 Germany 514 Belgium 507 
11 Iceland 515 Denmark 513 Estonia 512 Austria 506 Germany 506 
12 Denmark 514 Czech Republic 510 Iceland 507 Australia 504 Poland 504 
13 France 511 Iceland 506 Denmark 503 Ireland 501 Ireland 504 
14 Sweden 509 Austria 505 Slovenia 501 Slovenia 501 Norway 502 
15 United Kingdom 508 Slovenia 504 Norway 498 Denmark 500 Austria 497 
16 Austria 506 Germany 504 France 497 New Zealand 500 New Zealand 495 
17 Germany 503 Sweden 502 Slovak Republic 497 Czech Republic 499 Sweden 494 
18 Ireland 503 Ireland 501 Austria 496 France 495 Australia 494 
19 Slovak Republic 498 France 496 Poland 495 United Kingdom 494 France 493 
20 Norway 495 United Kingdom 495 Sweden 494 Iceland 493 United Kingdom 492 
21 Luxembourg 493 Poland 495 Czech Republic 493 Latvia 491 Czech Republic 492 
22 Poland 490 Slovak Republic 492 United Kingdom 492 Luxembourg 490 Portugal 492 
23 Hungary 490 Hungary 491 Hungary 490 Norway 489 Italy 490 
24 Spain 485 Luxembourg 490 Luxembourg 489 Portugal 487 Iceland 488 
25 Latvia 483 Norway 490 United States 487 Italy 485 Spain 486 
26 United States 483 Latvia 486 Ireland 487 Spain 484 Luxembourg 486 
27 Portugal 466 Spain 480 Portugal 487 Slovak Republic 482 Latvia 482 
28 Italy 466 United States 474 Spain 483 United States 481 Hungary 477 
29 Greece 445 Portugal 466 Italy 483 Sweden 478 Slovak Republic 475 
30 Turkey 423 Italy 462 Latvia 482 Hungary 477 Israel 470 
31 Mexico 385 Greece 459 Greece 466 Israel 466 United States 470 
32 Israel 442 Israel 447 Greece 453 Greece 454 
33 Turkey 424 Turkey 445 Turkey 448 Chile 423 
34 Chile 411 Chile 421 Chile 423 Turkey 420 
35 Mexico 406 Mexico 419 Mexico 413 Mexico 408 
2003: For Chile, Israel, Estonia, Slovenia no data available. 
Ranking 2003 Ranking 2006 Ranking 2009 Ranking 2012 Ranking 2015
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Figure 45: PISA, category: Reading. Sources: OECD (2018); own illustration.
1 Finland 546 Finland 543 Korea 556 Korea 539 Japan 538 Canada 527 
2 Canada 534 Korea 534 Finland 547 Finland 536 Korea 536 Finland 526 
3 New Zealand 529 Canada 528 Canada 527 Canada 524 Finland 524 Ireland 521 
4 Australia 528 Australia 525 New Zealand 521 New Zealand 521 Ireland 523 Estonia 519 
5 Ireland 527 New Zealand 522 Ireland 517 Japan 520 Canada 523 Korea 517 
6 Korea 525 Ireland 515 Australia 513 Australia 515 Poland 518 Japan 516 
7 United Kingdom 523 Sweden 514 Poland 508 Netherlands 508 Estonia 516 Norway 513 
8 Japan 522 Netherlands 513 Sweden 507 Belgium 506 New Zealand 512 New Zealand 509 
9 Sweden 516 United Kingdom 507 Netherlands 507 Norway 503 Australia 512 Germany 509 
10 Belgium 507 Belgium 507 Belgium 501 Estonia 501 Netherlands 511 Poland 506 
11 Iceland 507 Norway 500 Estonia 501 Switzerland 501 Switzerland 509 Slovenia 505 
12 Norway 505 Switzerland 499 Switzerland 499 Poland 500 Belgium 509 Netherlands 503 
13 France 505 Japan 498 Japan 498 Iceland 500 Germany 508 Australia 503 
14 United States 504 Poland 497 United Kingdom 495 United States 500 France 505 Sweden 500 
15 Denmark 497 France 496 Germany 495 Sweden 497 Norway 504 Denmark 500 
16 Switzerland 494 United States 495 Denmark 494 Germany 497 United Kingdom 499 France 499 
17 Spain 493 Denmark 492 Slovenia 494 Ireland 496 United States 498 Belgium 499 
18 Austria 492 Iceland 492 Austria 490 France 496 Denmark 496 Portugal 498 
19 Czech Republic 492 Germany 491 France 488 Denmark 495 Czech Republic 493 United Kingdom 498 
20 Italy 487 Austria 491 Iceland 484 United Kingdom 494 Italy 490 United States 497 
21 Germany 484 Latvia 491 Norway 484 Hungary 494 Austria 490 Spain 496 
22 Hungary 480 Czech Republic 489 Czech Republic 483 Portugal 489 Latvia 489 Switzerland 492 
23 Poland 479 Hungary 482 Hungary 482 Italy 486 Hungary 488 Latvia 488 
24 Greece 474 Spain 481 Latvia 479 Latvia 484 Spain 488 Czech Republic 487 
25 Portugal 470 Luxembourg 479 Luxembourg 479 Slovenia 483 Luxembourg 488 Austria 485 
26 Latvia 458 Portugal 478 Portugal 472 Greece 483 Portugal 488 Italy 485 
27 Israel 452 Italy 476 Italy 469 Spain 481 Israel 486 Iceland 482 
28 Luxembourg 441 Greece 472 Slovak Republic 466 Czech Republic 478 Sweden 483 Luxembourg 481 
29 Mexico 422 Slovak Republic 469 Spain 461 Slovak Republic 477 Iceland 483 Israel 479 
30 Chile 410 Turkey 441 Greece 460 Israel 474 Slovenia 481 Hungary 470 
31 Mexico 400 Turkey 447 Luxembourg 472 Greece 477 Greece 467 
32 Chile 442 Austria 470 Turkey 475 Chile 459 
33 Israel 439 Turkey 464 Slovak Republic 463 Slovak Republic 453 
34 Mexico 410 Chile 449 Chile 441 Turkey 428 
35 Mexico 425 Mexico 424 Mexico 423 
2000: For Estonia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey and Netherlands no data available. 
2003: For Chile, Slovenia, Estonia, Israel no data available. 
Ranking 2015Ranking 2000 Ranking 2003 Ranking 2006 Ranking 2009 Ranking 2012
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Figure 46: PISA, category: Overall Science. Sources: OECD (2018); own illustration.
1 Finland 563 Finland 554 Japan 547 Japan 538 
2 Canada 534 Japan 539 Finland 545 Estonia 534 
3 Estonia 531 Korea 538 Estonia 541 Finland 531 
4 Japan 531 New Zealand 532 Korea 538 Canada 528 
5 New Zealand 530 Canada 529 Poland 526 Korea 516 
6 Australia 527 Estonia 528 Canada 525 New Zealand 513 
7 Netherlands 525 Australia 527 Germany 524 Slovenia 513 
8 Korea 522 Netherlands 522 Netherlands 522 Australia 510 
9 Slovenia 519 Germany 520 Ireland 522 United Kingdom 509 
10 Germany 516 Switzerland 517 Australia 521 Germany 509 
11 United Kingdom 515 United Kingdom 514 New Zealand 516 Netherlands 509 
12 Czech Republic 513 Slovenia 512 Switzerland 515 Switzerland 506 
13 Switzerland 512 Poland 508 Slovenia 514 Ireland 503 
14 Austria 511 Ireland 508 United Kingdom 514 Belgium 502 
15 Belgium 510 Belgium 507 Czech Republic 508 Denmark 502 
16 Ireland 508 Hungary 503 Austria 506 Poland 501 
17 Hungary 504 United States 502 Belgium 505 Portugal 501 
18 Sweden 503 Czech Republic 500 Latvia 502 Norway 498 
19 Poland 498 Norway 500 France 499 United States 496 
20 Denmark 496 Denmark 499 Denmark 498 Austria 495 
21 France 495 France 498 United States 497 France 495 
22 Iceland 491 Iceland 496 Spain 496 Sweden 493 
23 Latvia 490 Sweden 495 Norway 495 Czech Republic 493 
24 United States 489 Austria 494 Hungary 494 Spain 493 
25 Slovak Republic 488 Latvia 494 Italy 494 Latvia 490 
26 Spain 488 Portugal 493 Luxembourg 491 Luxembourg 483 
27 Norway 487 Slovak Republic 490 Portugal 489 Italy 481 
28 Luxembourg 486 Italy 489 Sweden 485 Hungary 477 
29 Italy 475 Spain 488 Iceland 478 Iceland 473 
30 Portugal 474 Luxembourg 484 Slovak Republic 471 Israel 467 
31 Greece 473 Greece 470 Israel 470 Slovak Republic 461 
32 Israel 454 Israel 455 Greece 467 Greece 455 
33 Chile 438 Turkey 454 Turkey 463 Chile 447 
34 Turkey 424 Chile 447 Chile 445 Turkey 425 
35 Mexico 410 Mexico 416 Mexico 415 Mexico 416 
Ranking 2006 Ranking 2009 Ranking 2012 Ranking 2015
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